Opinion
A167506
12-19-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAEA IMULI TASINI, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 04002012409
DOUGLAS, J. [*]
In 2021, the Contra Costa District Attorney charged Paea Imuli Tasini with murder and willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder due to his participation in two shootings that took place in 2000. At trial, the jury heard two videotaped interviews in which Tasini admitted to his role in both offenses. The jury found Tasini guilty of both charges. Tasini appeals his conviction, arguing the police prejudicially delayed prosecuting him after he came forward in 2012 with information regarding the murder. He further challenges the admissibility of his confessions to the police on the grounds that his confessions were obtained involuntarily by a police inspector's improper promises and without proper advisement and waiver of his rights. He also contends that his conviction of attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation must be reversed due to the insufficiency of evidence showing he premeditated and deliberated over the nonfatal shooting. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The Shooting of Kenneth Brown Jr.
In January 2000, Kenneth Brown Jr. was shot in the head in Pittsburg, California; he survived with severe injuries. Brown later recalled that, immediately before the shooting, he was on foot near railway tracks at night, then a car pulled up and shots rang out from the car.
James Clark heard the shooting while working at a nearby train depot. Clark looked out a window, "within moments of hearing the gunshots," and saw a Black male run from the scene "along the tracks." Clark stepped outside, found Brown, and saw a red car with its headlights off slowly drive away before it turned northbound, then turned westbound, and turned on its headlights. He also observed that the car carried a passenger, but he did not have a good view of either the driver or passenger.
Robert Zumbro heard the same shooting from his house. When Zumbro looked outside, he saw a red car with its headlights off make a U-turn. He managed to catch the car's license plate number before it accelerated past his location; he watched it turn northbound, then turn westbound, and turn on its headlights. Like Clark, Zumbro saw the car had a driver and a passenger, whom he estimated were in their late twenties.
At the scene of the shooting, police later found an intact expended bullet but no casings. A week later, law enforcement found a "completely burned" red Nissan car in central California with a license plate number that matched Zumbro's description.
II. The Murder of Danny Guyse Jr.
Nine months later, Danny Guyse Jr. died by two gunshot wounds to his head while he sat in a brown Datsun outside a liquor store. A witness told responding police that he heard two gunshots and saw two men looking into Guyse's car before leaving the scene in a white Mustang.
Based on two cartridge casings found at the scene, and bullet fragments recovered from the autopsy, a forensic ballistic expert determined that Guyse was likely shot by .40-caliber bullets fired from a Glock pistol.
III. The Police Interview Tasini in 2019
In 2019, Police Inspector Kirk Sullivan began investigating cold cases, including Guyse's homicide. Sullivan learned that retired Detective Joe Reposa interviewed Tasini in 2012 regarding the shooting, but the interview transcript and report had been lost. In 2022, when asked about the 2012 interview, Reposa recalled that Tasini reached out to the police and stated "his motivation for coming forward was that he had become a Christian and after speaking with his pastor needed to atone for what he had done in the past." Reposa recollected that Tasini "indicated . . . he was the driver . . . of the vehicle involved in the homicide [of Guyse]." Reposa further recounted looking up the alleged shooter and discovering he was in federal custody; thus, because "there was no real imminent public safety issue," Reposa merely wrote up a report documenting Tasini's statement and did nothing more.
In 2019, ostensibly without the benefit of Reposa's recollection, Sullivan located Tasini and asked him if he would be willing to come to the police station to discuss the case again. Tasini agreed.
At the start of the 2019 interview, Sullivan assured Tasini that he was "not under arrest or anything like that" and asked him to talk about the day Guyse was killed. In a discursive narrative that jumped between the two shootings, Tasini recounted "that night" as well as the "buildup" of tension between drug dealers, of which he was one, that led to Guyse's killing.
As background to Guyse's murder, Tasini admitted that he shot someone else near the train depot in Pittsburg. In recounting those events, Tasini described the same area where Brown had been shot. According to Tasini, he sat in the passenger seat of a car while his friend, Abel Ramirez, drove when something broke the car window. At the time, Tasini believed gunfire broke the window. Ramirez "made a U-turn to chase them down," which "surprised" Tasini. Tasini explained: "I wasn't thinking, I was thinking we try to find them out." After Ramirez drove approximately 0.3 miles to return to where the object hit the car, Tasini spotted three figures, "unloaded a clip," and saw one of them "fall onto the ground." According to Tasini, Ramirez then" 'hit the [head]lights'" and drove slowly away before making several turns. The car was later burned.
