See People v. Cole (1982), 91 Ill.2d 172, 175, 435 N.E.2d 490, 491 ("[I]n the absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court when it discharges a jury because of its failure to reach a verdict, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not bar a new trial"). In People v. Taylor (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 148, 484 N.E.2d 384, defendant was retried for theft of firearms not from the person after his first trial ended in a hung jury. On appeal, defendant urged this court to review the evidence presented at his first trial.
A witness, however, is not equally available if he is likely to be biased against the State, for example, if that witness is related to the defendant. (See People v. Morando (1988), 169 Ill. App.3d 716, 735, 523 N.E.2d 1061, 1075; People v. Wilson (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 293, 300, 500 N.E.2d 128, 133; People v. Taylor (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 148, 154, 484 N.E.2d 383, 387.) Hence, we conclude that any comment by the prosecutor on defendants' failure to call their mother and brother to testify here was proper inasmuch as defendants' mother and brother were not equally accessible to the State, because they were likely biased against the State and also may have contradicted the victim's testimony.
) Here, we believe that the defendant's wife was not equally accessible to the State inasmuch as she was likely biased in favor of the defendant. See People v. Morando (1988), 169 Ill. App.3d 716, 523 N.E.2d 1061, 1075 (brother of defendant likely to be biased in favor of defendant and thus not equally accessible to the State); Wilson, 149 Ill. App.3d at 300, 500 N.E.2d at 133 (defendant's fiancee not equally available to State because she is likely biased toward defendant); People v. Taylor (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 148, 154, 484 N.E.2d 383, 387 (defendant's stepchildren not equally available to State). • 8 We also find that the comment concerning Grace was a proper comment.
In this regard, the prosecutor urged the jurors to do their duty and find defendant guilty. The remarks were proper as an exhortation to the jury to fearlessly administer the law. See People v. Boyle (1987), 161 Ill. App.3d 1054, 1096, 514 N.E.2d 1169; People v. Taylor (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 148, 154, 484 N.E.2d 383. We have examined both United States v. Young (1985), 470 U.S. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, and United States v. Mandelbaum (1st Cir. 1986), 803 F.2d 42, and do not find that the remarks made in those cases were similar to the comments made here, nor were they made in the same context as in the case at bar.
As the State observes, the remark was proper as an exhortation to the jury fearlessly to administer the law. People v. Taylor (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 148, 484 N.E.2d 383. • 24 The defendant's final assignment of error concerns the sentence imposed of 50 years.
Cf. People v. Taylor (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 148, 154, 484 N.E.2d 383, 387 (proper for State to comment on defendant's failure to call his stepchildren as witnesses — they could not be considered equally available to the prosecution and they could either support defendant's alibi or explain why they could not establish defendant's presence at a certain location on dates in question). • 14 When a defendant elects to take the stand in his own behalf, and gives such limited testimony on direct examination — as in this case — that the assertion of an alibi, as well as the names of potential alibi witnesses, are raised first on cross-examination, he is not automatically insulated from the inferences which naturally flow from the failure of the defendant to present any of the five witnesses he said he was with at the time of the offense.