Opinion
4-22-0338 4-22-0339
08-30-2022
In re T.B., a Minor v. Terrance B., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, In re G.B., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terrance B., Respondent-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County Nos. 19JA199, 20JA468 Honorable Derek G. Asbury, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
TURNER JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court's findings respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act and it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 In August 2021, the State filed motions for the termination of the parental rights of respondent, Terrance B., as to his minor children T.B. (born in May 2018) and G.B. (born in February 2020). The Peoria County circuit court held the fitness hearing and found respondent unfit in April 2022. After the best-interests hearing, the court found it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights.
¶ 3 Respondent appeals, asserting the circuit court erred by finding (1) respondent unfit and (2) it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate his parental rights. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 The minor children's mother is D'Anna H., who is not a party to this appeal. D'Anna had another child, B.H., who was part of the initial proceedings but is also not a party to this appeal.
¶ 6 In June 2019, the State filed a petition for the adjudication of wardship of T.B. The petition alleged T.B. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) because his environment was injurious to his welfare based on (1) the unsafe condition of his home, (2) D'Anna's use of cannabis, and (3) respondent's use of cannabis. On September 26, 2019, the circuit court held a joint adjudication and dispositional hearing. The record on appeal lacks a report of proceedings for the hearing and an adjudication order for T.B. In the written dispositional order, the court made T.B. a ward of the court but found both respondent and D'Anna fit and kept guardianship with them. Attached to the dispositional order was a list of tasks respondent needed to complete to correct the conditions that led to the adjudication. Those tasks included (1) executing all authorizations for releases of information requested by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), (2) cooperating with DCFS, (3) performing random drug drops at DCFS's discretion, (4) obtaining and maintaining stable housing conducive to the safe and healthy rearing of the minor child, (5) providing the caseworker any change in address or telephone number, (6) providing the caseworker information about a person if a relationship develops with the person that will affect the minor child, and (7) using best efforts to obtain or maintain a legal source of income. In July 2020, the State filed a motion to have D'Anna found to be unfit, but the record does not reveal if or when the motion was addressed by the court.
¶ 7 In September 2020, the State filed a petition for the adjudication of wardship of G.B. The petition alleged G.B. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) because his environment was injurious to his welfare based on the following: (1) the warship of his siblings and D'Anna's failure to complete services and (2) a September 21, 2020, incident, in which T.B. and G.B. were in a bedroom, T.B. found a gun, and T.B. discharged the gun striking D'Anna in the thigh. After the incident with the gun, the court gave temporary guardianship and custody of T.B. and G.B. to DCFS. In November 2020, the circuit court held a joint adjudication and dispositional hearing. Both respondent and D'Anna stipulated G.B. was neglected, and the court entered a written adjudication order finding G.B. neglected. The court also entered a written dispositional order, finding both respondent and D'Anna unfit to care for, protect, train, or discipline G.B.; making G.B. a ward of the court; and appointing DCFS as G.B.'s guardian and custodian. Again, attached to the dispositional order was a list of tasks for respondent. In addition to the tasks listed with T.B.'s dispositional order, the tasks included (1) obtaining a drug and alcohol assessment and following any course of treatment recommended, (2) performing random drug drops twice a month, (3) participating and successfully completing counseling to address specifically the following (nothing stated), (4) participating and successfully completing a parenting course, and (5) attending visits with the minor children and demonstrating appropriate parenting.
¶ 8 On August 11, 2021, the State filed motions to terminate respondent's and D'Anna's parental rights to T.B. and G.B. As to respondent, the motion asserted respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward each minor child's return during any nine-month period after the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)). The relevant nine-month period was November 7, 2020, to August 7, 2021.
¶ 9 On March 11, 2022, the circuit court commenced the fitness hearing. Both respondent and D'Anna moved to continue the hearing because they had another child, A.B., who had been taken into shelter care. The court denied the motion. The State presented the testimony of Jennifer Walker, the caseworker from October 2020 to March 2021, and Selena Bradshaw, the caseworker from March through August 2021. It also asked the court to take judicial notice of the original June 2019 petition in T.B.'s case, the September 2019 adjudication and dispositional order in T.B.'s case, the July 2020 motion for unfitness in T.B.'s case, and the September 25, 2020, shelter care order in both cases. Respondent testified on his own behalf and asked the court to take judicial notice of all the orders in the court file.
¶ 10 Walker testified she authored the court report dated December 31, 2020. She first addressed the time period of November 7, 2020, to December 31, 2020. During that time, respondent did not maintain consistent communication with the agency. Walker attempted to contact respondent but did not have any communication with him during that period. Respondent did not attend the family team meeting on December 16, 2020. He did complete a substance abuse assessment. Respondent reported marijuana use with no intent to stop. He denied experiencing negative consequences in his life from marijuana use. The substance abuse assessment instructed him to follow the recommendations of the agency. Walker acknowledged marijuana was legal at that time. Respondent completed three of five drug drops. All three drops were positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and one drop had a level of 1800, which is a high level. One of the missed drops was due to respondent not being in the computer system. Respondent completed a mental health assessment. The assessment did not recommend mental health treatment but instructed respondent to follow the agency's recommendations. Walker testified respondent was required to attend counseling, and she referred him to the Human Service Center because of the lengthy wait for counseling at the agency. Respondent did not provide proof of counseling. Respondent had completed a parenting course on November 4, 2020. Respondent attended visits with the minor children, which were supervised by his sister. Walker never observed a visit but received positive reports about the visits.
