Opinion
2013-01748
03-25-2015
Richard M. Langone, Garden City, N.Y., for appellant. Madeline Singas, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Cristin N. Connell and Laurie K. Gibbons of counsel), for respondent.
Richard M. Langone, Garden City, N.Y., for appellant.
Madeline Singas, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Cristin N. Connell and Laurie K. Gibbons of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Ayres, J.), rendered February 7, 2013, convicting him of assault in the first degree, assault in the third degree (two counts), and aggravated harassment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the conviction of aggravated harassment in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Penal Law former § 240.30(1)(a), which prohibited a person from engaging in communication “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm,” has been struck down by the Court of Appeals as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad (see People v. Golb, 23 N.Y.3d 455, 466–467, 991 N.Y.S.2d 792;, 15 N.E.3d 805 People v. Edrees, 123 A.D.3d 842, 999 N.Y.S.2d 86 ). Accordingly, the defendant's conviction of aggravated harassment in the second degree under that version of the statute must be vacated (see People v. Edrees, 123 A.D.3d 842, 999 N.Y.S.2d 86 ).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; People v. Finger, 95 N.Y.2d 894, 895, 716 N.Y.S.2d 34, 739 N.E.2d 290 ; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19–21, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, as the record reveals that defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 ; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 ).
The defendant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.
SKELOS, J.P., BALKIN, SGROI and LaSALLE, JJ., concur.