Opinion
F079022
09-25-2019
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; J.B., Real Party in Interest.
Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, and Galen Rutiaga, Chief Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Law Offices of Douglas C. Foster and Douglas C. Foster for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15CEJ600281-6)
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Mary Dolas, Judge. Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, and Galen Rutiaga, Chief Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Law Offices of Douglas C. Foster and Douglas C. Foster for Real Party in Interest.
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Effective November 9, 2016, Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57 or the Act), eliminated a prosecutor's ability to directly file charges in criminal (adult) court against minors who were 14 years of age or older at the time of their alleged offenses, and instead required prosecutors to obtain juvenile court approval before prosecuting minors in criminal court. Subsequently, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) (Senate Bill No. 1391). That legislation, which took effect on January 1, 2019, prohibits the transfer of 14- and 15-year-old offenders to criminal court in virtually all circumstances.
"The juvenile court and the criminal court are divisions of the superior court, which has subject matter jurisdiction over criminal matters and civil matters, including juvenile proceedings. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) When exercising the jurisdiction conferred by the juvenile court law, the superior court is designated as the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 245.)" (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 548, fn. 3.) Accordingly, when we refer to the juvenile court or the criminal (adult) court, we are referring to the statutory authority of the particular division of the superior court, in a given case, to proceed under the juvenile court law or the law generally applicable in criminal actions. (See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 837.)
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
This case concerns the validity of Senate Bill No. 1391. The District Attorney of Fresno County (the District Attorney) asks us to hold it is invalid, and issue a writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing pursuant to section 707 as it existed before enactment of Senate Bill No. 1391. Because we conclude Senate Bill No. 1391 is valid, we deny the petition for writ of mandate.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 26, 2019, the District Attorney filed a first amended juvenile wardship petition (§ 602) in Fresno County Superior Court case No. 15CEJ600281-6, alleging real party in interest J.B. (J.B.), age 15, committed four counts of robbery in which he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The District Attorney filed a "Motion in Support of Request for Transfer Hearing; Brief Re: SB-1391," in which she argued Senate Bill No. 1391 unconstitutionally amended Proposition 57.
The petition for writ of mandate and return thereto filed in this court erroneously show the first two digits of the lower case number as 19 instead of 15.
The record before us does not contain the transfer request itself. --------
At a hearing on March 6, 2019, the court found the District Attorney's arguments "unsupported and also unpersuasive." In part, the court found the issue to be whether the purpose of Proposition 57 was to limit the class of juveniles who could be tried as adults or whether it was to invest in juvenile court judges the discretion to decide in which court minors could be tried. Based primarily on People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, the court found the purpose was to limit the class of minors who could be tried as adults; hence, the court concluded, Senate Bill No. 1391 furthered the intent of Proposition 57. The court found Senate Bill No. 1391 to be constitutional and to apply in J.B.'s case. Accordingly, it ruled that since J.B. was 15 years old at the time of the alleged offenses, he did not fall within the purview of section 707, subdivision (a)(1), as amended by Senate Bill No. 1391. The court denied the People's transfer motion and set the matter for a settlement conference.
The District Attorney petitioned this court for a writ of mandate. We stayed further proceedings and issued an order to show cause.
DISCUSSION
The District Attorney contends Senate Bill No. 1391 unconstitutionally amended Proposition 57, and so is invalid. Her overall claim is that the legislation is inconsistent with the Act and does not further its intent. She finds it "highly significant" that the original version of Proposition 57 established 16 years old as the minimum age at which juveniles could be transferred to criminal court, but this provision was eliminated from the version submitted to voters. She also asserts that if Senate Bill No. 1391 is upheld, the Legislature ultimately could eliminate prosecution in criminal court for all minors.
Recently, we rejected these arguments. (People v. Superior Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, 372-375 [intent and purpose]; id. at pp. 376-377 [drafting history]; id. at pp. 377-378 [legislative nullification], petn. for review pending, petn. filed Sept. 13, 2019.) We see no reason to revisit our analyses and conclusions. Senate Bill No. 1391 constitutionally amended Proposition 57.
DISPOSITION
The order to show cause previously issued is discharged, and the petition for writ of mandate is denied. The stay issued by this court on April 8, 2019, shall remain in effect only until this opinion becomes final in all courts in this state or the California Supreme Court grants a hearing, whichever shall first occur; thereafter said order is vacated and said stay is dissolved.
/s/_________
DETJEN, J. I CONCUR: /s/_________
PEÑA, J. Poochigian, Acting P.J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Superior Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360 (petn. for review pending, petn. filed Sept. 13, 2019) (dis. opn. of Poochigian, J.).
/s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.J.