At this point, Sullivan reminded Tasini that he was "really focusing on the homicide portion," not this nonfatal shooting. He also reiterated that Tasini was "not under arrest for any of this stuff," but he warned Tasini was talking "about stuff that's criminal action." Tasini replied that discussing the events cleared his conscience and was important context to "explain[] everything as it was." Specifically, Tasini explained, "the reason why it was important for [him] to explain to [Sullivan] about the buildup" was because, Tasini believes, Ramirez decided to kill someone that night.
Tasini circled back to the murder of Guyse. On that night, Tasini received a "911" page, prompting him to rendezvous with several individuals, including Abel Ramirez, Aaron Doppie, and Silas Masinas. Tasini drove a white Mustang to the meeting, where he gave his gun to Masinas.
After the meeting, Tasini drove Ramirez and Doppie in his Mustang to meet someone. During the drive, Ramirez saw "this other guy driving down the street" in a "little Datsun, brown and gray," who "[had done] something to [Ramirez]." Tasini stated "[t]hat was the car [Guyse] was shot in." Tasini made a U-turn, caught up to Guyse, and told Guyse to pull over, who did so "[a]longside the liquor store." According to Tasini, Ramirez wanted to commit a drive-by shooting. But Tasini explained to Sullivan that he was "tired of, you know, being with people that's not going to do nothing," so he told Ramirez," 'No, get in the car with him.' "
Tasini expounded that he had intended to "put[] pressure on [Ramirez]" to "[g]o get in the car with [Guyse], and kill him inside the car." Although Tasini claimed he merely told Ramirez to" '[g]et in the car with him,'" Tasini assured Sullivan that Ramirez "knew" Tasini meant for Ramirez to kill Guyse. Tasini then described how Ramirez walked up to the car, drew his gun, and fired two shots into Guyse's vehicle.
Tasini recalled the murder weapon was a "Glock forty," in part because he had given the gun to Ramirez months earlier. Tasini also remembered that a witness saw the entire exchange. So, just as Ramirez did after Tasini shot Brown, Tasini drove off slowly "as a way of warning [witnesses]." According to Tasini, Doppie had stayed in the car the entire time. Tasini stated he drove to Sacramento that night and then left the car with family members in Reno.
IV. Sullivan Interviews Tasini Again in 2020
About three months after the first interview, Sullivan sought another interview with Tasini. After Sullivan again admonished Tasini that he was not under arrest, he again consented. At the 2020 interview, Tasini verified his initial account of Guyse's murder.
Notably, Tasini again stated that Ramirez preferred a "drive-by" shooting but that Tasini had "wanted [Ramirez] to prove himself" by committing the shooting inside the car with Guyse. Tasini reaffirmed that he gave Ramirez the forty caliber Glock used to shoot Guyse and that he "pushed" Ramirez to commit the murder. Tasini also told Sullivan that he was the one who broke down the murder weapon and disposed of it after the shooting.
During the 2020 interview, Sullivan pressed Tasini to be completely truthful and reiterated that he was not under arrest. Tasini stuck by his version of events, disputing any witness account that he or Doppie were outside of the car when Ramirez shot Guyse. Tasini further stated that his "mindset" at the time of the shooting made him question why he "didn't get out and shoot [Guyse] from the other side, to make sure he was dead, and tell [Ramirez and Doppie] this is how you're supposed to do it." But Tasini admitted that he also had felt some remorse in the moment because he "realized this is the first murder."
V. Procedural History
In 2021, the district attorney charged Tasini with the murder of Guyse (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and the willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder of Brown (§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2).
Before trial, Tasini moved to suppress his statements to Sullivan, arguing that he made them involuntarily in response to promises that he would not be prosecuted. He also moved to dismiss the charges on due process grounds, alleging he suffered actual prejudice from the "preaccusation delay in prosecution of 20 years from the filing of the complaint" and the offenses. The trial court denied both motions.
