Opinion
SC 154994
07-28-2022
PEOPLE v. TAYLOR
Argued on application for leave to appeal March 3, 2022.
SYLLABUS
Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack Justices: Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kathryn L. Loomis
Robert Taylor was convicted following a jury trial in the Macomb Circuit Court of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); carjacking, MCL 750.529a; conspiracy to commit carjacking, MCL 750.529a and MCL 750.157a; kidnapping, MCL 750.349; conspiracy to commit kidnapping, MCL 750.349 and MCL 750.157a; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. In 2009, defendant and his codefendant, Ihab Masalmani, abducted Matt Landry from outside a sandwich shop. Defendant acted as the lookout while Masalmani forced Landry into Landry's car. The two then drove Landry away at gunpoint. Defendant and Masalmani held Landry against his will for several hours and stole money from his bank account during that time; Landry was later killed by a gunshot wound to the head. The prosecutor proceeded at trial under the theory that defendant aided and abetted Masalmani in the crimes. The jury found defendant guilty of the charged offenses. The court, Diane M. Druzinski, J., sentenced defendant to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the felony-murder conviction. In an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on March 21, 2013 (Docket No. 303208), the Court of Appeals, Jansen, P.J., and Fitzgerald, and K. F. Kelly, JJ., affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing in light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which struck down as unconstitutional mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles. On remand, the prosecutor moved under MCL 769.25-a statute enacted by the Legislature in response to Miller-to have defendant resentenced to LWOP. Following a hearing during which the court reviewed the Miller factors, the court again sentenced defendant to LWOP. In an unpublished opinion issued September 22, 2016 (Docket No. 325834), the Court of Appeals, Borrello, P.J., and Markey and Riordan, JJ., affirmed defendant's sentence. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and his application was held in abeyance at various times pending decisions in People v Hyatt 502 Mich. 89 (2018); People v Masalmani 505 Mich. 1090 (2020); and Jones v Mississippi, 593 U.S. __; 141 S.Ct. 1308 (2021). After those cases were resolved, the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant's application for leave to appeal or take other action. 508 Mich. 938 (2021).
In an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justices Bernstein and Welch, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
When a prosecutor seeks to impose LWOP under MCL 769.25 for a crime committed when the defendant was a juvenile, the prosecutor bears the burden to rebut a presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence. The standard for rebuttal is clear and convincing evidence. In this case, defendant was entitled to resentencing because the trial court was not operating within that framework. However, because the Court of Appeals failed to address a separate issue that could be dispositive, the case first had to be remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of that issue.
1. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, guaranteeing individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. Further, a basic precept of justice requires that punishment be proportionate to both the offense and the offender. The United States Supreme Court has thus held that juvenile offenders are constitutionally different from adult offenders for purposes of sentencing-they are less deserving of the most severe punishments because of their diminished culpability and increased prospects for reform. In Miller, therefore, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for crimes committed when the offender was under 18 years old. Miller also set forth factors that a trial court should consider before concluding that it is appropriate to sentence a juvenile offender to die in prison for a homicide offense. Those factors are: (1) the juvenile's chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile's family and home environment; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the juvenile's participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected the juvenile; (4) the incompetencies of youth, which affect whether the juvenile might have been charged with and convicted of a lesser crime, for example, because the juvenile did not have the capacity to assist their attorney in their own defense; and (5) the juvenile's possibility of rehabilitation. These factors have been expressly incorporated into this state's discretionary juvenile LWOP sentencing scheme under MCL 769.25.
2. Under MCL 769.25, if a defendant who was less than 18 years old at the time of their crime is convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including first-degree murder, the prosecutor may file a motion seeking to have the defendant sentenced to LWOP. The motion must specify the grounds on which the prosecutor is requesting that sentence, and the defendant has 14 days to respond. After that, the court must conduct a hearing on the motion during which it must consider the Miller factors and may consider any other relevant criteria. Next, the court must specify on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that it considered and the reasons supporting the sentence imposed. If the court decides not to sentence the defendant to LWOP, it must sentence the defendant to a statutory term of years. Although MCL 769.25 does not specify the standard of proof, the burden of proof is generally assigned to the party who seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion. Under MCL 769.25, a sentence of LWOP can be imposed only if the prosecutor files a motion. This motion requirement is meaningful. Under MCL 769.25, the status quo is that a juvenile defendant will be sentenced to a term of years. If the prosecution seeks to change the status quo by filing a motion to impose LWOP, it becomes the moving party and must bear the burden and risk of nonpersuasion at the Miller hearing.
3. If the prosecutor seeks to have a juvenile offender sentenced to LWOP pursuant to MCL 769.25, it is the prosecutor's burden to overcome the presumption that LWOP is disproportionate. The most important consideration in the creation of presumptions is probability. A steady line of precedent from the United States Supreme Court could not be clearer-persons under 18, as a group, are less culpable than adults, more prone to outside influence, more likely to be rehabilitated, and less deserving of the most severe punishments. As a procedural mechanism, therefore, it makes sense for sentencing courts to start from the premise that the juvenile defendant before them, like most juveniles, has engaged in criminality because of transient immaturity, not irreparable corruption. In other words, it is probable that the juvenile offender standing before the court possesses those attributes of youth that diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences available under Michigan law.
4. The standard of proof serves to allocate the risk of error between litigants and reflects the relative importance attached to a decision. When the Legislature is silent on the standard of proof, the courts must prescribe one. The United States Supreme Court has explained that proof by clear and convincing evidence is appropriate when particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake. Considering the important Eighth Amendment right at stake in comparison to the fact that juvenile LWOP is not categorically barred in Michigan, the prosecutor must prove facts and circumstances that rebut the presumption against LWOP by clear and convincing evidence.
