Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Ronald L. Taylor, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. No. IM18172, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Petition granted.
Rod Pacheco, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Law Offices of Aaron L. Turner and Aaron L. Turner for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
GAUT, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
In this matter, we have reviewed the petition and the opposition filed by real party in interest. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
DISCUSSION
First, we stress that this is not an “unreasonable delay/due process” case. (Cf. People v. Litmon (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 383.) Real party in interest’s motion was based on the breach of the 2004 stipulation and, in any event, the record is certainly not adequate to permit an evaluation of the reasons for the various delays.
In our view, the trial court erroneously granted real party in interest’s motion for dismissal based on petitioner’s failure to have “full” psychological evaluations completed within the six- to eight-month period provided in the stipulation. If real party in interest had felt genuinely prejudiced by the additional delay, the time to seek assistance from the trial court was in 2005 when the delay became apparent. Had real party in interest done so, the trial court could possibly have prompted the People into compliance or, at the very least, the reasons for the delay would have been easier to ascertain and evaluate. The delay (and we note the evaluations were completed Jan. 2006) does not constitute a basis for a “gotcha!” dismissal four years later. Furthermore, the stipulation on its face contains no acquiescence by petitioner to such a sanction.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order dismissing the petition in question and to enter a new order denying real party in interest’s motion.
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, J., MILLER, J.