People v. Sumpter

15 Citing cases

  1. People v. Crane

    35 Misc. 3d 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    To the extent that defendant has preserved his objection to the Justice Court's refusal to discharge the prospective juror for cause, we find no error. Where a prospective juror's statements raise a serious question as to bias, the juror must be excused unless the juror can provide an unequivocal and unambiguous assurance that he can set the bias aside and reach a fair and impartial verdict (People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 613 [2000];Matter of State of New York v. Kalchthaler, 82 AD3d 1672, 1673 [2011];People v. Velasquez, 79 AD3d 1153, 1153–1154 [2010] ). In determining whether a potential juror has made the necessary unequivocal declaration, there is no canonical formula; rather, the juror's statements must be evaluated as a whole to determine if the unequivocal declaration is credible and sufficient (People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d at 615–616;People v. Wilson, 7 AD3d 549, 550 [2004];People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389, 391 [1997] ). The determination of whether a prospective juror has exhibited such bias and has produced an unequivocal declaration are determinations that are “committed largely to [the] judgment of the Trial Judge with his [or her] peculiar opportunities to make a fair evaluation” (People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 885 [1984];People v. Pagan, 191 A.D.2d at 651–652).

  2. People v. Chambers

    283 A.D.2d 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    "[W]hen potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence" ( People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 614). The challenged prospective juror in this case expressed his bias in favor of the testimony of police officers, thus demonstrating that his state of mind was "likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial" (CPL 270.20 [b]; see, People v. Johnson, supra, at 614-615; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389, 390-391, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864). The prospective juror asserted that he "would try not to" give the testimony of police officers more weight than that of other witnesses and, when asked whether his views would affect his ability to listen fairly to police testimony, he responded, "No, I don't think so." Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, we conclude that those assertions fall short of an unequivocal declaration of impartiality ( see, People v. Sumpter, supra, at 391; see generally, People v. Burdo, 256 A.D.2d 737, 740-741), and thus defendant's challenge for cause should have been granted.

  3. People v. Escoto

    283 A.D.2d 962 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 5 times

    Where the testimony of a prospective juror reveals uncertainty, the court must examine the juror's testimony as a whole ( see, People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361, 368, rearg denied 64 N.Y.2d 885; People v. Blyden, supra, at 78) and "should lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testing the bounds of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve" ( People v. Branch, 46 N.Y.2d 645, 651; see, People v. Torpey, supra, at 369; People v. Blyden, supra, at 78). Equivocal responses "are insufficient in the absence of `express and unequivocal' declarations that the juror will put any preconceptions aside and render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence" ( People v. Burdo, 256 A.D.2d 737, 740; see, People v. Brzezicki, 249 A.D.2d 917, 918-919; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389, 390-391, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864; People v. Webster, 177 A.D.2d 1026, 1028, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 866). Here, the prospective juror gave equivocal responses concerning his impartiality and did not state unequivocally that his prior state of mind would not influence his verdict.

  4. People v. Thigpen

    277 A.D.2d 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Thigpen (277 A.D.2d 261), a prospective juror who indicated that he believed police officers were more credible than other witnesses was told by the court that one had to "treat a police officers like anyone else.

    However, the court did not further explore the prospective juror's bias or attempt to otherwise elicit an expurgatory oath. The tendency to accept uncritically the testimony of police officers constitutes a "state of mind that is likely to preclude [the juror] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial" (CPL 270.20[b]; see, People v. Zachary, 260 A.D.2d 514; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389). Furthermore, contrary to the People's contention, it is the obligation of the trial court, and not of the defense counsel, to "require the prospective juror to `expressly state that his prior state of mind * * * will not influence his verdict, and * * * that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence'" (People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361, 367, quoting People v. Biondo, 41 N.Y.2d 483, 485, cert denied 434 U.S. 928; see also, People v. Zachary, supra; People v. Cruz, 244 A.D.2d 417). Here, the court failed to obtain such a statement from the prospective juror and denied the defendant's challenge for cause. Inasmuch as the defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to excuse the prospective juror and then subsequently exhausted all of his challenges before jury selection was complete, we reverse and order a new trial (see, CPL 270.

  5. People v. Jackson

    271 A.D.2d 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 2 times

    The court failed to conduct further inquiry, and the juror never unequivocally stated that he could render an impartial verdict based on the evidence presented (see, People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73). Defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge against this juror, and exhausted all peremptory challenges before the end of jury selection. The defendant was thereby prejudiced, requiring a new trial (see, People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389). The defendant also contends that an audio tape recording of a telephone call to the 911 emergency number, reporting the crime in question, was Rosario material and that the failure to preserve the tape required that an adverse inference charge be given. Where the tape of a 911 call is not preserved and the defendant is prejudiced thereby, the court must impose an appropriate sanction and the failure to do so requires reversal (see, People v. Joseph, 86 N.Y.2d 565; People v. Burch, 247 A.D.2d 546).