5. The trial court must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence in order to impose LWOP. This is an exercise in discretion, not a fact-finding mission. MCL 769.25 does not require the sentencing court to find any particular fact before it can impose LWOP. It is true that in People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89 (2018), the Court wrote that neither Miller nor Montgomery imposes a presumption against LWOP for those juveniles convicted of first-degree murder on either the trial court or the appellate court. But the central holding in Skinner was that Miller does not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility. Whether a presumption against LWOP for juvenile offenders exists was irrelevant to the outcome of the case, so this statement was nonbinding dictum. Moreover, Skinner was interpreting what the federal Constitution requires while this case concerned what the statute requires and how sentencing courts should implement the statute. The decision in this case does not foreclose a sentencing court's ability to sentence a juvenile offender to LWOP if the sentencing court determines that, considering all the information before it, LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate sentence. In this case, defendant was entitled to resentencing because the trial court was not operating within the correct framework for implementing MCL 769.25 when it resentenced defendant.
6. In his Court of Appeals brief, defendant argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and Article art 1, § 16 of Michigan's Constitution, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment, because he was convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor. The Court of Appeals failed to address this issue, so the case had to be remanded to that Court for consideration of that potentially dispositive issue before any resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
Chief Justice McCormack, joined by Justices Bernstein and Cavanagh, concurring, wrote separately to explain why she believed the trial court abused its discretion in applying the Miller factors when sentencing defendant. The first Miller factor requires considering the juvenile offender's chronological age and its hallmark features. These hallmark features include immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. Defendant was 16 years and 10 months old at the time of the offense. The trial court noted that the juvenile offenders in Miller were roughly two years younger and that defendant's underdeveloped prefrontal cortex would not be much more undeveloped than that of an 18 year old. But a juvenile offender need not be the same age as those in Miller to receive the benefit of the Miller decision. Proximity to age 18 can affect the extent of the mitigation, but proximity to age 18 is emphatically not an aggravating factor. The trial court also concluded that because an 18 year old could not benefit from the brain science presented at the resentencing hearing, neither should a 16-year-old defendant. This was also error. Miller requires that juveniles under 18 are to be treated, categorically, as having diminished culpability. That the Eighth Amendment might not require the same for similarly situated 18-year-olds is not constitutionally relevant. The next Miller factor is the juvenile's family and home environment. Juveniles subjected to trauma, abuse, and neglect are more vulnerable to outside influences than ordinary teenagers and suffer from cognitive underdevelopment, lack of maturity, and decreased ability to restrain impulses. The trial court here concluded from the evidence that defendant's family environment was "far from optimal" but determined only that this factor "could arguably favor some leniency or lessening of culpability for defendant." Justice McCormack agreed with the trial court that defendant's home environment was "far from optimal" but disagreed that it only arguably favored leniency; juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their environment. The third Miller factor is the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the juvenile's participation and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected the juvenile. The trial court found that this factor weighed in favor of LWOP. The court noted that there was no evidence that defendant did not expect the murder to occur, that he attempted to remove himself from the situation, or that he tried to dissuade his codefendant. As much as the trial court believed that defendant's failure to stop his codefendant's conduct, or at least to walk away from it, was evidence against mitigation, Miller says otherwise. Juveniles make rash decisions, cannot assess consequences, and are often unable to extricate themselves once criminal situations are set in motion. Finally, the trial court did not address the fact that defendant was convicted of felony murder, not premeditated murder, and as an aider and abettor, not as the principal offender; nor did it address that defendant did not pull the trigger and may not have even been present when the victim was killed. The trial court did not reconcile how both defendant and his older codefendant-who killed the victim-could each be the truly rare juvenile offender deserving of LWOP given their differing conduct. Regarding the next Miller factor, the trial court found that there was no evidence that the incapacities of youth hurt defendant's ability to participate in preparing his defense or led him to implicate himself to the authorities. Thus, it found that "this factor favors sentencing defendant to life without the possibility of parole." That is, this factor was aggravating, not mitigating. The trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. Miller did not suggest that a juvenile offender is more deserving of LWOP if the offender is better able to participate in their defense. If a defendant's youth hindered their ability to successfully navigate the criminal justice system, that fact is mitigating. If a defendant's youth did not hinder their ability, this factor is neutral. The final Miller factor is the possibility of rehabilitation. The trial court found that defendant's "far from optimal" home environment-the only factor that the court found weighed against a sentence of LWOP-also showed that defendant's prospects for rehabilitation were minimal, supporting LWOP. The court's analysis was backward. Because there was no evidence that defendant could not be rehabilitated, there was no reason to conclude that defendant, like the great majority of youths, lacked the capacity to change and mature. Requiring a defendant to prove that they fall into the general category of adolescents would turn Miller upside down. The trial court erred by finding that defendant's family environment was mitigating under one Miller factor but that the same finding discounted the mitigation of another Miller factor. Childhood trauma, neglect, and abuse will always pose a challenge for a juvenile's rehabilitation. But the Supreme Court views a difficult upbringing as a mitigating factor, not as evidence of impossible rehabilitation. The trial court's contrary assessment was error.
Justice Viviano, joined by Justices Zahra and Clement, dissenting, stated that the majority was using this brutal kidnapping and murder case as an opportunity to drastically limit the discretion sentencing courts have traditionally held to impose a sentence on a defendant convicted of one of our state's most serious crimes. The majority announced a presumption against imposing LWOP on juveniles who commit the crime of murder, ignoring Skinner, in which the Court declined to recognize such a presumption only a few years ago. The requirement that the prosecution must file a motion requesting an LWOP sentence is only a condition precedent, not evidence of a presumption. The majority then announced that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting this presumption, despite the fact that no such burden exists in MCL 769.25. Instead, the statute imposes an unqualified requirement that the trial court consider the Miller factors and exercise its discretion to impose either a term-of-years sentence or an LWOP sentence. Justice Viviano would have concluded that neither party has the burden of proving to the sentencing court how it should weigh an individual Miller factor. From a practical standpoint, a no-burden standard makes good, common sense. The Miller factors are not aggravating factors. Therefore, a prosecutor who is seeking an LWOP sentence has no incentive to present evidence regarding the Miller factors. It is the defendant who has the incentive to present mitigating evidence. The majority's holding was not supported by the statute and conflicted with caselaw; its rewriting of the statute also raised serious separation-of-powers concerns. Justice Viviano would have instead applied the abuse-of-discretion standard and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by resentencing defendant to LWOP. The trial court in this case carefully considered and applied each of the Miller factors in a lengthy, written opinion, finding that all but defendant's home and family environment favored sentencing defendant to LWOP. It was well within the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to sentence defendant to LWOP. Absent from the majority's opinion was any recognition of the enormous cost the Court imposed on the victim's family and friends by once again requiring them to relive this tragic crime at yet another resentencing, and the Court offered no hope for closure some 13 years after the heinous crime was committed because the trial judge would again have to attempt to fashion a sentence in search of the ever-elusive blessing of the majority. Rather than changing how trial courts sentence juveniles facing LWOP, Justice Viviano would have remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for it to address the issue it did not address on direct appeal-whether defendant's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 16-but he would have otherwise affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment.
Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack Justices: Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
OPINION
Cavanagh, J.
This case presents us with a vehicle to provide much-needed guidance to criminal defendants, prosecutors, and trial courts on the proper procedure for conducting MCL 769.25 sentencing hearings when a prosecutor seeks to impose a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a crime committed when the defendant was a juvenile. We hold that, as the moving party at a Miller hearing, the prosecutor bears the burden to rebut a presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence. The standard for rebuttal is clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the trial court was not operating within the framework we set forth today. Defendant is therefore entitled to resentencing. Because the Court of Appeals failed to address a separate constitutional issue that could be dispositive, however, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider that issue in the first instance before any resentencing can take place.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
There is no denying that the facts of this case are heinous. The victim, Matt Landry, was brazenly abducted in broad daylight from outside an Eastpointe sandwich shop by defendant, Robert Taylor, and codefendant, Ihab Masalmani. Armed with a gun, defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, acted as a lookout while 17-year-old Masalmani forced Landry into Landry's own car; the two then drove Landry away at gunpoint. The pair held Landry captive over the next several hours, drove his vehicle around, and stole money from his bank account. Eventually, while continuing to hold Landry captive, the pair made their way into the city of Detroit to purchase crack cocaine. The victim was last seen alive inside a vacant drug house. A few days later, Landry's body was discovered inside a burned-out house in Detroit. He had been shot in the back of the head, execution style.
Defendant and Masalmani were arrested and tried before separate juries in connection with these criminal actions. The prosecutor's theory at trial was that defendant aided and abetted Masalmani. Following trial, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); carjacking, MCL 750.529a; conspiracy to commit carjacking, MCL 750.529a and MCL 750.157a; kidnapping, MCL 750.349; conspiracy to commit kidnapping, MCL 750.349 and MCL 750.157a; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant received the mandatory sentence of LWOP for his first-degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. However, in light of the then-recent United States Supreme Court case, Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which struck down mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles, the Court of Appeals vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.
As will be discussed in greater detail, in response to Miller, the Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 769.25. In accordance with that statute, the prosecutor moved to have defendant sentenced to LWOP. MCL 769.25(2). As required by MCL 769.25(6), the trial court held a Miller hearing over the course of two days in October 2014. The trial court heard testimony from Kathleen Schaefer, a licensed professional counselor and associate professor qualified as an expert in parole and probation. Schaefer had met with defendant in prison and expressed a belief that defendant was capable of change and rehabilitation, although she admitted there was no predictive "test" that could indicate whether a person was capable of rehabilitation or not. The parties also stipulated to the admission of the report and testimony of Dr. Daniel Keating, a professor of psychology, psychiatry, and pediatrics, who was qualified as an expert in cognitive brain development in adolescents. Keating's testimony concerned scientific generalizations surrounding adolescent brain development. Following the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
On January 6, 2015, the trial court issued an order and opinion sentencing defendant to LWOP. In its opinion, the trial court went through each Miller factor and determined that LWOP was an appropriate sentence, characterizing defendant as a" 'rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.'" (Citation omitted.) Defendant again sought leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals again affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v Taylor, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 22, 2016 (Docket No. 325834) (hereinafter, "Taylor, unpub op"). Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, and the application was held in abeyance multiple times while this Court and the United States Supreme Court continued to refine the contours of juvenile LWOP sentencing jurisprudence. After the resolution of those cases, this Court ordered oral argument on the application in defendant's case, directing the parties to address
whether, in exercising its discretion to impose a sentence of life without parole (LWOP), the trial court properly considered the "factors listed in Miller v Alabama, (2012)" as potentially mitigating circumstances. MCL 769.25(6). See also People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89, 113-116 (2018). In particular, the parties shall address: (1) which party, if any, bears the burden of proof of showing that a Miller factor does or does not suggest a LWOP sentence; (2) whether the sentencing court gave proper
consideration to the defendant's "chronological age and its hallmark features," Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-478, by focusing on his proximity to the bright line age of 18 rather than his individual characteristics; and (3) whether the court properly considered the defendant's family and home environment, which the court characterized as "far from optimal," as weighing against his potential for rehabilitation. [People v Taylor, 508 Mich. 938 (2021) (alteration in original).]
II. LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const, Am VIII. This amendment" 'guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.'" Miller, 567 U.S. at 469, quoting Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560; 125 S.Ct. 1183; 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). A "basic precept of justice" requires that punishment must be proportionate to both the offense and the offender. Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing." Id. at 471. In general, juveniles are less deserving of the most severe punishments because of their diminished culpability and increased prospects for reform. Id. Juveniles lack maturity, possess an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, are more vulnerable to negative outside influence, have limited control over their own environment, and have transitory personality traits. Id. For these reasons and others, the Supreme Court held in Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for offenders who were under the age of 18 when they committed their crimes and held in Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82; 130 S.Ct. 2011; 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the sentence of LWOP for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. The Supreme Court later summarized:
Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Because the heart of the retribution rationale relates to an offender's blameworthiness, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Nor can deterrence do the work in this context, because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults-their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity-make them less likely to consider potential punishment. Similarly, incapacitation could not support the life-without-parole sentence in Graham [because] [d]eciding that a juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society would require making a judgment that he is incorrigible- but incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth. And for the same reason, rehabilitation could not justify that sentence. Life without parole forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. It reflects an irrevocable judgment about an offender's value and place in society, at odds with a child's capacity for change. [Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-473 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).]
Next came Miller, 567 U.S. 460, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for crimes committed when the offender was under 18 years old. Mandatory LWOP penalty schemes "preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it." Id. at 476. This "poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment." Id. at 479. "[I]n imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult." Id. at 477.