In a subsequent motion, Tasini moved to suppress his confessions because he was not advised of, nor waived, his constitutional rights. The trial court found Tasini was not in custody during his interviews and denied the motion. The jury heard both of Tasini's confessions during the trial.
After both sides rested, Tasini moved to dismiss count 2 for insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. After reviewing the evidence overnight, the trial court denied the motion.
The jury returned a guilty verdict for counts 1 and 2. Tasini appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Prefiling Delay
Tasini spoke to Reposa in 2012, twelve years after the shootings, but the police did not file any charges against Tasini until 2021. Tasini argues the delay was unjustified and denied him due process. We reject the claim.
We observe that Tasini is vague as to whether the delay should be measured starting in 2000, when he committed the crimes, or 2012, when Reposa interviewed Tasini. Tasini's reply briefing suggests it is the latter. When it comes to count 2 regarding the shooting of Brown, however, we assume it is the former because Tasini admitted in his motion to dismiss that he "was never implicated in the crime."
A. Legal Standards
While a delay between the commission of a crime and the filing of criminal charges does not implicate the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the right to due process bars unjustified, prejudicial prefiling delays. (People v. Smothers (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 829, 855 (Smothers).) The right of due process "safeguard[s] a criminal defendant's interest in fair adjudication by preventing unjustified delays that weaken the defense through the dimming of memories, the death or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or destruction of material physical evidence." (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 908; see People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 767.) But a lengthy prefiling delay alone is insufficient to establish a due process violation. (E.g., Smothers, at p. 860 [nearly 33-year delay in prosecution found not unconstitutional].)
Courts employ a three-step balancing test to determine whether a prefiling delay violates a criminal defendant's due process right. (People v. Bracamontes (2022) 12 Cal.5th 977, 987 (Bracamontes).) First, the defendant bears the initial burden of proving actual prejudice. (Ibid.) A minimal prima facie showing of prejudice satisfies this burden (Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540-1541), but the asserted prejudice must be affirmatively shown and may not be speculative. (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 120 (Cordova) [unavailability of witnesses not prejudicial because potential exonerating testimony is speculative].) Second, if the defendant meets its burden," '[t]he prosecution may offer a justification of the delay...." '" (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250 (Nelson).)Third, the court weighs and" 'balances the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.'" (Ibid.)
The "state and federal constitutional standards regarding justification for delay differ." (Bracamontes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 988 fn. 5.) "Under the federal Constitution, a claim based on preaccusation delay requires showing the delay was undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant." (Smothers, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 856, italics added.) We apply California's constitution because "the law under the California Constitution is at least as favorable for defendant in this regard as the law under the United States Constitution." (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)
The third step effectively creates a sliding scale. (See Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.) For instance, a scintilla of prejudice is sufficient to establish a due process violation if the prosecution purposefully delayed filing charges to gain an advantage; whereas a merely negligent delay requires "a greater showing of prejudice . . . to establish a due process violation." (Ibid.) Moreover, "[i]n so balancing the interests, 'it is important to remember that prosecutors are under no obligation to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied that guilt can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or before the resources are reasonably available to mount an effective prosecution.'" (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1329 (Mirenda).) "On the other hand,' "[t]he [prosecutors] cannot simply place gathered evidence. . . on the 'back burner hoping that it will some day simmer into something more prosecutable." '" (Ibid.) Nor is negligence or incompetence a" 'valid police purpose justifying a lengthy delay which results in the deprivation of a right to a fair trial.'" (Id. at p. 1330)
The trial court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the reviewing court" 'defer[s] to any underlying factual findings if substantial evidence supports them.'" (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 407 (Mataele).) We consider all the evidence that was before the trial court at the time it made its ruling. (Ibid.)
B. Tasini Established Minimal Showing of Prejudice
Tasini's showing of prejudice is" 'relatively weak'" and generally speculative. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 431 (Cowan).) Tasini asserts the delay to charge him caused prejudice due to the fading of witnesses' memories, the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence in Reposa's 2012 report, and the destruction of potentially exculpatory physical evidence. We take each asserted ground of prejudice in turn.
The People argue that Tasini does not and cannot raise a claim of prejudice in charging him with attempted murder of Brown because law enforcement had no evidence tying him to the crime before his 2019 confession. This is not accurate; in his motion to dismiss and on appeal, Tasini argues he was prejudiced by the destruction of physical evidence in the Brown shooting.
