Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05F1914
DAVIS, P.J.
A jury convicted defendant Tiffany Marin Tatum of misdemeanor possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), two counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), two counts of maintaining a place for selling or using methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366), and two counts of possession of a narcotics smoking device, a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). The jury also sustained an allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of one of the possession for sale counts. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c).) The trial court sustained an on-bail allegation (Pen. Code, § 12022.1), suspended imposition of sentence, and imposed three years of formal probation.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying her Marsden motion. We shall affirm.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2004, around 2:30 p.m., California Highway Patrol Officer Donald Guy went to defendant’s house to investigate a report of a stolen racing boat and trailer parked across the street from her residence. Defendant came home at 7:20 p.m. and was met by Officer Guy, who asked if they could step inside to where it would be comfortable to talk. Other officers arrived at defendant’s house, one with a search warrant; the warrant was executed around 8:00 p.m.
Numerous items taken from the stolen trailer and boat were found in defendant’s garage, including a red tool bag, a battery charger, a power drill, and two canisters of nitrous oxide. In defendant’s bathroom officers found a white box that contained marijuana, a marijuana pipe, and two bags holding usable amounts of methamphetamine.
An officer searching defendant’s bedroom found a bag that contained a scale and methamphetamine residue and a methamphetamine pipe wrapped in a towel. He also discovered a .38 caliber pistol on top of the dresser. A purse in defendant’s closet contained various items, including a digital scale, a glass jar with white residue, eight “Apple” bags, and 36 unused Ziploc bags.
After initially minimizing any knowledge of the trailer, defendant admitted taking the red tool box from the trailer.
Defendant was given her Miranda warnings by another officer at the end of the interview. She waived her rights, and admitted to selling methamphetamine from her house. Defendant told the officer she would purchase the methamphetamine, store it at her house, and a friend would sell it to buyers.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].
A second search warrant was served on defendant’s home on March 22, 2005. Officers found four used methamphetamine pipes, 50 to 75 unused Ziploc bags, a digital scale with white residue, a Ziploc bag with methamphetamine residue, and a small plastic cup with methamphetamine residue in a dresser drawer in defendant’s bedroom. Officers found .38 caliber ammunition, a round for a .30-30 rifle, and two plastic bags containing usable amounts of methamphetamine in defendant’s bathroom. An officer also found pay-owe sheets in the living room and defendant’s office area, along with a digital radio frequency scanner elsewhere in the house.
DISCUSSION
Defendant made a Marsden motion two days before the start of trial. Defendant first told the court she did not understand why the first search warrant was valid--the warrant was signed at 7:48 p.m., but indicated “night search not approved.” She thought the term “night search” was defined by sunrise and sunset, and therefore, the search was conducted too late. The court informed defendant, to her satisfaction, that the term “night search” applied to warrants served after 10:00 p.m. or 11:00 p.m.; there was no correlation to daylight or lack thereof.
Defendant’s next complaint was with counsel’s response to a list of witnesses she gave him. Counsel replied that this document was not a list of names; it also had “a lot of ideas and stuff.” According to counsel, defendant’s problem was she wanted counsel to address matters not relevant to her case. The defense investigator looked into the names defendant provided, but they were just “a series of . . . wrong turns in [counsel’s] opinion.”
Defendant also had an issue concerning the card of a parole officer; the card had been left at her house the day before the first search. On the back of the card was written a name and a phone number, which defendant thought belonged to a confidential informant who provided information supporting the first search warrant. Counsel stated there was no evidence that the name or number on the back of the card belonged to any of the three confidential informants utilized by the police.
Defendant continued by accusing the defense investigator of having called her a liar. Counsel could not recall this happening, and told the court such a comment did not sound like something the investigator would say.
As the hearing continued, defendant expressed the feeling she had been told too often her questions were not relevant. Counsel told the court he had done his best, having had several lengthy meetings with defendant. He had informed her of the prosecution’s current offer and tried to make it clear to her that from a legal point of view it was difficult to see how she could defeat some of the charges.
The trial court concluded counsel’s representation was not ineffective and denied the Marsden motion. Defendant then told the court she did not feel confident about going to trial. She was also unhappy that counsel had replied, “‘I can’t hear you’” during their last telephone conversation after she told him that she didn’t feel that he was “‘hearing [her].’” Counsel explained that he had told defendant that the comment was a joke, and that the comment was made about an hour into a conversation similar to that which was occurring in the Marsden motion. The court then told defendant the hearing had now lasted 30 minutes. Defendant then interrupted the court, saying, “You have to understand, this is my life.”
After being told by the court it was her choice to try the case or settle it, defendant continued to object to counsel, telling the court, “My response to every question is your statement, and it’s not a statement, it’s a report.” Counsel explained that defendant was “[t]alking about what the police officers says [sic] that she said.”
After defendant told the court, “Your position is to oversee a very important part that I have a lot of faith in,” the court started to explain to defendant how the statements would be treated at trial. Defendant complained that counsel had not filed a suppression motion regarding the statements. The court told defendant that counsel had read the police reports, explained them to her, and was ready to go to trial. The court then denied her Marsden motion for a second time. Defendant repeatedly interrupted the court during the hearing.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not inquiring into her complaints about the lack of a suppression motion. She claims the court erred by not asking counsel to respond to each of the allegations she made during the Marsden hearing. She contends the Marsden hearing did not adequately deal with defendant’s admissions made to officers, that there was no adequate defense investigation into defendant’s claim of coercion with regard to the officers’ questioning, and that numerous potential witnesses to the events were not called. We disagree.
A defendant is entitled to discharge his appointed counsel only if the record clearly shows counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become so embroiled in conflict that ineffective representation will likely result. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.) We review the trial court’s denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion, and will find such an abuse only where the defendant has shown that the failure to replace appointed counsel would substantially impair defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. (Ibid.)
We agree with the trial court that defendant failed to carry her burden of showing such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result. Defendant presented the trial court with a barrage of unspecified, often incoherent allegations against counsel. She also showed little respect for the court, interrupting it several times.
A court does not have to inquire into every vague complaint raised by a defendant. When a defendant makes vague allegations against counsel, the court has no further duty than to listen to defendant without interruption and consider any evidence presented by defendant or counsel. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367.) The trial court gave defendant numerous opportunities to explain her differences with counsel. In response to each complaint, the court either explained the matter to defendant, or examined counsel regarding the complaint. This more than adequately satisfied the court’s duty under Marsden. During the trial, the trial court held a hearing at the request of defense counsel to “take a foundational issue with respect to the Miranda admonition . . . .” The trial court held that defendant’s statements to the officers were voluntary and denied defendant’s motion to suppress. In support of the ruling, the court also determined that defendant was not a credible witness and had lied to the court, while the testifying officers were credible.
We reject defendant’s claim that the alleged inadequacy of this hearing supports a finding that the court should have granted the Marsden motion. An appellate court does not look to subsequent matters when reviewing the denial of a Marsden motion. (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070-1071, overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) Even if this midtrial hearing was relevant to the pretrial Marsden motion, it does not help defendant. We do not see how further investigation could have solved the fundamental problem with defendant’s claim regarding her admissions--that her testimony was fundamentally not credible. Furthermore, given the overwhelming other evidence of her guilt, suppression of her statements would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Even assuming that counsel was negligent for failing to further investigate the events surrounding defendant’s admissions, she was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiencies.
Accordingly, even when viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ROBIE, J., BUTZ, J.