¶ 11 Walker further testified she was able to complete one home visit in October 2020, which was respondent's mother's home. Respondent was cooperative with the home visit. Walker found the home was not suitable for the minors to reside in. The home had one bedroom for the two minor children and both respondent and D'Anna. Walker described the room as cluttered. The room had a full-sized bed, a crib, a Pack n' Play, and a dresser in it. Moreover, the caseworker with Walker observed roaches on the wall. The main area of the home was acceptable.
¶ 12 According to Walker, nothing changed in terms of respondent's progress between December 31, 2020, and March 2021. During her time as the minor children's caseworker, she did not believe it was safe to return the minor children to respondent's care.
¶ 13 Bradshaw testified she became the caseworker after Walker on March 29, 2021. She first testified about the period of March 29 to June 7, 2021. Despite calling respondent, leaving voicemails, writing a letter, talking with the foster parent, and calling respondent's mother, Bradshaw did not make contact with respondent until May 19, 2021, when she made an unannounced home visit. At the visit, Bradshaw was able to get a telephone number for respondent. She also testified she received the new number from the foster parent. Respondent did not appear for drug drops for the period of February 24 to May 4, 2021, which was six drops. He also did not provide proof of counseling. Bradshaw stated she discussed his need to complete individual counseling at the May home visit. Moreover, respondent also did not have a home suitable for the minor children. Respondent did appear for visits, and no issues were reported. Bradshaw did not feel it was safe to return the minor children to respondent because he did not complete services and lacked suitable housing. She also had concerns about his level of THC.
¶ 14 Bradshaw also testified about the period of June 7 to August 4, 2021. She testified respondent did a better job communicating with the agency. However, he only did one of four drug drops, and the one drop was positive for THC with a level of 1718. Respondent also did not provide proof of counseling. Bradshaw further testified she had been told respondent and D'Anna applied for low-income housing. During her time as the caseworker, she never believed it was safe to return the minor children to respondent due to his lack of suitable housing, failure to complete services, and lack of communication.
¶ 15 Respondent testified he first met with Walker at his mother's home. She had another worker with her during the visit. Respondent gave Walker his telephone number. He was unemployed at the time and remained so until he obtained employment with Stanley Steamer in June 2021. Respondent testified he really did not need services but just agreed to them. He further testified he did not have any mental disorders or take medications for mental health issues. Respondent also testified he and D'Anna did not have any issues in their relationship and supported each other. As to communication, respondent testified he was difficult to get a hold of because his telephone was not always working due to his employment. He told the caseworker the situation and provided the foster parent as a means of contacting him. Respondent believed that kind of mode of communication worked. Additionally, he lived in the same home the entire nine-month period and could be contacted there. He believed he was cooperative with the caseworkers. Respondent denied being told he needed to attend individual counseling. Additionally, respondent testified he used marijuana regularly and it did not interfere with his day-to-day functioning. He admitted he did not get his marijuana legally.
¶ 16 D'Anna also testified she and respondent did not have any domestic violence or other issues in their relationship. She further stated they were supportive of each other.
¶ 17 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 18 On April 7, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing to announce its decision. The court found respondent and D'Anna unfit. The court then proceeded to the best-interests hearing. The State presented the best-interests report and the testimony of Bradshaw. Bradshaw testified the minor children had been placed with their paternal aunt since September 24, 2020. The residence was adequate for the minor children's needs. The minor children had a strong bond with their aunt, who ensures their needs are met. Their aunt was willing to provide the minor children permanency through adoption.
¶ 19 After hearing the parties' arguments, the circuit court found it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. The court also terminated D'Anna's parental rights to the minor children. On April 14, 2022, the court entered a written order terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 20 On April 14, 2022, respondent filed a timely notice of appeal in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). See Ill. S.Ct. R. 660(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) (providing the rules governing civil cases also govern appeals from final judgments in all proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, except for delinquency cases); see also Ill. S.Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) ("A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment or order, is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the judgment or order."). Thus, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020)), the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is "unfit," as that term is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). If the circuit court makes a finding of unfitness, then the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence it is in the minor children's best interests that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 366, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1228 (2004).
¶ 23 Since the circuit court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses, it is in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses' testimony. In re E.S., 324 Ill.App.3d 661, 667, 756 N.E.2d 422, 427 (2001). Further, in matters involving minors, the circuit court receives broad discretion and great deference. E.S., 324 Ill.App.3d at 667, 756 N.E.2d at 427. Thus, a reviewing court will not disturb a circuit court's unfitness finding and best-interests determination unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 354, 830 N.E.2d 508, 516-17 (2005) (fitness finding); In re J.L., 236 Ill.2d 329, 344, 924 N.E.2d 961, 970 (2010) (best-interests determination). A circuit court's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 354, 830 N.E.2d at 517.
