People v. Terlikowski

11 Citing cases

  1. People v. Neumann

    148 Ill. App. 3d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 39 times
    In State v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 101 Ill.Dec. 899, 499 N.E.2d 487 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051, 107 S.Ct. 2184, 95 L.Ed.2d 840 (1987), the court held that a criminal record does not disqualify a person from testifying; it merely goes to his credibility.

    We find no error in the court's determination. (See, e.g., People v. Nolan (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 895, 430 N.E.2d 345; People v. Terlikowski (1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521.) Indeed, the fact that defendant was accompanied by Federal marshals each time he visited the circuit court of Cook County and was returned to the Metropolitan Correctional Center is evidence that he was not even in temporary custody of this State but remained in Federal custody. ( People v. Dye (1977), 69 Ill.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630.) We further find no indication in the record of any voluntary relinquishment of custody by the Federal authorities to support defendant's citations of authority.

  2. People v. Nolan

    430 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    Therefore, at the time the mandate was issued, defendant was in custody in Tennessee. It follows that the speedy trial statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a)) was not applicable since defendant was not in custody in this State at the time. (See People v. Rose (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 374, 378-79, 287 N.E.2d 195, 198; People v. Terlikowski (1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 310, 227 N.E.2d 521, 522.) Instead, his statutory right to a speedy trial arose from the Agreement on Detainers (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1003-8-9), which provides that if a person is imprisoned in a party State and there is pending in another party State an untried indictment on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he notifies the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction of his place of imprisonment and his request for a final disposition of his case.

  3. People v. Brown

    87 Ill. App. 3d 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 18 times
    Eliciting information from a witness that refused to be interviewed prior to trial was not impeachment because "a witness has a right to refuse to submit to such questioning

    In the light of the positive identification of the defendant by the witness at trial and the fact that defendant was apprehended shortly after the incident while in possession of Coronado's automobile and other possessions taken from him, we do not find these minor discrepancies to be controlling. (See People v. Terlikowski (1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521.) Coronado generally gave a clear account of the events of that evening and the jury chose to believe that account. We find no basis for disturbing their determination.

  4. People v. Beyah

    42 Ill. App. 3d 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 4 times

    ( People v. Nettles (1969), 107 Ill. App.2d 143, 246 N.E.2d 29.) This burden includes a demonstration that he caused no delay ( People v. Walton (1969), 110 Ill. App.2d 115, 249 N.E.2d 170; People v. Terlikowski (1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521), which fact the record must affirmatively establish ( People v. Jones (1965), 33 Ill.2d 357, 211 N.E.2d 261, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 854). • 2 Where the record is unclear, the court of review must inquire into the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether defendant did in fact occasion delay.

  5. People v. Coleman

    17 Ill. App. 3d 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 57 times
    In People v. Coleman (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 421, 308 N.E.2d 364, the court found no reversible error where evidence that photographs of the accused, shown to a victim in aid of identification, had come from a police station and the error had not been preserved.

    (See People v. Hanisch, 361 Ill. 465, 198 N.E. 220.) Finally, the discrepancy between complainant's testimony as to his initial description of defendant and the account thereof in the police report is not of a nature so substantial as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. (See People v. Terlikowski, 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521.) Being insubstantial, the resolution of any discrepancy in the testimony was properly a matter for the jury's consideration and will not be disturbed on appeal. People v. Nelson, 127 Ill. App.2d 238, 262 N.E.2d 225. • 3 Defendant further points to the testimony of Edgar Shorter and of defendant's mother, Elizabeth Coleman, in alleging the State's failure to meet its burden of proof. He cites several cases holding that plausible evidence of an alibi cannot be disregarded where the only evidence contradicting it rests upon the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged, and where the entire record reveals reasonable doubt of guilt because of an uncertain identification.

  6. People v. Rose

    287 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 4 times

    "* * * Such statute requiring trial within 120 days is applicable to persons imprisoned in Illinois. People v. Terlikowski, 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521 (Third Dist. 1967). * * * In The People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill.2d 606, 213 N.E.2d 516, it was held that a delay of ten months in bringing the defendant to trial after he was located in another state was not so oppressive as to amount to a denial of speedy trial.

  7. People v. Gilliand

    267 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)   Cited 3 times

    • 1 The principal issue on this appeal is whether the "120 day rule" commenced to run from February 1, 1968, the date defendant was arrested in Colorado or February 9, 1968, the date defendant was placed in custody in Illinois. Defendant's claim to right of discharge is based on ch. 38, par. 103-5(a), 1967, which provides, "Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant * * *". It is defendant's contention the period begins to run when defendant is taken into custody on the charge whether he is initially arrested in this State or some other state. Defendant argues that People v. Terlikowski, 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 52, People v. Hayes, 23 Ill. App.2d 527, 179 N.E.2d 660 and People v. Tamborski, 415 Ill. 466, 114 N.E.2d 469, which suggests contrary views, are not controlling and are of little significance because the observations in each of the cases are dicta. While it may be said that the decision in each of the aforementioned cases did not depend upon the application of the 120 day rule the observations of the court indicate in a general way that the statute is concerned with custody in this State. If the prosecution is to be faulted for failure to exercise appropriate diligence it does not seem to us that such diligence can be exercised or effectively measured when defendant is not in custody in this State. No claim is made that the prosecution failed to act diligently in securing defendant's return from Colorado. Where the defendant has fled the State as in the case at bar, thereby increasing the difficulties of prosecution, it does not appear to us that giving the statute effect only upon his

  8. People v. Rice

    109 Ill. App. 2d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)   Cited 7 times
    In People v. Rice, 109 Ill. App.2d 212, 248 N.E.2d 332 (1969), the court held that failure of an attorney to appear at arraignment was not a delay attributable to defendant where the attorney had filed no appearance and had advised the trial court and State that he did not represent defendant.

    Prior to the trial, defendant renewed his motions for discharge and tendered evidence that he had been in jail since November 18, 1966, and that he had neither made a motion for continuance nor authorized one to be made in his behalf. The People v. Jones, 33 Ill.2d 357, 211 N.E.2d 261 (1965); People v. Terlikowski, 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521 (3d Dist 1967). The essential argument of the State's Attorney upon the issue is that the delay was occasioned by the failure of "defendant's attorney" to appear on March 13. This assumption was found wanting in our opinion in People v. Rice, 96 Ill. App.2d 253, 238 N.E.2d 266 (4th Dist 1968). That opinion considered the statutes concerning the function of an arraignment in establishing the proper representation of a defendant.

  9. People v. Nettles

    107 Ill. App. 2d 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)   Cited 27 times
    In Nettles the People had no knowledge as to where the defendant was incarcerated or any reason to believe or know that he was in fact incarcerated in another county.

    The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. People v. Jones, 33 Ill.2d 357, 211 N.E.2d 261; People v. Terlikowski, 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521. The trial date of July 24, 1967, being less than 120 days from April 29, 1967, the defendant's constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated.

  10. People v. Kelley

    105 Ill. App. 2d 481 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)   Cited 11 times

    People v. Stuckey, 34 Ill.2d 521, 216 N.E.2d 785. Such statute requiring trial within 120 days is applicable to persons imprisoned in Illinois. People v. Terlikowski, 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521 (Third Dist 1967). The defendant, who had been released on bond, was returned for trial within 60 days of his letter demanding trial.