Opinion
B199734
10-29-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HIRAM DANIEL SUMMERS, Defendant and Appellant.
Lea Rappaport Geller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Nancy G. James, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
Hiram Summers appeals from the judgment following his convictions of two counts of assault and two counts of battery resulting from an incident in March 2006 and from his convictions of two counts of battery and one count of resisting arrest resulting from an incident in April 2006. Summers, however, only requests that we "independently review the files and turn over all pertinent documents" regarding his Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531) related to the convictions arising out of the April incident. We find that the trial court abused its discretion in not disclosing to defense counsel a complaint against one of the arresting officers. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court with directions set forth below.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Summers and Yolanda Moore were in a dating relationship. In March 2006, Summers physically assaulted Moore, resulting in the convictions described above as the March incident. Because those convictions are not challenged we do not discuss the facts of that incident. With regard to the convictions which Summers does challenge, we describe the facts only briefly as necessary to consider his Pitchess request.
In April 2006, Summers came to the motel room where Moore was staying with her daughter, Tia. When Summers arrived, Moore told Tia to call the police. Tia did so while Summers and Moore were talking privately inside the motel bathroom.
Los Angeles Police Officers Joseph Fransen and Richard Compton came to the motel room in response to Tias call. Officer Compton observed that Moores face was swollen and bruised. Compton ordered Summers to come out of the bathroom and Summers complied. When Officer Fransen tried to handcuff Summers, however, he elbowed Fransen in the face, struck him in the chest with a closed fist and ran for the door. When Compton tried to grab Summers, a struggle ensued and Summers elbowed Compton and punched him in the head and face multiple times. In response to a call for back up, Officers Ernesto Carbajal and Linman Doster arrived at the scene. Summers was ultimately double handcuffed and placed in a police car. As Doster was parking the car in the police parking garage, Summers jumped out and started to run. Several officers ran after Summers and detained him by using a "hobble restraint."
Fransen suffered abrasions on his thumb and head. Comptons finger was bleeding and he sustained numerous bruises to his knees, elbows and head. Summers had lacerations on his head and knees.
Summers was charged with two counts of battery on a police officer and one count of resisting arrest. Defense counsel filed a Pitchess motion to obtain the personnel records of Compton, Fransen, Doster, and Carbajal, requesting complaints against any of the officers for, among other things, the use of excessive force, moral turpitude, disciplinary misconduct, or any other impeaching evidence. The trial court granted the motion in part. It ordered the LAPD to produce portions of Compton and Fransens personnel records related to "excessive force and false reports, and . . . fabricating testimony" for an in camera review. Reviewing the records provided in response to its order, the court found a relevant complaint against Compton and disclosed it to Summers.
After a bench trial, the court convicted Summers of battery on Compton and Fransen and one count of resisting arrest which, for sentencing purposes merged into the battery convictions. The court sentenced Summers to consecutive terms of eight months (one-third the midterm) for the batteries. (As to the March 2006 incident, the court convicted Summers of one count of assault with a deadly weapon, one count of assault likely to produce great bodily injury and two counts of battery. It sentenced him to 15 years on the assault with a deadly weapon conviction (3 years doubled for a prior strike, plus 5 years for a prior conviction, plus 4 years for a great bodily injury/domestic violence enhancement), 6 months consecutively on the battery convictions and 1 year for the assault likely to produce great bodily injury.)
DISCUSSION
I. GOOD CAUSE FOR REVIEW OF THE OFFICERS RECORDS
Summers asks us to conduct an independent review of the officers records produced in response to the courts Pitchess order to determine whether there is any additional material that should have been turned over to the defense.
The People contend we need not reach the issue whether pertinent records were withheld from Summers because he failed to establish good cause for discovery of any of the records.
California allows criminal defendants to obtain information relevant to their defense from the personnel records of police officers. (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1047.) The defendant must file a "Pitchess motion" showing good cause for discovery. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) A showing of good cause requires that the defendant establish two elements: "(1) the `materiality of the information or records sought to the `subject matter involved in the pending litigation, and (2) a `reasonable belief that the governmental agency has the `type of information or records sought to be disclosed. [Citation.]" (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) Information requested from personnel records is material if it can help establish a logical link between the pending charges and the proposed defenses and a plausible factual scenario of officer misconduct "that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges." (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1026-1027.) When establishing a plausible factual foundation, the defendant only needs to suggest "that a plausible scenario of misconduct is one that might or could have occurred." (Id. at p. 1026.) A "denial of facts asserted in the police report" may suffice as a plausible factual scenario. (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.) "[A]ffidavits may be on information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge . . . ." (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) If a showing of good cause is made, the trial judge conducts an in camera review of the personnel records in order to determine whether they contain any relevant information for the defense. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b).)
The declaration of Summerss counsel supporting the motion alleged the following facts on information and belief. When officers arrived at the motel, both Summers and Moore told the officers there was no problem. The officers threatened to arrest Moore for allowing a minor to possess narcotics if Moore did not go forward with a complaint against Summers. Upon hearing this threat, Summers tried to run but never made it out of the room. He was detained, handcuffed and severely beaten by officers.
The People maintain Summers failed to show good cause for discovery of the personnel records of any of the officers because the declaration does not identify the officer or officers who allegedly used "excessive force" in detaining and arresting him. We reject the Peoples argument because the record of the Pitchess hearing shows that the court read the police report of the incident in the motel room and determined that Compton and Fransen were the officers referred to in the declaration filed by Summerss counsel. Summers showed good cause for discovery of Comptons and Fransens personnel records for past complaints about the officers use of excessive force. The People conceded at the hearing that both Compton and Fransen physically struggled to detain Summers at the motel. Past complaints in their personnel records could support Summerss claim that the officers initiated the altercation by their use of excessive force and that he only acted in self-defense.
Summers also showed good cause for discovery of Comptons and Fransens personnel records for past evidence of false reports and fabricating testimony. Summers alleges that there was no problem between Moore and him and that the officers acted in bad faith by pressuring Moore to file a false domestic violence complaint against him. This plausible factual scenario passes the "low threshold" for a showing of good cause. (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.) Past acts of fraudulent behavior in Comptons and Fransens personnel records could help Summers impeach the officers credibility.
Finally, the court found that Summers did not show good cause for discovery of Carbajals and Dosters personnel records. Counsel for Summers accepted that ruling, stating "Thats fine, your honor." Summers does not challenge the ruling in his appeal.
II. RELEASE OF INFORMATION BY THE TRIAL COURT
Summers asks us to "independently review the files and turn over all pertinent documents." We have reviewed the sealed reporters transcript of the courts in camera examination of the files. As to Officer Fransen, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering no disclosures. As to Officer Compton, we find that the court correctly ordered disclosure of complaint 05-1201 but that it abused its discretion in not ordering disclosure of complaint 02-1294.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to order the report in complaint 02-1294 disclosed to defense counsel with the requisite protective order. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).) The court shall permit Summers an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice and shall order a new trial if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the complaint been disclosed. If, after a reasonable time, Summers has not moved for a new trial or the court finds no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome if the complaint had been disclosed, the court shall reinstate the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court to conduct further proceedings as ordered in this opinion.
We concur:
MALLANO, P. J.
NEIDORF, J. --------------- Notes: Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.