The Supreme Court set forth circumstances that a trial court should consider before concluding that it is appropriate to sentence a juvenile offender to die in prison. Id. at 477-478. Those "Miller factors" are: (1) the juvenile's "chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences"; (2) the juvenile's family and home environment-"from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional"; (3) "the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him"; (4) "the incompetencies of youth," which affect whether the juvenile might have been charged with and convicted of a lesser crime, for example, because the juvenile was unable to deal with law enforcement or prosecutors or because the juvenile did not have the capacity to assist their attorney in their own defense; and (5) the juvenile's "possibility of rehabilitation." Id. These factors have been expressly incorporated into this state's discretionary juvenile LWOP sentencing scheme. MCL 769.25(6).
While the Supreme Court declined to categorically ban juvenile LWOP sentences for homicide convictions, it reasoned that the "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. "That is especially so because of the great difficulty . . . of distinguishing at this early stage between the 'the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.'" Id. at 479-480, quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 773, and citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
A few years later, the Supreme Court held that Miller would be applied retroactively. Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190; 136 S.Ct. 718; 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In that case, the Supreme Court reiterated that, while Miller did not foreclose a sentencer's ability to sentence a juvenile to LWOP, "a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children" and is reserved for those "whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption." Id. at 195 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Most recently, in Jones v Mississippi, 593 U.S. __; 141 S.Ct. 1307; 209 L.Ed.2d 390 (2021), the Supreme Court concluded that a factual finding of permanent incorrigibility was not constitutionally required before imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile offender. Id. at __, __; 141 S.Ct. at 1314, 1319. Even so, that decision "carefully follow[ed] both Miller and Montgomery" and reconfirmed that juvenile LWOP should be "relatively rare." Id. at __, __; 141 S.Ct. at 1318, 1321.
As for this Court's relevant precedent, in People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89; 917 N.W.2d 292 (2018), we considered whether MCL 769.25 was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We held that MCL 769.25 did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the statute did not require a judge to find any particular fact before imposing LWOP. Id. at 97. The Court further recognized that, under Miller, the Eighth Amendment does not require a sentencer to make a finding of "irreparable corruption" before imposing an LWOP sentence. Id. at 120. The subsequent Jones decision confirmed that this was an accurate statement of law. Jones, 593 U.S. at; 141 S.Ct. at 1318-1319 ("[T]he Court has unequivocally stated that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required before a sentencer imposes [an LWOP] sentence on a murderer under 18.").
III. ANALYSIS
This Court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law. People v Hughes, 506 Mich. 512, 522; 958 N.W.2d 98 (2020). A trial court's decision to sentence a juvenile to LWOP is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Skinner, 502 Mich. at 131-132. A sentencing court's underlying factual findings in support of a sentence are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 137 n 27.
Miller's substantive holding is that LWOP is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 210. In Montgomery, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the procedures necessary to implement that substantive guarantee are left to the states. Id. at 211 ("[T]his Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the States' sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems."). Although Jones held that all that was required is a discretionary sentencing procedure, it also noted that its holding did "not preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder." Jones, 593 U.S. at __; 141 S.Ct. at 1323. The Michigan Legislature has imposed additional sentencing limits via MCL 769.25. It is this Court's duty to "determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature through reasonable construction in consideration of the purpose of the statute and the object to be accomplished," Gross v Gen Motors Corp, 448 Mich. 147, 158-159; 528 N.W.2d 707 (1995), and it is also our duty to ensure that sentencing judges have the tools to "determine the proper sentence in individual cases in light of the facts and circumstances of the offense," Jones, 593 U.S. at __; 141 S.Ct. at 1322. With these principles in mind, today we clarify the procedural mechanisms necessary for applying MCL 769.25 that are consistent with the statutory language, the constitutional background giving rise to that statute, and standard motion practice in Michigan. Specifically, we hold that there is a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences in Michigan and that it is the prosecution's burden to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence at a Miller hearing.
It is helpful to start with an overview of MCL 769.25, the statute our Legislature enacted to remedy the constitutional defect present in sentencing schemes that allow for mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences. Under that statute, if a defendant who was less than 18 years old at the time of their crime is convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including first-degree murder, the prosecutor may file a motion seeking to have the juvenile sentenced to LWOP. The motion "shall specify the grounds on which the prosecuting attorney is requesting the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole." MCL 769.25(3). The defendant has 14 days to respond. MCL 769.25(5). After that, the court must conduct a hearing on the motion during which it must consider the Miller factors and may consider any other relevant criteria. MCL 769.25(6). Next, the court must "specify on the record the aggravating and mitigating circumstances considered by the court and the court's reasons supporting the sentence imposed." MCL 769.25(7). If the court decides not to sentence the defendant to LWOP, it must sentence the defendant to a statutory term of years. MCL 769.25(9).
The question of who bears the burden at a Miller hearing is relatively straightforward. Although MCL 769.25 does not include a specified standard of proof, the burden of proof is generally assigned to the party who "seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion." 2 McCormick, Evidence (8th ed), § 337, p 696. This concept-that the moving party bears the burden-is uniformly present in Michigan practice and procedure in both criminal and civil contexts. See, e.g., People v Denson, 500 Mich. 385, 398; 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017) (noting that the prosecution bears the burden of establishing a proper purpose when seeking to introduce other-acts evidence); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n, IAFF Local 344 v Detroit, 482 Mich. 18, 34; 753 N.W.2d 579 (2008) (recognizing that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking a preliminary injunction); Shallal v Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co, 455 Mich. 604, 609; 566 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (stating that the burden of supporting its position is on the party moving to show summary disposition is appropriate); People v Maranian, 359 Mich. 361, 368; 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960) (explaining that the burden of showing the necessity of requested discovery "rests upon the moving party"); People v Van Camp, 356 Mich. 593, 602-603; 97 N.W.2d 726 (1959) (noting that the burden is on the movant of a motion in a criminal proceeding). Nothing in MCL 769.25 suggests a deviation from this standard practice. See Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich. 58, 61-62; 8 N.W.2d 910 (1943) (noting that if the Legislature had intended to depart from a long-established construction, it "seems certain that it would have expressed such intention in clear and definite terms").