¶ 24 A. Respondent's Fitness
¶ 25 Respondent contends the circuit court erred by finding him unfit. In this case, the circuit court found respondent unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)), which provides a parent may be declared unfit if he or she fails "to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child[ren] to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act." Illinois courts have defined "reasonable progress" as "demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d 1036, 1046, 871 N.E.2d 835, 844 (2007). Moreover, they have explained reasonable progress as follows:
" '[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's "progress toward the return of the child[ren]" under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child[ren], and in light of other conditions which later became known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child[ren] to the parent.'" Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 216-17, 752 N.E.2d at 1050).Additionally, this court has explained reasonable progress exists when a circuit court "can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child[ren] returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child[ren] returned to parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the child[ren]." (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991). We have also emphasized" 'reasonable progress' is an 'objective standard.'" In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88, 19 N.E.3d 227 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d at 461, 577 N.E.2d at 1387).
¶ 26 In determining a parent's fitness based on reasonable progress, a court may only consider evidence from the relevant time period. Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill.2d 223, 237-38, 802 N.E.2d 800, 809 (2003)). Courts are limited to that period "because reliance upon evidence of any subsequent time period could improperly allow a parent to circumvent her own unfitness because of a bureaucratic delay in bringing her case to trial." Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844. In this case, the petition alleged the nine-month period of November 7, 2020, to August 7, 2021.
¶ 27 The tasks for respondent that were attached to the November 6, 2020, dispositional order for G.B., required respondent to, inter alia, perform two random drug drops per month, participate and successfully complete counseling, and obtain and maintain stable housing. Thus, contrary to his claims, respondent was aware he needed to do the aforementioned tasks. During the relevant nine-month period, respondent missed numerous drug drops, including a period of six in a row. He did not attend counseling and never maintained a home suitable for the minor children. Clearly, respondent and D'Anna needed a suitable home for the minor children to be returned to them. Walker testified she determined the home in which respondent and D'Anna resided with respondent's mother was not suitable for the minor children in October 2020. While evidence was presented respondent applied for low-income housing, respondent waited until near the end of the nine-month period to apply for the housing despite knowing before the beginning of the nine-month period his current home was not suitable. Additionally, both caseworkers testified they were never close to returning the minor children to respondent. While respondent did complete some services, he did not complete and/or comply with other ones. The State's evidence showed the minor children were never close to being returned to respondent's care.
¶ 28 Given the above evidence, the circuit court's finding respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the nine-month period of November 7, 2020, to August 7, 2021, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 29 B. Minor Children's Best Interests
¶ 30 Respondent also challenges the circuit court's finding it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate his parental rights. The State disagrees and contends the court's finding was proper.
¶ 31 During the best-interests hearing, the circuit court focuses on "the child[ren]'s welfare and whether termination would improve the child[ren]'s future financial, social and emotional atmosphere." In re D.M., 336 Ill.App.3d 766, 772, 784 N.E.2d 304, 309 (2002). In doing so, the court considers the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020)) in the context of the children's age and developmental needs. See In re T.A., 359 Ill.App.3d 953, 959-60, 835 N.E.2d 908, 912-13 (2005). Those factors include the following: the children's physical safety and welfare; the development of the children's identity; the children's family, cultural, and religious background and ties; the children's sense of attachments, including continuity of affection for the children, the children's feelings of love, being valued, security, and familiarity, and taking into account the least disruptive placement for the children; the children's own wishes and long-term goals; the children's community ties, including church, school, and friends; the children's need for permanence, which includes the children's need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other relatives; the uniqueness of every family and each child; the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and the wishes of the persons available to care for the children. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).
¶ 32 We note a parent's unfitness to have custody of his or her children does not automatically result in the termination of the parent's legal relationship with the children. In re M.F., 326 Ill.App.3d 1110, 1115, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002). As stated, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the termination of parental rights is in the minor children's best interests. See D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 366, 818 N.E.2d at 1228. "Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that the fact at issue *** is rendered more likely than not." People v. Houar, 365 Ill.App.3d 682, 686, 850 N.E.2d 327, 331 (2006).
¶ 33 Here, the majority of the best-interests factors favor the termination of respondent's parental rights. At the time of the best-interests hearing, the minor children had been living in their foster home for around 18 months and were bonded with their foster parent, who was willing to adopt them. The minor children felt secure and loved by their foster mother and had other attachments to their placement. While the minor children did not live with their younger sister, born during the pendency of the proceedings, or their half-brother, all four children were in relative placements.
¶ 34 The best-interests report indicated the parents were back living in respondent's mother's home, which was deemed unsuitable in October 2020. Moreover, while respondent had again completed a mental health assessment, he had yet to engage in counseling. He also failed to appear at his last drug drop. Thus, we disagree with respondent's suggestion the return of the minor children was "relatively imminent."
¶ 35 Accordingly, we find the circuit court's conclusion it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Peoria County circuit court's judgment.
¶ 38 Affirmed.