" ( Ibid . ) In People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428 ( Tate ), we applied Spring 's ruling. Tate was arrested while driving a murder victim's car on the day of the murder. ( Id . at pp. 641–642, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428.)
Hardship excusals “ ‘are to be granted only on a sufficient showing that the individual circumstances of the prospective juror make it unreasonably difficult for the person to serve or that hardship to the public will occur if the person must serve in the particular case.’ ” ( People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 663, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428.) The propriety of a hardship excusal does not depend on the underlying facts of the specific case, but rather on the juror's individual circumstances of hardship in serving on a jury in general.
51 fails to adequately instruct that motive alone is insufficient to establish guilt, that the instruction impermissibly lessens the prosecution's burden of proof with regard to the element of intent, that it shifts the burden of proof to defendants to prove their innocence, and that its use violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and reliable guilt and penalty determinations. We reject these claims, as we have before (e.g., People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 699, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428; People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 53, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520; People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 22, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 178 P.3d 1113; People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 750, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302), and see no reason to revisit their merits. To the extent this claim merely concerns the clarity of the instruction, it is not cognizable on appeal given defendant's failure to request clarification at trial.
) The use of deceptive statements during an investigation does not invalidate a confession as involuntary unless the deception is the type likely to procure an untrue statement. ( People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 684, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428 (Tate ).) Even assuming defendant's fragile emotional state made him susceptible to Deputy Ackerman's suggestion he knew defendant was suppressing information, and that the deputy's suggestion was actually deceptive, defendant fails to explain how he incriminated himself as a result of this deception.
The court and the prosecutor extensivelyquestioned Prospective Juror J.A. orally, and the court considered both her answers and her demeanor in excusing her for cause. We distinguished Stewart on this same basis in People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428, in which the defendant argued that a juror's mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty is not a valid basis for excusal. We observed that the trial court had engaged the juror in oral voir dire, and held: “Under such circumstances, a juror's conflicting or ambiguous answers may indeed give rise to the court's definite impression about the juror's qualifications, and its decision to excuse the juror deserves deference on appeal.”
Here, the court engaged W.M. in voir dire, and “[u]nder such circumstances, a juror's conflicting or ambiguous answers may indeed give rise to the court's definite impression about the juror's qualifications, and its decision to excuse the juror deserves deference on appeal.” ( People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 674, fn. 22, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428; see also People v. Thomas, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 360, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 489, 256 P.3d 603.) [9] Defendant, however, contends we may not infer a finding of bias here because the court expressly found that the challenge to W.M. lacked merit.
[Citation.]” ( Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 898, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 261 P.3d 243 [upholding removal of prospective juror for cause where, although she favored the death penalty, she stated she would “ ‘feel a little uncomfortable’ ” and “ ‘have a hard time’ ” voting for death and she “ ‘probably would not’ ” set aside her beliefs]; see People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 110–112, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 254 P.3d 300 [upholding removal for cause of prospective juror who could not personally impose the death penalty] ( Bivert );People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 674, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428 [upholding removalfor cause of prospective juror who “harbored very serious doubts whether, if seated on a capital jury, she could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty”] ( Tate ).) Although F.T.'s assertion that she would have found it “difficult” to vote for the death penalty would have been insufficient, standing alone, to conclude her views would substantially impair her performance as a juror ( People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 786, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041;People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271), answers on her jury questionnaire, coupled with her voir dire responses and the trial court's observations of her demeanor on the stand, comprised substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that her ability to serve as a capital juror was impaired.
“When a defense attorney makes a ‘conscious, deliberate tactical choice’ to [request or] forego a particular instruction, the invited error doctrine bars an argument on appeal that the instruction was [given or] omitted in error.” ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 657–658, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; see People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 695, fn. 32, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428 ( Tate ); People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) Here, the record on appeal reveals that when the parties conferred with the trial court regarding the proposed jury instructions, trial counsel was silent when the prosecutor indicated that he wanted to withdraw his request for CALJIC No. 2.01.
However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio,supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370; accord, People v.Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428]; People v. Carrington, supra, 41 Cal.4th 145, 198; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244-1245.) Several reasons exist.
"When a defense attorney makes a `conscious, deliberate tactical choice' to [request or] forego a particular instruction, the invited error doctrine bars an argument on appeal that the instruction was [given or] omitted in error." ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 657-658 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80]'; see People v.Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 695, fn. 32 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156, 234 P.3d 428] ( Tate); People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].) Here, the record on appeal reveals that when the parties conferred with the trial court regarding the proposed jury instructions, trial counsel was silent when the prosecutor indicated that he wanted to withdraw his request for CALJIC No. 2.01.