Pursuant to the statutory scheme created by the Legislature, if the prosecutor does not seek LWOP for a juvenile defendant convicted of one of the enumerated offenses in MCL 769.25(2), then the default sentence is a term of years. MCL 769.25(4). The Legislature could have simply made the Miller hearing the next step in the criminal proceeding. See, e.g., NC Gen Stat 15A-1340.19B. But, under our statutory scheme, a sentence of LWOP can be imposed only if the prosecutor files a motion. This motion requirement is meaningful. Under MCL 769.25, the status quo is that a juvenile defendant will be sentenced to a term of years; however, if the prosecution seeks to change the status quo by filing a motion to impose LWOP, it becomes the moving party that must bear the burden and risk of nonpersuasion at the Miller hearing.
A few additional points are worth making. First, a Miller hearing is not comparable to an ordinary sentencing hearing in which neither the prosecutor nor the defendant generally bears any particular burden. A Miller hearing has unique constitutional implications beyond those present at other sentencing hearings because it necessarily involves defendants who commit crimes when they are juveniles-individuals who are "constitutionally different" from their adult counterparts for purposes of sentencing. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. Second, unlike a typical sentencing, a Miller hearing is not a natural progression of a criminal proceeding because the prosecutor must file a motion to change the status quo posttrial. Third, to conclude that neither party bears the burden, as the prosecution argues, would allow LWOP to be the default sentence, which would run contrary to Supreme Court precedent and the framework adopted by our Legislature under MCL 769.25. Finally, a no-burden standard is unworkable as it leaves a juvenile defendant to the whims of individual sentencing courts, instead of promoting uniformity and fairness. See McCormick, § 336, p 694 (explaining that a possible risk posed by not allocating a burden is that a court might assign its own burden "describing that burden as it saw fit by substituting its own notions of policy"). This is particularly troublesome in a Miller hearing-when the trial court is faced with imposing the harshest possible punishment under Michigan law on some of the potentially least culpable offenders.
Because the prosecution bears the burden of proof as to the imposition of LWOP, the question becomes what does the prosecution need to prove or demonstrate in its role as the movant at a Miller hearing? Skinner and Jones make clear that, for Eighth Amendment purposes, MCL 769.25 does not require the trial court to make any particular finding of fact before the court can impose LWOP. Skinner, 502 Mich. at 114; Jones, 593 U.S. at __; 141 S.Ct. at 1319. We do not deviate from that holding, and we do not suggest that there is one particular fact that a prosecutor must prove to establish that LWOP is appropriate. For example, the prosecutor need not prove that the defendant is "permanently incorrigible" or "irreparably corrupt." That said, the Legislature has created a scheme in which the prosecutor is the moving party, and as the bearer of the burden, the prosecutor must prove something.
In this regard, we hold that if the prosecutor seeks to have a juvenile offender sentenced to LWOP pursuant to MCL 769.25, it is the prosecutor's burden to overcome the presumption that LWOP is disproportionate. "[A] presumption is a standardized practice, under which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts." McCormick, § 342, p 724. "[T]he most important consideration in the creation of presumptions is probability." Id. at § 343, p 731. A steady line of precedent from the Supreme Court could not be clearer-persons under 18, as a group, are less culpable than adults, more prone to outside influence, and more likely to be rehabilitated. For these reasons and others, juveniles are "less deserving of the most severe punishments." Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This is why the Supreme Court has, for example, categorically banned certain punishments for defendants under 18 and why all juvenile offenders are entitled to a discretionary sentencing procedure when it comes to LWOP sentencing. As a procedural mechanism, therefore, it makes sense for sentencing courts to start from the premise that the juvenile defendant before them, like most juveniles, has engaged in criminality because of transient immaturity, not irreparable corruption. In other words, it is likely that the juvenile offender standing before the court possesses those attributes of youth that diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences available under Michigan law.
Again, MCL 769.25 does not require the sentencing court to find a particular fact before it can impose an LWOP sentence. Skinner, 502 Mich. at 97. That the court need not make any particular finding of fact, however, does not relieve the prosecutor of the burden of demonstrating facts that support their extraordinary request to sentence a juvenile defendant to LWOP. In doing so, the prosecutor must prove facts and circumstances that rebut the presumption against LWOP by the well-known standard of clear and convincing evidence. The trial court, in turn, must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP. This is an exercise in discretion, not a fact-finding mission. See Skinner, 502 Mich. at 116 n 11 ("Those terms-consider, justify, outweigh-reflect a process of assigning weights to competing interests, and then determining . . . which of those interests predominates."), quoting United States v Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532 (CA 6, 2013).
These procedural mechanisms do not run afoul of Skinner or Jones. It is true that in Skinner this Court wrote that "neither Miller nor Montgomery imposes a presumption against life without parole for those juveniles who have been convicted of first-degree murder on either the trial court or the appellate court." Skinner, 502 Mich. at 131. But the central holding in Skinner was that "Miller does not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility." Id. at 122. Whether a presumption against LWOP for juvenile offenders exists was irrelevant to the outcome of the case, and so this statement was nonbinding dictum. See People v Peltola, 489 Mich. 174, 190 n 32; 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011) ("Obiter dicta are not binding precedent. Instead, they are statements that are unnecessary to determine the case at hand and, thus, lack the force of an adjudication.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, Skinner was interpreting what the federal Constitution requires while our decision today is about what the statute requires and how this Court can help guide trial courts in implementing the statute. In addition, the fact that Miller and Montgomery did not patently provide a presumption against LWOP is not dispositive. As the Supreme Court remarked in Montgomery, when a new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, the Supreme Court is "careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the State's sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems." Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211. Finally, while the Jones Court rejected that a separate factual finding of incorrigibility was a constitutionally required means to implement Miller, it in no way walked back the primary essence of that decision-that a juvenile LWOP sentence should remain "relatively rare." Jones, 593 U.S. at,; 141 S.Ct. at 1318, 1321 ("The Court's decision today carefully follows both Miller and Montgomery.").
