Opinion
A157545
06-25-2020
In re T.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.C., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1601085) MEMORANDUM OPINION
We conclude this matter is proper for disposition by memorandum opinion in accordance with the California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules, rule 19, Abbreviated opinions.) We therefore recite the facts only as necessary to resolve the issues on appeal.
T.C. appeals from the juvenile court's disposition order committing T.C. to a rehabilitation facility, contending the juvenile court miscalculated his maximum confinement term and credit for days of custody. The People agree that the juvenile court erred. We also conclude the juvenile court erred, so we will modify the juvenile court's order.
BACKGROUND
After his arrest in San Francisco County on November 5, 2016, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that minor T.C. had committed second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c).) T.C. was detained in juvenile hall from the date of his arrest until December 16, 2016, when the juvenile court found him to be a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed him to a program at the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF). T.C. remained at either OAYRF or juvenile hall after absconding from OAYRF until September 21, 2017, when he was terminated from the OAYRF program and released on home supervision.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On December 27, 2017, T.C. was arrested for absconding from home supervision and detained at juvenile hall until January 11, 2018, when he was released on home supervision.
On January 19, 2018, T.C. was arrested in San Mateo County for possessing a stolen cell phone and detained in juvenile hall. The San Mateo County District Attorney filed a new section 602 petition alleging felony possession of stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) The court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), and T.C. admitted it. T.C. was released from juvenile hall when the juvenile court placed him at a program in Stockton on March 27, 2018.
On May 10, 2018, T.C. was terminated from his program in Stockton, arrested, and detained at juvenile hall. He was released from juvenile hall when he was placed at a different program on July 3, 2018.
On August 20, 2018, T.C was arrested in Stanislaus County for driving a stolen car and detained at juvenile hall. The Stanislaus County District Attorney filed a section 602 petition alleging a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. T.C. admitted the charge and on October 9, 2018, was returned to his most recent program.
T.C. was arrested on November 18, 2018, for absconding from his program. He was detained at juvenile hall until February 11, 2019, when he was again returned to his program.
On April 6, 2019, T.C. was arrested and detained at juvenile hall for violating probation by unlawfully driving or taking a car (Veh. Code, § 10851) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496). T.C. remained at juvenile hall until May 16, 2019, when the juvenile court committed him to a mandatory nine-month program at OAYRF. At that hearing, the juvenile court stated that T.C.'s maximum term of confinement was six years, 120 days, and gave T.C. credit for 582 days of custody.
T.C. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
T.C. argues the juvenile court erred in calculating his maximum term of confinement and custody credits. The People agree. We agree that the juvenile court erred in calculating the maximum term of confinement and that the correct maximum term is six years. We also agree that the juvenile court miscalculated T.C.'s custody credits, though we conclude the proper number of credits is slightly different than the number the parties have calculated.
I. Maximum confinement term
Section 726 states that when a "minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." (§ 726, subd. (d)(1); see also In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1238.) "Section 726 permits the juvenile court to aggregate terms on the basis of previously sustained section 602 petitions in computing the maximum period of confinement." (In re Adrian R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 448, 454.) When the juvenile court aggregates previously sustained petitions, the maximum term of confinement is calculated by adding together the upper term for the principal offense (which is the longest term of imprisonment for any of the offenses) and one third of the middle term of all subordinate felonies or misdemeanors. (§ 726, subd. (d)(3); Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subd. (a); In re Deborah C. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 125, 140.)
The juvenile court chose to aggregate the maximum term of confinement from T.C.'s three sustained section 602 petitions: (1) the petition in San Francisco County in which T.C. admitted a felony charge of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (c), 213); (2) the petition in San Mateo County in which T.C. admitted a misdemeanor charge of possession of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)); and (3) the petition in Stanislaus County in which T.C admitted a felony charge of unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). The upper term of the second degree robbery charge was five years. (Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(2).) The term of the misdemeanor charge of possession of stolen property was one year, one third of which was four months. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) The term of the felony unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle was two years, one third of which was eight months. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(1).) Adding these together, T.C.'s maximum term of confinement was six years. Thus, the trial court erred when it stated the maximum term was six years and 120 days.
II. Custody credits
In order to carry out the mandate in section 726, subdivision (d)(1) that minors not be held in physical confinement longer than the maximum term of imprisonment an adult could face for the same offenses, minors are entitled to credit for days they were held in custody prior to the resolution of the charges against them. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 536.) "Because an adult would be entitled to presentence custody credit under Penal Code section 2900.5, this has been interpreted to mean that an equivalent amount of time must be subtracted from a minor's maximum period of physical confinement." (In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 352.) Custody credit under Penal Code section 2900.5 includes partial days, and calculation of the credit "begins on the day of arrest and continues through the day of sentencing." (People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) "[W]hen a juvenile court elects to aggregate a minor's period of physical confinement on multiple petitions pursuant to these foregoing statutory provisions, the court must also aggregate the predisposition custody credits attributable to those multiple petitions." (In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067.)
T.C. agrees with the People that the juvenile court erred by calculating his custody credits as 582 days and that he was actually due 649 days of credit. However, we are not bound by the People's confession of error. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1021.) After reviewing the matter for ourselves, we agree that the trial court erred, but we determine T.C. is actually entitled to 638 days of credit.
T.C. was due 42 days for his detention from his arrest on November 5, 2016, until the dispositional order on December 16, 2016, committing him to OAYRF.
T.C. would be due 280 days for his detention at OAYRF and other facilities from the date of the commitment order on December 16, 2016, until September 21, 2017. However, T.C. already received credit for December 16, 2016 as part of the prior 42 days of credit, so we exclude that day from this calculation. T.C. was therefore due 279 days of credit for the period from December 17, 2016, to September 21, 2017.
The People recognize the double-counting issue with December 16, 2016, but still miscalculate the credit due T.C. for the period from December 16, 2016, to September 21, 2017, as 280 days.
T.C. was due 16 days for his detention at juvenile hall between his arrest on December 27, 2017, and his release on January 11, 2018.
T.C. was due 68 days for his detention at juvenile hall between his arrest on January 19, 2018, and his placement on March 27, 2018.
T.C. was due 55 days for his detention at juvenile hall between his arrest on May 10, 2018, and his placement on July 3, 2018.
T.C. was due 51 days for his detention at juvenile hall between his arrest on August 20, 2018, until his placement on October 9, 2018.
The People miscalculate this period as 61 days.
T.C. was due 86 days for his detention at juvenile hall between his arrest on November 18, 2018, and his placement on February 11, 2019.
T.C. was due 41 days for his detention at juvenile hall between his arrest on April 6, 2019, and the entry of the juvenile court's disposition order on May 16, 2019.
Combined, these periods total 638 days.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is modified to state that T.C is committed for a period not to exceed 6 years and is entitled to credit for time served of 638 days. As modified, the order is affirmed.
/s/_________
BROWN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
STREETER, ACTING P. J. /s/_________
TUCHER, J.