There can be no doubt the passage of time fades memories, but whether fresher memories would be exculpatory is impermissibly speculative. (Shleffar v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 937, 946 ["speculation about prejudice because potential witnesses' memories have failed or because witnesses and evidence are now unavailable is insufficient to discharge defendant's burden"]; see also Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 120.) Tasini attempts to skirt around this problem by arguing the witnesses' reliance on writings to refresh their recollections "deprived the defense of the ability to conduct effective cross-examination." (See Evid. Code § 771, subd. (a) [permitting a witness to "use[ ] a writing to refresh his memory with respect to any matter about which he testifies"].) But Tasini neglects the fact that he had an opportunity to "inspect the writing, cross-examine the witness concerning it, and introduce in evidence such portion of it as may be pertinent to the testimony of the witness." (Evid. Code, § 771, subd. (b).) And in any event, it still does not affirmatively show prejudice.
As many courts have observed, it is difficult to show prejudice by the" 'impairment of one's defense'" because it"' "can rarely be shown" '" that time eroded exculpatory evidence. (Mirenda, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329, citing Doggett v. U.S. (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 655.) And here, if anything, the evidence suggests time eroded inculpatory evidence. Of the witnesses who refreshed their recollections with their prior statements to the police shortly after the shootings, Tasini fails to show that any changed their account of the pertinent details. (Shleffar v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 946 [no prejudice where "the memories of witnesses have not dimmed in any significant manner"].) We refuse to indulge Tasini's speculation that cross-examining those witnesses closer in time to the events would have uncovered exculpatory evidence.
We likewise reject Tasini's claim that the destruction of videotaped interviews of percipient witnesses to Brown's shooting prejudiced his defense. Tasini claims the video-recorded interviews may have been exculpatory, or, in the alternative, that he could have cross-examined any discrepancies between their trial testimony and their statements. But these contentions ring hollow considering Tasini did not call either witness to testify. Thus, any conjecture whether those witnesses' trial testimony would have contradicted their interviews is doubly speculative.
Separately, Tasini asserts prejudice from the loss of Reposa's 2012 report and interview transcript, which Tasini claims harmed his "effort to assert his claim that his incriminating statements were inadmissible because they were involuntarily elicited by Reposa's improper promise that [Tasini] would not be prosecuted based on any interview statements." Relatedly, he contends the loss of the report "precluded the defense from investigating discrepancies among [Tasini's] statements in 2012, 2019, and 2020." But such contentions again hinge on speculation. There is no evidence Reposa made any such promise, and there is no reason to suspect any meaningful discrepancies between Tasini's three interviews, other than him being more forthcoming in 2019 and 2020 about his involvement in Guyse's murder and his unsolicited confession to shooting Brown.
Moreover, in 2012 it was Tasini who reached out to police to confess "he was the driver . . . of the vehicle involved in the homicide [of Guyse]." Tasini claimed to have done so to "atone." It is a tautology to say an unsolicited statement needs no inducement. Thus, were we to speculate what transpired in the 2012 interview, it defies reason to assume Reposa made an "improper promise that [Tasini] would not be prosecuted." We will not do so.
We further observe that Tasini bears some responsibility for failing to record exculpatory evidence following his 2012 interview, mitigating any showing of prejudice. In Cowan, for example, the defendant asserted that, because of a 10-year delay between the crimes and his arrest, he could not recall his alibi. (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 429.) Our Supreme Court considered this a minimal showing of prejudice because, shortly after the crime, the defendant called the investigating detective to discuss the case, which demonstrated the defendant "was aware" he was a suspect and "therefore had an incentive to record any exculpatory information." (Id. at p. 432.) The instant facts are parallel. In 2012, Tasini reached out to police to confess "he was the driver . . . of the vehicle involved in the homicide [of Guyse]." Thus, at that time, Tasini had cause to document or commit to memory any exculpatory evidence; any prejudice from the loss of the 2012 report is therefore minimal. (Cowan, at p. 432.) For the same reason, we find little-to-no prejudice stemming from Tasini's alleged "inability to investigate [his] belief that [he] told another inspector named Sangimino in 2011 about the homicide." Tasini's "belief" is unsupported by evidence, which he would have had cause to preserve.
