Opinion
B330118
04-19-2024
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent, TONY RIOS, Real Party in Interest.
George Gascon, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Tracey Whitney, Deputy District Attorney, and Byron L. Beck, Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Ricardo D. Garcia, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Albert J. Menaster, Head Deputy Public Defender, Marisa Gallegos and Lara Kislinger, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Original Proceeding; petition for writ of mandate. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Nos. ZM077517 & GA113698 Ronald O. Kaye, Judge. Petition denied.
George Gascon, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Tracey Whitney, Deputy District Attorney, and Byron L. Beck, Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ricardo D. Garcia, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Albert J. Menaster, Head Deputy Public Defender, Marisa Gallegos and Lara Kislinger, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.
LEE, J. [*]
Defendant Tony Rios is charged with one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245 (a)(4). The felony complaint alleges multiple circumstances in aggravation, among them that the victim was particularly vulnerable and the defendant has suffered prior convictions and juvenile adjudications that are numerous and of increasing seriousness. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) &(b)(2).)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On January 17, 2023, defendant was found mentally incompetent to stand trial by the Los Angeles Superior Court's mental health division (the mental health court), placed on psychotropic medications, and committed to the Department of Mental Health.
Under section 1370, subdivision (c)(1), a defendant found incompetent to stand trial may be committed for a maximum of two years or "a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or complaint, . . . whichever is shorter." The punishment for the only crime charged in this case - assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury - is two, three, or four years. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) Accordingly, the mental health court set the maximum commitment term at two years, to end on February 9, 2025.
Subsequently, defendant moved to adjust the maximum commitment date, arguing the "maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious offense charged" should be pegged to the midterm sentence of three years, and not to the upper-term sentence of four years, because new law effective January 1, 2022 permits the court to impose an upper-term sentence only where "there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial." (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) As such, defendant argued, the presumptive "maximum term of imprisonment" for any charged offense is the midterm sentence. He also argued he is entitled to 50 percent conduct credit for time spent in commitment with the Department of Mental Health. To hold otherwise, he urged, would violate equal protection principles because section 4019, subdivision (a)(8) makes such credits available to defendants who are declared incompetent to stand trial, restored to competency, convicted, and sentenced. The mental health court agreed with defendant on both issues and on May 10, 2023, granted defendant's motion to adjust his maximum commitment date to June 21, 2024.
The People filed this writ petition on July 10, 2023, challenging the decision to adjust the maximum commitment date downward. Just two days later, on July 12, 2023, defendant was found competent to stand trial.
On August 17, 2023, we issued an order to show cause and directed defendant to file a return that addresses, in addition to the merits of the issues raised by the petition, whether this court should exercise its discretion to decide the issues now that they have been rendered moot. We now deny the petition as moot.
We recognize we have discretion to decide a moot issue that presents an issue of public importance and is capable of repetition yet evading review (see, e.g., People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 883), but we are unconvinced this issue will evade review. Moreover, the mental health court's equal protection analysis is now outdated in light of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834. Therefore, we decline to exercise our discretion to resolve this moot cause. (Verdugo v. Target Corp. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 312, 316, fn. 1 ["we do not resolve abstract questions of law"]; Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132 ["It is settled that 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it' "].)
DISPOSITION
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for writ of mandate is denied.
WE CONCUR: BAKER, Acting P.J., MOOR, J.
[*] Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the Califor-nia Constitution.