Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 2422941
BY THE COURT:Following our issuance of a stay in the trial of real party in interest’s codefendants, petitioner asked the trial court to continue real party’s trial so that the cases would remain joined. The trial court denied the request for the continuance and petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate with a request for a stay. We issued a stay of real party’s trial, sought informal opposition, and also gave notice that we might direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180.)
Penal Code section 1050.1 provides that if the court, upon showing of good cause, continues the trial of a jointly charged defendant, “the continuance shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, constitute good cause to continue the remaining defendants’ cases so as to maintain joinder.” It goes on to say that “[t]he court... shall not cause jointly charged cases to be severed due to the unavailability or unpreparedness of one or more defendants unless it appears to the court... that it will be impossible for all defendants to be available and prepared within a reasonable period of time.”
Here, the codefendants are clearly unavailable for trial. But the trial court did not continue the codefendants’ cases; we stayed it to hear the People’s petition for writ of mandate. (See case No. A125840.) That distinction does not appear to be the basis of the trial court’s denial of the motion nor would it appear to be significant, as a court has essentially continued the codefendants’ cases. The next questions are whether there was good cause for the continuance and if it appears that the joint trial will happen in a reasonable period of time. Clearly we think there was good cause as we issued the stay. Moreover, there is no indication that the writ proceeding in the codefendants’ cases will not be resolved in a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the trial court should have granted petitioner’s request for a continuance.
In accordance with our notification to the parties that we might do so, we will direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 177-180.) Petitioner’s right to relief is obvious and no useful purpose would be served by issuance of an alternative writ, further briefing and oral argument. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236-1237, 1240-1241.) Therefore, let a peremptory writ of mandate issue requiring respondent court to grant petitioner’s motion to continue the trial.
This decision shall be final as to this court within five (5) court days (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(3)), at which time the stay is dissolved.