Finally, Tasini asserts "the preaccusation delay resulted in the destruction of physical and DNA evidence" that made "it impossible to test for exculpatory evidence." It is true that the physical and DNA evidence recovered at Brown's shooting was destroyed. The prosecution, however, presented strong evidence that those items-especially the swabs of blood- came from the victims, not the shooters. Regarding Guyse's murder, Tasini points to DNA testing conducted in 2020 of the bullet casings found at Guyse's homicide scene, which excluded Tasini, Ramirez, and Doppie as matches and contained "a weak and incomplete [DNA] profile" of an unidentified person. Tasini concludes the delay prevented the defense from identifying the DNA contributor and therefore prejudiced him. This is conjecture on two fronts. Tasini does not, for example, proffer expert testimony or other evidence that sooner-in-time DNA testing would have yielded better results. Nor are we persuaded that identifying the DNA contributor would exonerate Tasini any more than the fact that he was already excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA profile found on the bullet casings.
In sum, Tasini's claimed prejudice" 'cannot be considered more than minimal prejudice.'" (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 432.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports Justification for Investigative Delay
Tasini asserts that the trial court relied on the People's "wholly inaccurate claim that in 2012, [Tasini] admitted only his presence at the scene of [Guyse's murder] but did not admit his participation." Because of this, he reasons, there was no permissible justification for the prefiling delay between 2012 and 2021. Nonetheless, we will not find negligence by second-guessing law enforcement. (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.) Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the People had a "legitimate reason" for the prefiling delay beyond" 'the absence of governmental bad faith.'" (Id. at p. 1254.)
In its brief opposing Tasini's motion to dismiss, the People argued "nothing in [Reposa's] interview prompted any suspicion as to [Tasini]" and "[Tasini] led the police to think he was a witness, not a suspect, because he was not willing to fully implicate himself in 2012." At the motion hearing, the People argued that "Tasini portrayed himself in 2012 as being a bystander, a percipient witness but not a coconspirator."
In denying Tasini's motion, the trial court gave Reposa the benefit of the doubt for not further investigating Guyse's murder. Specifically, the court said, "Detective Reposa recalled Mr. Tasini coming in and recalls that [Tasini] only told him that he was present during the shooting of Danny Guyse but never gave Detective Reposa any inkling or information that Mr. Tasini was more of a[n] involved participant or in any way helped to plan the murder." The court credited this as the reason Tasini "was not a suspect after his interview." Thus, the court found the investigative delay justified because "no further need was necessary for them to look at [Tasini] further with regard to his involvement in the case."
We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Reposa's decision to not investigate Tasini further does not sound in negligence, despite not being faultless. (See Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 436 ["the investigation . . . was not perfect; no investigation is"].) First, insofar as Tasini's motion to dismiss was directed at count 2-the nonfatal shooting of Brown-Tasini admitted that he "was never implicated" in Brown's shooting before his 2019 confession; and Tasini's 2012 statements, as recounted by Reposa, did not mention Brown's shooting, and Tasini does not argue otherwise. Thus, the People had a "legitimate reason" for the delay in filing count 2.
Second, assuming arguendo Tasini's statements to Reposa were "sufficient to warrant a conclusion that [he] was a participant or suspect in the fatal shooting" of Guyse, as Tasini maintains, the investigative delay of count 1 was not negligent. There is no contention, for example, of "[n]egligence on the part of police officers in gathering evidence or in putting the case together for presentation to the district attorney." (Mirenda, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) Instead, Tasini seems to suggest that Reposa should have interrogated him further until he confessed more details or that Reposa should have flown to another jurisdiction to interview Ramirez-the latter of which statements would almost certainly have no evidentiary value in trial. (See Bruton v. U.S. (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [Confrontation Clause limits out-of-court statement incriminating codefendant].) We do not take that approach.
"A court may not find negligence by second-guessing how the state allocates its resources or how law enforcement agencies could have investigated a given case." (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.) This is a principle our Supreme Court has emphasized and repeated:" 'A court should not second-guess the prosecution's decision regarding whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant bringing charges. "The due process clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek an indictment.... Prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." '" (Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 406-407.)
