Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TA111582, Gary E. Daigh, Judge.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Margaret E. Maxwell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
After defendant and appellant Sidney Summerville’s motion to suppress evidence was denied, he pleaded no contest to having a concealed weapon in his car. On appeal, defendant contends that the deputy did not have a reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop, and therefore the evidence should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are from the preliminary hearing.
On March 31, 2010, at about 6:30 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Miguel Fuentes was patrolling in a marked police car. It was still light outside. Defendant drove past. Defendant’s car caught Deputy Fuentes’s eye because it had “extremely dark tinted windows.” The deputy could not see through the windows to tell how many people were in the car. Defendant’s car also didn’t have DMV-issued license plates. Instead, the car had what looked like paper plates from a dealership, although the car looked new.
All windows but the front were tinted.
The deputies conducted a traffic stop based on those two violations. Defendant was driving the car, and there were three other people in the car, including Adell Carter. The deputies asked for defendant’s driver’s license and vehicle registration. Defendant said the information was somewhere in the car, and the deputies ordered everyone out of the car. While searching for the documents, Deputy Fuentes opened the center console, and in plain view was a loaded gun. Carter told Deputy Fuentes that defendant had shown the gun to him, but, at trial, Carter testified he didn’t know who the gun belonged to and he had never seen it before.
II. Procedural background.
Before the preliminary hearing, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Deputy Fuentes was a credible witness and that he had legal grounds to stop the car based on the tinted windows. Defendant renewed his motion before the trial judge, who denied it. Defendant therefore, on August 19, 2010, pleaded no contest to having a concealed weapon in a vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (a)(1). He was sentenced to three years’ probation and required to perform 45 days of Caltrans (Department of Transportation).
DISCUSSION
III. The traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant contends that the deputies did not have a reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement personnel. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384.) But “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123.) “ ‘Although police officers may not arrest or search a suspect without probable cause and an exception to the warrant requirement, they may temporarily detain a suspect based only on a “reasonable suspicion” that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime. [Citations.] Such detentions are permitted, notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and a search warrant, because they are “limited intrusions” that are “justified by special law enforcement interests.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 734.) An ordinary traffic stop is treated as an investigatory detention, that is, a “ ‘ “Terry stop.” ’ ” (Durazo, at p. 734, fn. omitted.) A Terry stop is justified if it is based on at least reasonable suspicion that the individual has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. (Durazo, at pp. 734-735.) In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings where supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.) But we exercise independent judgment to determine whether, on these facts, the search and seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. at p. 597.)
Deputy Fuentes articulated two reasons why he stopped defendant: first, the car windows were “extremely” tinted and, second, it had paper license plates. We address only the first reason because it resolves this matter. Vehicle Code section 26708 provides that clear, colorless, and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the front side windows, if certain conditions are met, for example, the material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent, the tinting meets federal safety standards, the material is designed and manufactured to enhance the window’s ability to block ultraviolet A rays, and the driver has a certificate stating that the windows meet the requirements of the Vehicle Code.
Vehicles on the roadway must display valid license plates or a valid temporary permit. (Veh. Code, §§ 4156, 5200, 5201, 5202.)
A traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion that a car’s tinted windows violate the Vehicle Code does not violate the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1293 & fn. 10.) In Niebauer, the officer said that the defendant’s car windows were darker than normal and that he could only see defendant’s outline through the window. (Id. at p. 1292.) The officer conducted a traffic stop, and Niebauer, albeit in dicta, found that the stop would not have violated the Fourth Amendment had such a claim been raised. (Accord, People v. Hanes (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6 [officer had reasonable suspicion to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code where the suspect’s car’s windows were so dark they matched the color of the car]; see People v. Carter (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529 [“When a police officer sees a vehicle with tinted front and side windows, the officer may stop the car and cite the driver for a violation of Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)”]; cf. People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602, 606 [insufficient facts supported officer’s suspicion that the defendant’s car windows were illegally tinted, where the officer “simply admitted that he ‘didn’t like the idea of the tinted windows’ ”].)
If there are no articulable facts suggesting that the tinted glass is illegal, a detention will be found to rest upon the type of speculation which may not properly support an investigative stop. (People v. Butler, supra, 202 Cal.App.3dat p. 607.) Here, however, Deputy Fuentes testified that the windows of defendant’s car were “extremely” dark. In fact, the windows were so dark, he could not see inside the car to ascertain how many people were inside. The deputy therefore articulated facts suggesting that the tinted glass was illegal and supporting a reasonable suspicion that the Vehicle Code had been violated. The traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., KITCHING, J.