  6. People v. Thorn

    269 A.D.2d 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 8 times

    We agree that three of those jurors should have been excused. Defendant exercised peremptory challenges to excuse the prospective jurors in question and exhausted his peremptory challenges; thus, the erroneous denial of the challenges for cause constitutes reversible error ( see, CPL 270.20; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389, 391, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864).

  7. People v. Smith

    265 A.D.2d 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    In evaluating whether the prospective juror has made an unequivocal declaration, the trial court must consider the juror's entire testimony (see, People v. Torpey, supra, at 368; People v. Jordan, supra, at 360). The record clearly demonstrates that the jurors' statements, as a whole, fell short of the required unequivocal declaration of impartiality (see, People v. Burdo, 256 A.D.2d 737; People v. Jordan, supra, at 360; People v. McFadden, 244 A.D.2d 887; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389, 391). Since the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, a new trial is required. In light of our determination we need not reach the remaining issues.

  8. State v. Harris [2d Dept 1998

    (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 21, 1998)

    In evaluating whether the prospective juror has made an unequivocal declaration, the trial court must consider the juror's entire testimony [citing authority]. The record clearly demonstrates that the juror's statements, as a whole, fell short of the required unequivocal declaration of impartiality (see, People v. Blyden, supra; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389 * *; People v. Butler, 221 A.D.2d 918 * *; People v. Williams, 210 A.D.2d 914 * *). The trial court's failure to grant the defendant's challenge for cause constitutes reversible error because the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of the jury selection (see, CPL 270.20 [2]; People v. Torpey, supra, at 365 * *; People v. Hewitt, 189 A.D.2d 781 * *).

  9. People v. Harris

    179 Misc. 2d 612 (N.Y. App. Term 1998)

    "The trial court erred in denying the defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror. Where there is evidence that a prospective juror's state of mind is likely to preclude him or her from rendering an impartial verdict ( see, CPL 270.20 [b]), the juror is required to state in unequivocal terms that he or she would be able to render a verdict based solely on the evidence adduced at trial * * * In evaluating whether the prospective juror has made an unequivocal declaration, the trial court must consider the juror's entire testimony * * * The record clearly demonstrates that the juror's statements, as a whole, fell short of the required unequivocal declaration of impartiality ( see, People v. Blyden, supra; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389; People v. Butler, 221 A.D.2d 918; People v. Williams, 210 A.D.2d 914). "The trial court's failure to grant the defendant's challenge for cause constitutes reversible error because the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges prior to the completion of the jury selection ( see, CPL 270.

  10. People v. Burdo

    256 A.D.2d 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 18 times

    either the case or either of the parties will not influence his verdict, and he must also state that he will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence'" ( People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 78, quoting People v. Biondo, 41 N.Y.2d 483, 485, cert denied 434 U.S. 928 [emphasis supplied]). "[I]t is essential that all elements of the required statements be voiced, and that they be voiced with conviction" ( id., at 78; see, People v. Walton, 220 A.D.2d 286). Equivocal, uncertain responses, including statements that a prospective juror will "try" or "hope" to be impartial, are insufficient in the absence of "express and unequivocal" declarations that the juror will put any preconceptions aside and render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence ( see, e.g., People v. Brzezicki, 249 A.D.2d 917, 918-919 [where juror who stated that her ability to be impartial could "possibly" be affected replied only "I will try" to follow court's instruction on presumption of innocence]; People v. Sumpter, 237 A.D.2d 389, 390-391, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864 [juror replied only "I think I could be impartial"]; People v. Butler, 221 A.D.2d 918 [where juror "provided assurances that he would try to be objective, but at the same time expressed doubt that he could be"]; People v. Webster, 177 A.D.2d 1026, 1028, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 866 [juror expressed only that she "thought", "hoped" and "would try" to put attitudes aside]; People v. Moore, 172 A.D.2d 778 [where juror stated "I don't know" to question whether her relationship to a law enforcement agent would affect her ability to be impartial]; People v. Scott, 170 A.D.2d 627 [where juror stated only "I hope not" and "I don't know" to question whether her relationship to a law enforcement agent would affect her ability to be impartial]; People v. Brown, 111 A.D.2d 248, 249 [where juror replied "I don't think so" when asked if it would be difficult to put aside preconceived opinions]; see also, People v. Davis, 248 A.D.2d 399; People v. Birch, 215 A.D.2d 573; People v