So too here. We will not second-guess the police's decision to not look further into Tasini after his 2012 interview, based on Reposa's apparent impression that Tasini was merely present at Guyse's murder by Ramirez, as opposed to "more of a[n] involved participant" in it. Even though Reposa's understanding turned out to be erroneous, we find the People proffered a legitimate reason for the investigative delay.
Moreover, even if failing to probe further Tasini's 2012 statement that "he was the driver . . . of the vehicle involved in the homicide [of Guyse]" amounted to negligence," 'a greater showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process violation.'" (Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 406.) Accordingly, we proceed to the balancing process.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Tasini's Motion to Dismiss Due to Prearrest Delay
In weighing and balancing the prejudice to Tasini against the People's justification for the investigative delay, we likewise find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Tasini demonstrated de minimis prejudice; the People evidenced a legitimate reason for not investigating Tasini sooner for Guyse and Brown's murder. Even if we viewed the delay in filing count 1 to be negligent, Tasini's showing of prejudice is insufficient to establish a due process violation. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tasini's motion to dismiss due to prearrest delay.
II. Tasini's Confessions Were Not Involuntary
Tasini contends his 2019 and 2020 confessions were involuntary, and therefore inadmissible, because Sullivan employed false promises to elicit them. The record does not support this contention.
Involuntary confessions may not be introduced as evidence at trial to prosecute criminal defendants. (People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 157 (Suarez); U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.) A confession may be "involuntary" if "the motivating cause of the decision to speak was an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage." (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1088; see People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176 ["A confession is not rendered involuntary by coercive police activity that is not the 'motivating cause' of the defendant's confession"].)
The prosecution must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant voluntarily confessed. (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 157.) Courts evaluate voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.)" 'Among the factors to be considered are" 'the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity' as well as 'the defendant's maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.'" '" (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411; see Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 693.)
We review the trial court's findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the confession for substantial evidence, but we independently determine the confession's voluntariness. (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 158.) The facts of a recorded interview are undisputed. (Ibid.)
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the People met their burden demonstrating Tasini's confessions were not motivated by an express or implied promise of leniency. Even assuming arguendo Sullivan's statement at the 2019 interview to Tasini that "You're not under arrest or anything like that" was a tacit assurance of clemency, Tasini made clear that his motivation for confessing to multiple crimes was his religious conversion and guilty conscience.
Tasini urges that the phrase" 'Anything like that' could only mean suffering penal consequences for confessing to participating in crimes committed 19 or 20 years earlier prior to the interviews." We find this argument specious but need not resolve the issue.
Indeed, when Tasini volunteered that he shot Brown, Sullivan warned Tasini that "you're telling me all this stuff, and I don't know what's happened with it and what not, I'm not, you're not under arrest for any of this stuff, you're being forward, so, you know what I mean?" Tasini reassured Sullivan that "it helps me more than it helps you," and he then affirmed Sullivan's follow-up query, "Meaning, like, clear your conscience of what you did in the past, or like get right with God?"
Later in the interview, Sullivan returned to Tasini's motivations, expressly asking why he decided to make a statement in 2012. Tasini described "reading the scriptures" when a voice told him to" 'Repent.'" Tasini said he knew "exactly what [the voice] was talking about." When Sullivan again warned Tasini, "the reason I'm asking is in talking with you, when you're talking, you're openly admitting to being involved in some other shooting," Tasini again explained that "I have to let you know everything, it's better for me."
After Tasini further stated he "heard it through the grapevine" that Brown survived the shooting Sullivan followed up: "I'm not asking you, you know, like, 'Did you murder somebody,' but you just told me you said you thought that you murdered this one guy, you had been in several shootings, and you shot a few people, but no one has actually died from it thus far, as far as what I'm understanding what you're saying. This is the one murder that you were involved with where you were like, at this point, you reach this point in your life, now you're like, 'You know what? That was wrong. We shouldn't have been doing this kind of thing,' and you had come forward for it? Is that where the mindset is? Because you got to Revelations, and you found God, and you're straightening your life out?" Tasini reiterated that he was coming clean "because [he] fear[s] the Lord," because he did not "want to lie, and belittle [himself]," and because "the Lord provided this way for [him] to break loose from any secret oaths that [he] had with anyone else."
