Discussion A plea of guilty, as we have repeatedly observed, generally marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation (People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5). As a rule, a defendant who in open court admits guilt of an offense charged may not later seek review of claims relating to the deprivation of rights that took place before the plea was entered (see, People v DiRaffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 240; see also, Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267).

We agree. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly observed that “a plea of guilty generally ‘marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation’ ” (People v. Pacherille, 25 N.Y.3d 1021, 1022–1023, 10 N.Y.S.3d 178, 32 N.E.3d 393, quoting People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 ; see People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 ). A guilty plea signals the defendant's intention not to litigate the issue of his or her guilt, “and necessarily involves the surrender of certain constitutional rights, including the right to confrontation, the privilege against self incrimination and the right to trial by jury” (People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d at 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

We agree. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly observed that “a plea of guilty generally ‘marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation’ ” (People v. Pacherille, 25 N.Y.3d 1021, 1022–1023, 10 N.Y.S.3d 178, 32 N.E.3d 393, quoting People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755; see People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773). A guilty plea signals the defendant's intention not to litigate the issue of his or her guilt, “and necessarily involves the surrender of certain constitutional rights, including the right to confrontation, the privilege against self incrimination and the right to trial by jury” (People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d at 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). A guilty plea not only encompasses a waiver of the specific rights attached to a trial, but also “effects a forfeiture of the right to renew many arguments made before the plea” ( id.; see People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773). “This is so because a defendant's ‘conviction rests directly on the sufficiency of his plea, not on the legal or constitutional sufficiency of any proceedings which might have led to his conviction after trial’ ” (People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E

To be sure, "[t]he pleading process necessarily includes the surrender of many guaranteed rights" (People v Seaberg, supra, at 7). Among these are the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers (see, Boykin v Alabama, 395 U.S. 238; People v Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1; People v Harris, supra). These rights, as well as others normally associated with a criminal trial, such as the right to have the charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to be present at trial, and the right to present evidence on one's own behalf, are waived as a matter of necessity upon the entry of a guilty plea.

MEMORANDUM. The order appealed from should be affirmed essentially for the reasons stated by Justice John F. Lawton at the Appellate Division ( 146 A.D.2d 281) and in People v Prescott ( 66 N.Y.2d 216, cert denied 475 U.S. 1150), People v Taylor ( 65 N.Y.2d 1) and People v Siciliano ( 40 N.Y.2d 996). "A guilty plea generally represents a compromise or bargain struck after negotiation between defendant and the People.

A forfeiture is the loss of a right, privilege, or property due to a crime (Black's Law Dictionary, 14th ed. [2014], forfeiture). It automatically "occurs by operation of law as a consequence of the guilty plea, with respect to issues which as a matter of policy the law does not permit to survive such a plea" (People v Thomas, 53 NY2d 338, 342 n.2 [1981]; see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230 n.1 [2000]). This forfeiture of claims is consistent with the understanding that a guilty plea "marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation" (People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, 5 [1985]), and reflects the fact that a guilty plea shifts the propriety of a conviction to the sufficiency of the plea (People v Di Raffaele, 55 NY2d 234, 240 [1982] ["(W)here defendant has by his plea admitted commission of the crime with which he was charged, his plea renders irrelevant his contention that the criminal proceedings preliminary to trial were infected with impropriety and error; his conviction rests directly on the sufficiency of his plea, not on the legal or constitutional sufficiency of any proceedings which might have led to his conviction after trial"]). Notwithstanding this interest in "marking the end of a criminal case," and forfeiture's general application in furtherance of that goal, forfeiture is neither an absolute nor inevitable rule of claim foreclosure but a rule contingent on the nature of the claim.

It automatically "occurs by operation of law as a consequence of the guilty plea, with respect to issues which as a matter of policy the law does not permit to survive such a plea" ( People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 338, 342 n.2, 441 N.Y.S.2d 650, 424 N.E.2d 537 [1981] ; see People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230 n.1, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 [2000] ). This forfeiture of claims is consistent with the understanding that a guilty plea "marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation" ( People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [1985] ), and reflects the fact that a guilty plea shifts the propriety of a conviction to the sufficiency of the plea ( People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 433 N.E.2d 513 [1982] ["(W)here defendant has by his plea admitted commission of the crime with which he was charged, his plea renders irrelevant his contention that the criminal proceedings preliminary to trial were infected with impropriety and error; his conviction rests directly on the sufficiency of his plea, not on the legal or constitutional sufficiency of any proceedings which might have led to his conviction after trial"] ). Notwithstanding this interest in "marking the end of a criminal case," and forfeiture's general application in furtherance of that goal, forfeiture is neither an absolute nor inevitable rule of claim foreclosure but a rule contingent on the nature of the claim.

( People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476; Hill v Lockhart, 474 US 52; United States v Hansel, 70 F3d 6; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137; People v McDonald, 1 NY3d 109; People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214; Toussie v United States, 397 US 112; People v Seda, 170 Misc 2d 697, 246 AD2d 675, 93 NY2d 307.) II. The court denied appellant due process by refusing to honor its original 6-to-12-year sentence promise, vindictively substituting a 7-to-14-year sentence, solely because appellant questioned his status as a second felony offender. ( People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227; People v Young, 94 NY2d 171; North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; People v Van Pelt, 76 NY2d 156; People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1; Blackledge v Allison, 431 US 63; Santobello v New York, 404 US 257; People v Hicks, 98 NY2d 185; People v Young, 94 NY2d 171; Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357.) Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx ( Yael V. Levy, Joseph N. Ferdenzi and Stanley R. Kaplan of counsel), for respondent. I. Counsel was not ineffective solely for declining to move to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds, where filing such a motion would have been futile, and counsel secured defendant a very favorable plea disposition.

While a plea of guilty constitutes an actual waiver of certain rights associated with a trial and effects a forfeiture of the right to renew many arguments made before the plea, not every claim is forfeited by a plea of guilty (seePeople v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 ). "There is no mechanical rule fixing when a claim is otherwise waived; however, since a plea usually removes the issue of factual guilt from a case, resolution of the question may be guided by determining whether the claim relates to the factual elements of the crime charged, or to some other, fundamental matter" ( id. at 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 ).

Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly observed that "a plea of guilty generally ‘marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation’ " ( People v. Pacherille , 25 NY3d 1021, 1022-1023 [2015], quoting People v. Taylor , 65 NY2d 1, 5 [1985] ; seePeople v. Hansen , 95 NY2d 227, 230 [2000] ). "As a rule, a defendant who in open court admits guilt of an offense charged may not later seek review of claims relating to the deprivation of rights that took place before the plea was entered" ( People v. Hansen , 95 NY2d at 230 ). "This is so because a defendant's ‘conviction rests directly on the sufficiency of his plea, not on the legal or constitutional sufficiency of any proceedings which might have led to his conviction after trial’ " (id. , quoting People v. Di Raffaele , 55 NY2d 234, 240 [1982] ). "A guilty plea will thus encompass a waiver of specific rights attached to trial, such as the right to a trial by jury and to confrontation, and it will also effect a forfeiture of the right to revive certain claims made prior to the plea" ( People v. Hansen , 95 NY2d at 230 ; seePeople v. Taylor , 65 NY2d at 5 ). A guilty plea does not, however, forfeit every claim on appeal.