As in Miller, our decision today does not foreclose a sentencing court's ability to sentence a juvenile offender to LWOP if it is determined that, considering all the information before it, LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate sentence. Miller, 467 U.S. at 489.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our decision today seeks to provide guidance and ensure uniformity in the procedures used by sentencing courts when facing the monumental responsibility of balancing the lessened culpability of juveniles and their capacity for change and rehabilitation with their often abhorrent criminal actions. It also intends to ensure that a juvenile defendant's substantive Eighth Amendment right against receiving an excessive sentence remains safeguarded by our Legislature's statutory scheme. Accordingly, we hold that MCL 769.25 expressly requires that the prosecutor play the role of moving party and that, therefore, the prosecutor bears the burden of proof at a Miller hearing. That burden is to rebut a presumption that the particular juvenile defendant is not deserving of LWOP. If the prosecutor cannot shoulder this burden by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must sentence the defendant to a term of years. With this guidance on practice and procedure, it is our sincere hope that Michigan's discretionary sentencing scheme, MCL 769.25, can live up to the Supreme Court's philosophy that a discretionary sentencing procedure will ensure that juvenile LWOP remains relatively rare. Jones, 593 U.S. at __; 141 S.Ct. at 1318.
Before the trial court can implement these procedures, however, the Court of Appeals must address an issue raised by defendant in his appeal of right. In his Court of Appeals brief, defendant argued that his LWOP sentence violates the Eighth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 16 because he was convicted of felony murder as an aider and abettor. The panel failed to address this issue, so we remand to that Court for consideration of defendant's argument. We do not retain jurisdiction.
McCormack, C.J. (concurring).
I concur fully with the majority opinion. I write separately to explain, as I did in People v Masalmani, 505 Mich. 1090 (2020) (McCormack, C.J., dissenting), why I believe the trial court abused its discretion in applying the factors from Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), when sentencing the defendant, Robert Taylor. As the majority explains, those factors are (1) the juvenile's chronological age and its hallmark features, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, (2) the juvenile's family and home environment, (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him, (4) "the incompetencies of youth," and (5) the juvenile's possibility of rehabilitation. Id. at 477-478.
I. CHRONOLOGICAL AGE AND ITS HALLMARK FEATURES
The first Miller factor requires considering the juvenile defendant's "chronological age and its hallmark features . . . ." Id. at 477. These hallmark features include "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." Id. Most juveniles possess these characteristics. Id. at 471 (noting that it was "common sense" and that" 'any parent knows'" that children possess these characteristics) (citation omitted); Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116; 102 S.Ct. 869; 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) ("Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult.").
The defendant was 16 years and 10 months old at the time of the offense. The trial court found noteworthy that although he was 10 months younger than his codefendant, Ihab Masalmani, the defendant was "still much older than the 14-year old [sic] defendants in Miller." As to the "hallmark features" of youth, the trial court acknowledged that the defendant presented an expert, Dr. Daniel P. Keating, who testified that an adolescent's limbic system, "which serves as an arousal system, . . . an incentive system, and a reward system" is more active than an adult's. The expert also explained that the prefrontal cortex is supposed to work as a "brake on the [limbic] system but it develops much more slowly than the limbic system." There is thus a "developmental maturity mismatch" between the two systems in adolescents. As a result, Keating explained, teenagers tend to engage in reckless behavior.
But the trial court found that the defendant's age and its hallmark features did not "significantly mitigate defendant's culpability." The court believed that the defendant was readily distinguishable from the Miller defendants because those defendants were roughly two years younger. Although Keating stated that the prefrontal cortex remains undeveloped, the court reasoned that because it was "not free to take this developmental disconnect into consideration when a criminal is over 18," and this defendant was only 14 months shy of 18, his developmental disconnect was "not much more pronounced than that of an 18 year old." Ultimately, the court was "not convinced that this factor mitigates against a sentence of life without the possibility of parole" (LWOP).
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's consideration of this first factor. People v Taylor, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 22, 2016 (Docket No. 325834); slip op at 3-4. For the panel, the defendant's age was "in marked contrast to the 14-year-old defendants in Miller[.]" Id. And it concluded that the record refuted "any claim that the hallmark features of adolescence identified in Miller . . . played any role in defendant's crimes." Id. at 4. Unlike in Miller, this case did not involve a botched robbery but brazen criminal action over a long period. Id. To the panel, this demonstrated that the crime was "not reflective of a merely immature or impetuous adolescent who fails to appreciate risks and consequences." Id. Finally, the panel concluded that Keating's testimony had "minimal bearing" because he did not personally meet or interview the defendant and his testimony only addressed "generic brain science." Id.
I am not persuaded by either court's reasoning. A juvenile defendant need not be the same age as the petitioners from Miller to receive the benefit of the Miller decision. The Supreme Court drew the line at 18, not 14. Proximity to age 18 can affect the extent of the mitigation; the Supreme Court suggested as much. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476-477 (explaining that one of the flaws of mandatory LWOP is that it mandates the same sentence for "the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old"); id. at 480 n 8 ("Our holding requires factfinders . . . to take into account the differences among defendants . . . ."). But that is the question: how does a juvenile's age affect the extent of mitigation? Proximity to age 18 is emphatically not an aggravating factor.
The trial court also concluded-despite the brain science presented-that because an 18 year old could not benefit from consideration of that information, neither should a 16-year-old defendant. This was also error. As I have stated, "Miller did not suggest that 18-year-olds are, as a class, equipped with the decision-making faculties that 17-year-olds lack. Nor did Miller suggest that a sentencer should disregard the expanding body of scientific knowledge on adolescent brain development merely because an older offender who, although developmentally similar, may be subject to mandatory LWOP sentencing." Masalmani, 505 Mich. at 1093 (McCormack, C.J., dissenting).
In other words, Miller requires that juveniles under 18 are to be treated, categorically, as having diminished culpability. That the Eighth Amendment might not require the same for similarly situated 18-year-olds is not constitutionally relevant. It is not a juvenile defendant's burden to prove that they were especially immature, impetuous, or risk-seeking. Miller requires that we start from the premise that every youthful offender possesses these characteristics. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' view that Keating's testimony was only minimally relevant because he did not personally interview the defendant turns the starting presumption upside down. Rather, Keating's testimony reflects the starting presumption that LWOP is not appropriate.