Tasini points to no other statement or evidence demonstrating another motive. Rather Tasini insists it is an "inevitable inference that [Sullivan's] promises of leniency motivated [him] to confess." But, as outlined above, making such an inference "inevitable" would contravene the law regarding the admission of a defendant's statement, which "raises two separate questions: was a promise of leniency either expressly made or implied, and if so, did that promise motivate the subject to speak?" (People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873; see People v. McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1088; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1176.) Considering Tasini's express statements that his religious convictions motivated his confessions and a lack of confounding evidence, we find the record establishes Tasini voluntarily confessed.
III. No Miranda Violation Because Tasini Was Not in Custody During Interviews
Tasini further contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements made in his interviews with Sullivan on grounds he was in police custody but was not advised of his rights before questioning, as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). "A confession obtained in violation of . . . Miranda is . . . inadmissible during the prosecution's case-in-chief." (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 931.) But this claim fails because Tasini was not in custody during his interviews.
Under Miranda, an interrogation is custodial "when 'a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395 (Moore).) "When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have understood his situation." (Id. at p. 395.) The totality of circumstances is relevant to this inquiry. (Ibid.) We review the trial court's findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the confession for substantial evidence, but we independently determine" 'whether, given those circumstances, "a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave" [citation].'" (Ibid.)
As Tasini concedes, being at a police station is not sufficient to constitute custody. (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 833.) Nonetheless, Tasini contends five factors render the interviews custodial: (1) Sullivan initiated contact with Tasini; (2) the "express purpose of the interview" was to question Tasini as a suspect, not a witness; (3) the interviews took place in a small room at the police station; (4) Sullivan never told Tasini he could terminate the interviews and leave at any time; (5) Sullivan "dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation[s]." We disagree.
Each of Tasini's contentions either contravenes black letter law or the trial court's findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence. First, our Supreme Court has held that an interrogation is not custodial merely because the police initiated it. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 403 [noncustodial interrogation where defendant "was first contacted as a witness with potentially important information about the burglary . . ., rather than as a homicide suspect"].) Second, the trial court determined that the "express purpose of the first interview was to question Mr. Tasini as a witness regarding a previous interview that he had with police where he had come to the station voluntarily on his own" and the second interview was a follow-up. In making these findings, the trial court relied on Sullivan's testimony and the videotaped interviews, which constitute substantial evidence. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 412-413 ["We find such substantial evidence in the sworn testimony of the officers"]; Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 158 ["when 'an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed' "].)
The trial court also found "the questioning was not confrontational" or aggressive, "was more along the lines of a conversational tone," and lacked "any interrogation techniques that were used to pressure the defendant into giving any information or going in a certain way." Such findings of fact are at odds with Tasini's assertion that Sullivan "clearly 'dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation[s].'" The court's findings regarding Sullivan and Tasini's demeanor are supported by substantial evidence. Sullivan testified that both he and Tasini were friendly and relaxed when they interacted before and during the interview. This characterization comports with the interview transcript; for example, when the first interview began Tasini calmly asked Sullivan, "Do you want me to shut the door or anything?" Sullivan then asked Tasini, "Can I sit on that side? I'm right-handed, I need to write. Thank you, I appreciate it, man."
For this reason, Tasini's reliance on People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151 is misplaced. As that court explained, "on the issue of custody, courts consider highly significant whether the questioning was brief, polite, and courteous or lengthy, aggressive, confrontational, threatening, intimidating, and accusatory." (Id. at p. 1164.) There, the interrogating officers "explicitly [told] defendant he would not be allowed to leave if they had to go interview an alleged alibi witness," the defendant lacked "means of getting home on his own," and the officers "unmistakably informed defendant he was a potential suspect and repeatedly told him they had evidence to prove his involvement. (Id. at pp. 1163-1164.) The court therefore found "the environment during the interrogation had become coercive, and a reasonable person would have understood he or she was required to remain for questioning indefinitely at the sole discretion of the officers and was not free to leave until he or she satisfied the officers' demand for the truth." (Id. at p. 1165.) That was not the case here.
