Opinion
SC: 165436 COA: 360535
06-21-2023
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andre Dwain TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2023 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to that court. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court reasoning "[t]he trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, in part, because defendant was presumptively prejudiced by counsel's performance." However, although the trial court did mention United States v Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), it explicitly wrote "[b]ecause the Strickland [v Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),] test applies to Defendant's claim, Defendant must demonstrate Ms. Irey Iverson's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, in addition to proving that defense counsel's representation was constitutionally deficient, defendant must show that but for counsel's deficient performance, a different result would have been reasonably probable." (citation and quotation marks omitted). Among the trial court's extensive prejudice analysis, it found "By advising and ostensibly convincing the Defendant that he did not need to testify in [sic] on his own behalf Ms. Irey Iverson deprived the Defendant of the ability to raise his only viable defense to allegations in this case consent. In doing so not only was she unable to argue that the sexual acts described by the complaining witness and supported by the medical records and DNA evidence was consensual she precluded the jury from being instructed on defense of consent." On remand, the Court of Appeals shall review the trial court's prejudice analysis under Strickland .
We do not retain jurisdiction.