Opinion
C083378
10-26-2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CR032302)
After her motion to suppress was denied, defendant Karen Sue Takerian entered a negotiated plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (count III) and the remaining felony charges of possession of methamphetamine for sale (count I) and transportation of methamphetamine for sale (count II) were dismissed. The court imposed a 280-day county jail term but stayed execution of sentence pending appeal.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. She argues none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied nor did the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On September 23, 2014, Officer Nathan Horton went to 408 Alexander Avenue in Susanville to conduct a probation search. Mark Hafner, the probationer, listed the address as his residence. Upon arrival at the residence, Hafner was not present but defendant and Michael Iovin were present. Defendant stated that the residence was hers and Iovin claimed he was the only other resident.
Law enforcement officers searched the residence. Three police dogs alerted to the odor of narcotics emanating from a safe located in the laundry room. Defendant refused to provide the combination and Iovin claimed he did not know it. Officers seized the safe and obtained a search warrant to open it the next day. The safe contained methamphetamine, plastic baggies, and a digital scale. On October 8, 2014, the court issued a warrant for defendant's arrest.
On October 15, 2014, Officer Pon conducted a traffic stop on defendant based on the arrest warrant. The officer asked defendant to get out of the car. She removed the keys from the ignition, got out of the car, threw the keys on the driver's seat, and locked the car. Horton arrived and saw the keys in plain view on the driver's seat in the locked car.
Horton advised defendant of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . Defendant refused to acknowledge her rights and refused to speak. Horton explained that defendant's car would be impounded to ensure the car's safety as it would not have been safe to leave the car parked on the street with the keys in plain view. There had been several auto break-ins in the neighborhood where her car was parked. The officer explained that there was a department policy that required impoundment under the circumstances.
Horton testified that department policy stated that when "the driver of the vehicle is arrested and the driver of the vehicle is not the owner of the vehicle and we're able to contact the owner of the vehicle, the owner of the vehicle is on scene, then the vehicle may be released to the owner of the vehicle if they're not the person being arrested. Small misdemeanor traffic arrest warrants in which the arrest warrant is for $5,000 or less, $7,500 or less and the person is going to be released later that day, then the officer has the discretion to leave the vehicle on scene, parked and locked legally." Where the keys are on the driver's seat, "it would be a violation of department policy to leave the vehicle" at the scene of the arrest because "it would be in violation of the reasonable effort for safe keeping of a stored vehicle pursuant to a driver's arrest." Before storing the vehicle, an inventory search must be conducted pursuant to department policy.
After the vehicle was impounded, a tow truck driver used a tool to retrieve the keys and open the car. An inventory search of the car made pursuant to department policy revealed methamphetamine.
Defendant testified that when the police searched her house, she did not give them permission to take her safe. When she was stopped by Pon, he advised her that he had a warrant for her arrest and instructed her to get out of the car. She rolled up the windows, threw the keys on the floorboard, got out, and closed and locked the door with the keys inside.
DISCUSSION
For the methamphetamine found in her car during the inventory search, defendant was charged with possession for sale, transportation, and misdemeanor possession. Defendant entered a plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession. In her motion to suppress, defendant argued that the methamphetamine found in her car was fruit of the poisonous tree in that the methamphetamine found in the safe had been suppressed in another case based on an illegal seizure, the warrant for her arrest was based on the methamphetamine found in the safe, she was arrested based on the arrest warrant, and her arrest led to the impound and inventory search of her car where more methamphetamine was found. She argued the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because Horton, who conducted the inventory search of her car, was the same officer who seized the safe from her house.
The prosecutor argued that the good faith exception applied in that the methamphetamine found in the safe was suppressed in the other case on August 11, 2015, 10 months after defendant was arrested on the arrest warrant, which could not have been anticipated by the officer who arrested defendant on the arrest warrant or by Horton who conducted the inventory search of defendant's car pursuant to department policy.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence found in the car during the inventory search. The court found the good faith exception applied to the arrest warrant, and that Officer Horton who conducted the inventory search could not have known that 10 months later in another case, the seizure of the safe would be ruled illegal. The court concluded that the impound of defendant's car and inventory search followed protocol.