Finally, an interrogation is not inherently custodial if it took place "in a locked interview room in the police station" or if the police did not expressly state the defendant was free to leave at any time. (People v. Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 834.) Moreover, such facts are especially underwhelming evidence of coercion where "the defendant acceded to a police officer's request to be interviewed at the police station and [t]he officer told the defendant he was not under arrest," even if "the interview was accusatory." (Id. at p. 833, citing Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we independently find a reasonable person in Tasini's position would have believed he was not under arrest and free to leave if he so chose. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 395, 403). Accordingly, Tasini was not in custody during interviews, and therefore there was no Miranda violation in admitting Tasini's confessions at trial.
IV. Sufficient Evidence Supports Finding of Premeditation and Deliberation in Shooting of Brown
Tasini also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his jury conviction for attempted murder of the first degree for his shooting of Brown. We affirm.
In reviewing a challenge to the evidentiary support for a conviction," 'we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701.) In doing so, we" 'presume[] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence,'" including direct or circumstantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Here, Tasini argues there is insufficient evidence of his premeditation and deliberation in the Brown shooting."' "Deliberation" refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; "premeditation" means thought over in advance. [Citations.]'" (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812 (Solomon).) Both are commonly shown by three categories of evidence: planning, motive, and the manner of attempted killing. (Ibid.; see People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 ["this court sustains verdicts of first-degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3)"].) Such types of evidence "are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive." (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 (Perez); see Solomon, at p. 812.) But even relying solely on these categories to guide our assessment, we find substantial evidence regarding Tasini's motive and manner of killing supports the jury's finding.
The record contains substantial evidence that the shooting did not result from unconsidered or rash impulse. Although Tasini arguably did not initiate the contact with Brown, Tasini's own statement supports the inference that Tasini devised a plan to kill Brown once Tasini perceived that Brown shattered the window of the car in which he was a passenger. (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1069-1070 [sufficient evidence of planning even though officer "initiated the early morning encounter" with defendant].) As Tasini explained to Sullivan, he and Ramirez were in an ongoing feud with other drug dealers at the time. This was, at least in part, why he and Ramirez were armed and "riding around on these streets" intimating to rival drug dealers that "if you want to deal with us, deal with us on the streets." After their car window shattered, which Tasini believed was gunfire and "assumed at the time . . . was part of the buildup that was going on between the factions of people," Ramirez made a U-turn to return to the scene and Tasini spotted the people he had "no doubt" were responsible. Tasini further recounted, "I duck[ed] down and hid, tried to take cover, but I'm ready. You know? I got my, I got a gun on me." Tasini then "unloaded a clip." This evidences a plan to kill, no matter how imprudent.
Even assuming, as Tasini contends, there was no "advance planning for this particular shooting" before the car window shattered, does not rule out premeditation, which merely" '" 'means thought over in advance.'" '" (Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 812.)"' "Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. 'The test is not time, but reflection.'" '" (Ibid.) Further, Tasini cannot deny his own agency by pointing to Ramirez's decision to drive back to the scene. Sullivan determined the distance "from point A being where the window broke to point B being where [Tasini] described opening fire" was approximately 0.3 miles. Tasini therefore had time after the window shattered, and while Ramirez drove back to the scene, to decide whether he would shoot at Brown; this is sufficient. (Ibid. [" '"' "Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly" '"' "].)
The same evidence shows a plausible motive-to intimidate rival drug dealers in the "street feud." This supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129 [evidence of "plausible motive" sufficient].) It is immaterial whether, as Tasini asserts, Tasini lacked "a compelling motive to kill Brown that predated their hostile encounter."
Likewise, Tasini's manner of attempting to take Brown's life-i.e., looking for his intended targets, taking cover, and then expending every bullet in his gun at his victim-also supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Tasini's authorities, which found execution-style killings sufficient to substantiate premeditation and deliberation, do not counsel otherwise. Of course, it is possible that a different jury might have concluded on the same evidence that, as Tasini argues, he fired his gun "out of anger, fear, or retribution." But "the relevant question on appeal is not whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any rational trier of fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant premeditated the murder." (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1127 [same].) "A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support"' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Tasini has not shown such an absence of evidence supporting the jury's findings.
In sum, the evidence of planning, motive, and manner of killing supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Accordingly, we need not recite the other evidence in the record that also supports these findings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BROWN, P. J., GOLDMAN, J.
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.