II. FAMILY AND HOME ENVIRONMENT
The next Miller factor is the juvenile's home and family environment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477. Juveniles subjected to trauma, abuse, and neglect are more vulnerable to outside influences than ordinary teenagers and suffer from cognitive underdevelopment, lack of maturity, and decreased ability to restrain impulses. Equal Justice Initiative, Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing 13- and 14-year-old Children to Die in Prison (January 2008), p 18, available at <https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/cruel-and-unusual.pdf> (accessed June 8, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Z9MW-KCS2]. One of the Miller petitioners was physically abused and neglected by addict parents, in and out of foster care, and struggled with mental health issues, Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, and the other petitioner came from a background of violence, id. at 478.
The trial court here recognized the defendant's difficult home and family environment. He was born to a teenaged mother and grew up in an unstable and unsafe environment; there was an active child protective case open on the family from the time the defendant was 6 years old. He was neglected and subjected to violence and substance abuse. His father, who was addicted to alcohol and cocaine, was not present. More than once, the defendant and his siblings did not have adequate food and shelter.
The trial court concluded from this evidence that the defendant's family environment was "far from optimal" but determined only that this factor "could arguably favor some leniency or lessening of culpability for defendant." (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals affirmed: "In light of these far from optimal circumstances, the trial court properly weighed this factor in favor of defendant and against a life without parole sentence." Taylor, unpub op at 4.
I agree with the trial court that the defendant's home environment was "far from optimal" but disagree it only arguably favors leniency. As the Supreme Court has said, "vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean[s] juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment." Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570; 125 S.Ct. 1183; 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).
III. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE
The third Miller factor is the "circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the juvenile's] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him." Miller, 567 U.S. at 477. Because one of the Miller petitioners did not fire the bullet that killed the victim, had not intended her death, and was convicted as an aider and abettor, id. at 478, these circumstances were part of the calculus of determining the defendant's culpability, id.
In this case, the trial court recounted the grim details of the victim's abduction and death and acknowledged that it was the codefendant who shot the victim. And although the defendant's expert, Kathleen Schaefer, testified that "peer pressure is an issue for children," the court determined that no specific evidence or testimony tied the defendant's criminal activity to "direct peer or family pressure." Thus, the trial court found that this factor "weighs in favor of finding that defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole is appropriate." The court was persuaded that because the defendant drove the victim around for hours and "facilitated his murder in cold blood . . . his actions were still quite culpable" given that there was no evidence that he did not expect the murder to occur, that he attempted to remove himself from the situation, or that he tried to dissuade his codefendant. According to the trial court, there was therefore nothing in the facts that would warrant anything less than LWOP.
The Court of Appeals agreed. Taylor, unpub op at 4-5. The panel reasoned that there is no categorical bar on LWOP for a juvenile convicted of felony murder on an aiding-and-abetting theory. Id. And given the substantial evidence that the defendant participated in the crime, "[t]he evidence supports the conclusion that defendant was actively and extensively involved in committing the crimes, and there is no indication that defendant was subjected to any family or peer pressure." Id.
As much as the trial court or the Court of Appeals believed that the defendant's failure to stop his codefendant's conduct, or at least to walk away from it, was evidence against mitigation, Miller says otherwise. Juveniles make rash decisions, cannot assess consequences, and are often unable to extricate themselves once criminal situations are set in motion. Id. at 478 (noting that the petitioner's age "could well have affected his calculation of the risk . . ., as well as his willingness to walk away at that point").
Finally, the trial court did not address the fact that the defendant was convicted of felony murder, not premeditated murder, and as an aider and abettor, not as the principal offender; nor did it address that the defendant did not pull the trigger and may not have even been present when the victim was killed. See Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69; 130 S.Ct. 2011; 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (noting that a juvenile offender who does not kill or have an intent to kill has "a twice diminished moral culpability" as "compared to an adult murderer"). The trial court did not reconcile how both the defendant and his older codefendant-who killed the victim-can each be the truly "rare juvenile offender" given their different respective conduct. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-480 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. INCOMPETENCIES OF YOUTH
The next Miller factor instructs trial courts to consider "the incompetencies associated with youth," id. at 477-478, because "[t]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings," Graham, 560 U.S. at 78. For example, juveniles might be unable to deal with police officers or prosecutors or help their attorneys mount a defense, leading to charges and convictions of greater offenses than an adult more capable of navigating the criminal justice system. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-478.
The trial court found that there was no evidence that the incapacities of youth hurt the defendant's ability to participate in preparing his defense or led him to implicate himself to the authorities. Thus, it found that "this factor favors sentencing defendant to life without the possibility of parole." (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals seems to have recast the trial court's work: the panel held that "[t]his factor . . . did not weigh in favor of mitigation." Taylor, unpub op at 6 (emphasis added).
But the trial court found that this factor "favor[ed] sentencing defendant to life without the possibility of parole." That is, this factor was aggravating, not mitigating. The trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. "Miller did not suggest that a juvenile offender is more deserving of LWOP if the offender is better able to participate in their defense . . . ." Masalmani, 505 Mich. at 1094 (McCormack, C.J., dissenting). If a defendant's youth hindered their ability to successfully navigate the criminal justice system, that fact is mitigating. If a defendant's youth did not hinder their ability, this factor is neutral.
V. POSSIBILITY OF REHABILIATION
The final Miller factor is the possibility of rehabilitation. Permanent incorrigibility "is inconsistent with youth." Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Few juveniles are truly incorrigible, and "many . . . have the capacity for change." Graham, 560 U.S. at 77. While a trial court might "encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and [LWOP] is justified," this will be uncommon because of "children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change[.]" Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208; 136 S.Ct. 718; 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (quotations marks and citation omitted).
The trial court found that the defendant's "far from optimal" home environment- the only factor the court found weighed against a sentence of LWOP-also showed that the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation were minimal, supporting LWOP. The court was persuaded that because no evidence showed rehabilitation, or that the defendant had accepted responsibility for his part in the offense, "that defendant's prospects for rehabilitation are negligible." As a result, the court reasoned that "this factor favors a sentence of life without the possibility of parole."
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the defendant's difficult upbringing "weighed in his favor" but also "[i]ndicated that he faces significant challenges in improving himself[.]" And, like the trial court, because there was no evidence that he had "accepted responsibility or shown genuine remorse for his crimes," there was no reason "to conclude that he has made any substantial progress in rehabilitating himself . . . ." Taylor, unpub op at 6. There was also not "any discernable basis to conclude that he is likely to do so in the future." Id.