Defendant renews her arguments on appeal. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's suppression motion.
"Our review of issues related to the suppression of evidence seized by the police is governed by federal constitutional standards." (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1118.) "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court's factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." (Id. at p. 1119.)
First, defendant failed to establish that the arrest warrant was invalid. Defendant had the burden of showing that the warrant lacked probable cause to support an arrest. (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 770; People v. Cressey (1970) 2 Cal.3d 836, 842; People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 720; People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192, 219-220.)
Here, in his affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, Officer Horton stated that on September 23, 2014, he went to the residence listed as the address for probationer Hafner, Hafner was not present, defendant stated that the residence belonged to her, the house was searched, police dogs alerted to the odor of narcotics in the safe in the laundry room, defendant refused to provide the safe's combination and left the house, and the safe was searched with a warrant and revealed methamphetamine, plastic baggies and a digital scale. The warrant for defendant's arrest was issued on October 8, 2014, and defendant was arrested on the warrant on October 15, 2014. On August 11, 2015, in a separate case, the seizure of the safe was held to be illegal.
Defendant did not establish, nor did she attempt to establish, that the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant contained deliberate or reckless misstatements or omissions necessary to a finding of probable cause. (See People v. Huston, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at pp. 206, 219.) The arrest warrant was supported by probable cause on its face. A peace officer is required to execute an arrest warrant which is "regular on [its] face and issued by competent authority." (Lopez v. City of Oxnard (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1, 8.) Pon did so. We do not find any error.
In any event, even assuming the arrest warrant was invalid, the fruits of an invalid arrest warrant need not be suppressed if the officer serving the arrest warrant relied on the warrant in objective good faith. (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 919-920, 922-923 ; People v. Miller (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 216, 222; People v. Palmer (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 663, 668-670.) Here, Pon relied on the facially valid arrest warrant in good faith. Pon was not the officer who conducted the illegal seizure of the safe from defendant's house. Even had Horton executed the arrest warrant, his involvement would not negate the good faith exception because the detective did not know that 10 months later his seizure of the safe would be ruled illegal.
After impounding a vehicle, an inventory search may be conducted without first obtaining a search warrant provided it is conducted pursuant to standardized criteria or established routine, written or unwritten, and it is not merely a pretext or ruse for an investigatory search. (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 ; Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 372 ; South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373 ; People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 126; People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 266; People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 889.)
An officer has the authority under state law to impound a vehicle when a defendant, who is driving or in control of a vehicle, is taken into custody. (Veh. Code, § 22651, subd. (h)(1); People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721; People v. Aguilar (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1053.)
Defendant contends the inventory search was illegal because the police lacked a standardized procedure and were not fulfilling a community caretaking function when they impounded her car. While defense counsel asked the officer about the community caretaking function below, defendant did not claim the police lacked a procedure for impoundment and an inventory search and rightly so. Horton testified about the department procedure, which required the safekeeping of defendant's car. Impoundment was also justified by the community caretaking function since defendant had deliberately left her keys on the driver's seat in her car in plain view in a high-crime area when she got out, locked the doors and refused to speak to officers (See People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1248.) Since defendant's car would be stored, department policy required an inventory search.
Defendant complains that the officers failed to ask whether someone could retrieve her car rather than impounding it and did not try to get the keys, lock it, and leave it on the street. These arguments lack merit. As noted, defendant deliberately locked her keys in the car and refused to talk to the detective who tried to speak with her at the scene of her arrest. Moreover, that there may have been other means of protecting her car and contents does not mean the impound was unreasonable. (People v. Steeley, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 892.)
Defendant argues that the search of her car cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest or pursuant to the automobile exception. Having concluded that the inventory search was justified, we do not discuss these exceptions.
We conclude that defendant's challenges to her arrest on the warrant and the impound of her car and inventory search lack merit. The trial court properly denied her suppression motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL, J. We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P. J. MAURO, J.