Here, although County Court stated that prior counsel was experienced and knowledgeable and had represented defendant competently and aggressively in the proceedings until that point, the court granted defendant's request for substitution of counsel in the face of defendant's threat to absent himself from all court proceedings if prior counsel continued to represent him. New counsel then had four days to prepare for trial, and defendant concedes that the short notice did not affect counsel's performance at trial. Under these circumstances, "County Court struck a `reasonable balance between defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his own choice and the need to guard against unwarranted delay occasioned by . . . [the] request for substitution'" ( People v Goldston, 34 AD3d 922, 923, lv denied 8 NY3d 846 [citation omitted]; see People v Swaby, 179 AD2d 793, 793). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the police entry into his home did not violate Payton v. New York ( 445 U.S. 573). There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing courts conclusion that the defendant consented to the police entry into his home ( see, People v. Gonzalez, 222 A.D.2d 453; People v. Washington, 209 A.D.2d 817, 819; cf., People v. Richardson, 229 A.D.2d 316) and to the limited search for the gun ( see, People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128-130). The trial court's denial of the defense request for a continuance after the defendant chose to substitute counsel on the eve of trial was not an improvident exercise of discretion ( see, People v. Swaby, 179 A.D.2d 793; People v. Sharpe, 166 A.D.2d 620; People v. Gabler, 129 A.D.2d 733). Further, the court properly precluded the defendant from cross-examining the complainant, or eliciting testimony from the defendant's brother, about the brother's alleged sexual encounter with the complainant prior to the rape in order to establish a possible source of the semen recovered from the complainant's clothing.