This gets the analysis exactly backward. Because there was no evidence that the defendant could not be rehabilitated, there is no reason to conclude that the defendant, like the great majority of youths, lacks the capacity to change and mature, as the Supreme Court has consistently made plain. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. Requiring the defendant to prove that he falls into the general category of adolescents turns Miller upside down.
An escalating propensity for crime is relevant, to be sure. But" 'only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood.'" Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, quoting Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003). That is, juvenile criminal behavior does not inevitably predict adult criminal behavior. A lack of remorse is also relevant. The question is not whether the defendant was rehabilitated in 2014, but whether he could be rehabilitated within a statutory term of years-which can be up to 60.
Even more to the point, the trial court erred by finding that the defendant's family environment is mitigating under one Miller factor but that the same finding discounts the mitigation of another Miller factor. Childhood trauma, neglect, and abuse will always pose a challenge for a juvenile's rehabilitation. But the Supreme Court views a difficult upbringing as a mitigating factor, not as evidence of impossible rehabilitation. The trial court's contrary assessment was error.
Viviano, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority uses this brutal kidnapping and murder case as an opportunity to drastically limit the discretion sentencing courts have traditionally held to impose a sentence on a defendant convicted of one of our state's most serious crimes. It announces a presumption against imposing a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) on juveniles who commit the crime of murder, ignoring our precedent that declined to recognize such a presumption only a few years ago. The majority then announces that the prosecution bears the burden of rebutting this presumption, despite the fact that no such burden exists in MCL 769.25, the statute that instructs courts when they may sentence a juvenile to LWOP. The majority's holding finds no support in the statute and conflicts with our caselaw, and its rewriting of the statute raises serious separation-of-powers concerns. Rather than attempting to micromanage how our trial court judges make sentencing decisions, I would apply the time-honored abuse-of-discretion standard consistent with our caselaw and hold that the learned trial judge did not abuse her discretion in resentencing defendant to LWOP.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 9, 2009, defendant, Robert Taylor, who was then nearly 17 years old, helped his 17-year-old codefendant, Ihab Masalmani, brutally assault, kidnap, and murder a 21-year-old man in a random act of violence that began as a carjacking outside a sandwich shop on a Sunday afternoon. Defendant participated in the kidnapping as a lookout and by helping his codefendant get the victim into the car. Once inside the car, Masalmani and defendant showed the victim the gun and told him "what time it was," meaning that they intended to shoot him or beat him up. After Masalmani used the victim's ATM card to withdraw money, defendant and Masalmani took the victim to an abandoned house in Detroit, where Masalmani later shot the victim in the back of the head, killing him execution style. Defendant disposed of the murder weapon by selling it to someone on the street. Defendant was convicted by a jury of several offenses, the most serious of which was first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to a mandatory term of LWOP for the felony-murder conviction.
After defendant was convicted but before he had filed his direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v Alabama, which held that mandatory LWOP for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crime is unconstitutional. Our Legislature subsequently enacted MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, which establish procedures for sentencing juvenile defendants and resentencing defendants in light of Miller, respectively. On direct appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals remanding affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing under Miller and MCL 769.25.
A three-day resentencing hearing was held in 2014, at which there was testimony relating to both defendant and Masalmani. The trial court issued a written opinion, resentencing defendant to LWOP. The trial judge considered the five Miller factors and found that all of them except for defendant's home and family environment favored an LWOP sentence. First, the court looked at defendant's age and the "hallmark features" of it, noting that defendant was 16 years and 10 months old when he committed his crime, which was younger than Masalmani but older than the defendants in Miller, who were 14. The court noted that defendant was closer to 18 than the Miller defendants and reasoned that defendant's proximity to his 18th birthday suggested that the developmental disconnect between the parts of his brain would not be much more pronounced than that of an 18-year-old. Second, the court found "that defendant's family and home environment were very far from optimal." Third, the court looked at the circumstances of the offense, finding no evidence that peer pressure played a role. The court also found there to be no evidence that defendant did not expect the murder to occur. Fourth, the trial court found no evidence that the incapacities of youth prevented defendant from participating in his defense. Finally, the court opined that defendant's traumatic childhood reduced his likelihood of rehabilitation; it also found no evidence suggesting that defendant had shown signs of rehabilitation to date.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence in an unpublished per curiam opinion, concluding that the sentencing judge did not abuse her discretion. Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court. We held the case in abeyance for a number of cases, most recently Jones v Mississippi, in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing an LWOP sentence. After Jones was decided, we ordered oral argument on the application in this case, directing the parties to brief
whether, in exercising its discretion to impose a sentence of life without parole (LWOP), the trial court properly considered the "factors listed in Miller v Alabama, (2012)" as potentially mitigating circumstances. MCL 769.25(6). See also People v Skinner, 502 Mich. 89, 113-116 (2018). In particular, the parties shall address: (1) which party, if any, bears the burden of proof of showing that a Miller factor does or does not suggest a LWOP sentence; (2) whether the sentencing court gave proper consideration to the defendant's "chronological age and its hallmark features," Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-478, by focusing on his proximity to the bright line age of 18 rather than his individual characteristics; and (3) whether the court properly considered the defendant's family and home environment, which the court characterized as "far from optimal," as weighing against his potential for rehabilitation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the United States Supreme Court has limited the potential punishments available for juvenile offenders over the past twenty years. First, in Roper v Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on individuals for crimes committed under the age of 18 violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Next, in Graham v Florida, the Court held that "[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide."
Finally, in Miller v Alabama, the Supreme Court held "that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." In so holding, the Court relied on Roper and Graham, explaining:
Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures including from their family and peers; they have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to
extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child's character is not as well formed as an adult's; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity.
The Court further explained that mandatory LWOP
prevent[s] the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations. By removing youth from the balance-by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult-these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham's (and also Roper's) foundational principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.
The Court highlighted five factors that a mandatory LWOP statute prevents the sentencer from considering:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him- and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. . . . And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.
The defendants in Miller had argued that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on LWOP being imposed on juveniles. The Court found it unnecessary to address this issue and declined to impose such a categorical bar but observed:
[W]e think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between "the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."