Restitution is frequently ordered as part of the disciplinary proceedings. It is part of the rehabilitation process and a goal of rehabilitation. See People v. Huntzinger (Colo. 1998), 967 P.2d 160; In re Levine (1993), 174 Ariz. 146, 176, 847 P.2d 1093, 1123, fn. 2 (the Supreme Court of Arizona imposed a postdischarge disciplinary sanction of restitution as a term of probation because the restitution was part of the rehabilitative process of the disciplinary proceeding); People v. Sullivan (Colo. 1990), 802 P.2d 1091; Brookman v. State Bar of California (1988), 46 Cal.3d 1004, 251 Cal.Rptr. 495, 760 P.2d 1023. In Brookman, the California Supreme Court determined that "nothing in the Bankruptcy Act, or the cases interpreting the act, prevents imposition of restitution as a condition of probation in an attorney disciplinary matter — even if the underlying subject of the restitution has previously been discharged in bankruptcy, and thus cannot be collected as a debt as such."

The factual findings of the hearing board are binding on us unless, after consideration of the record as a whole, we conclude that the findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Colo. 1990); People v. Bergmann, 790 P.2d 840, 842 (Colo. 1990). "In determining whether the board's findings are supported by substantial evidence, it is not within the province of this court to measure the weight of the evidence or to resolve the credibility of witnesses."

Although we again find no Texas cases addressing this question, courts in other jurisdictions have ruled against Risker's position, and we agree with those decisions because of the fundamentally different purposes of restitution and a bankruptcy discharge.See In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1123 n. 21 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that a discharge in bankruptcy from an underlying civil judgment does not preclude the court from imposing a disciplinary sanction of restitution as a term of probation because restitution is part of the rehabilitative process of the disciplinary proceeding rather than a reinstatement of any of the discharged civil judgments against the debtor); People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Colo. 1990) (holding that ordering an attorney to pay restitution to the beneficiaries of an estate he represented was a proper sanction, even though a judgment against him based on that representation was a claim in bankruptcy proceedings, because the primary reason for requiring restitution is to allow the respondent to demonstrate his rehabilitation prior to reinstatement); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986) (holding that bankruptcy does not discharge a previous restitution order from a criminal case and a court may order restitution in a criminal case of debts that have been discharged in bankruptcy); Cabla v. State, 6 S.W.3d 543, 546-50 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (holding that bankruptcy does not discharge a restitution order imposed as a condition of probation). Risker's reply brief further argues that the restitution sanction violates section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, which states, in part:

See Brookman v. State Bar of California, 46 Cal.3d 1004, 251 Cal.Rptr. 495, 497, 760 P.2d 1023, 1026 (1988) ("Restitution imposed as a condition of probation serves the state interest of rehabilitating culpable attorneys (and protecting the public) by forcing the attorney to 'confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.' ") (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 353, 360 n. 10, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986)); People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Colo. 1990) (opinion that one reason for restitution requirement "is for the (petitioner) to demonstrate his rehabilitation prior to reinstatement"). Second, restitution is designed to protect the prospective clients of the person wishing to be reinstated.

See, e.g., People v. Kanwal, 321 P.3d 494, 496 (Colo.2014) ( “the organs and procedures of attorney discipline are unique, or sui generis, having been designed for the precise, and sole, purpose of exercising this exclusive jurisdiction and fulfilling this responsibility of the supreme court.”); Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 447, 247 S.W.3d 498, 503 (2007) (“disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature but are sui generis, meaning of their own kind.”); People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Colo.1990) (“Attorney discipline proceedings are sui generis, and are strictly neither civil actions nor criminal proceedings.”); Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d 436, 447, 113 Cal.Rptr. 602, 521 P.2d 858, 865 (1974) (“Proceedings before the State Bar are sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in character, and the ordinary criminal procedural safeguards do not apply.

"It is part of the rehabilitation process and a goal of rehabilitation. See People v. Huntzinger (Colo. 1998), 967 P.2d 160; In re Levine (1993), 174 Ariz. 146, 176, 847 P.2d 1093, 1123, [fn. 21] (the Supreme Court of Arizona imposed a postdischarge disciplinary sanction of restitution as a term of probation because the restitution was part of the rehabilitative process of the disciplinary proceeding); People v. Sullivan (Colo. 1990), 802 P.2d 1091; Brookman v. State Bar of California (1988), 46 Cal.3d 1004, 251 Cal.Rptr. 495, 760 P.2d 1023." Gay, 94 Ohio St.3d at 407, 763 N.E.2d 585 (Lundberg Stratton J., dissenting).

(Emphasis added.) In People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Colo. 1990), an attorney discipline case like this one, we stated: We also conclude that an order of restitution is warranted even though the probate court judgment was a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.

" The respondent also asserts that "[n]othing in this Election is intended as a waiver of the affirmative defense of bankruptcy in any action to collect the costs and sanctions assessed against the Respondent." But see People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Colo. 1990) (imposing order of restitution as a condition of reinstatement notwithstanding fact that basis of restitution was a claim in previous bankruptcy proceeding; primary reason for restitution requirement was for respondent to demonstrate rehabilitation prior to reinstatement).

In addition, the respondent, as the personal representative of the estate of the Boatmans, charged and collected excessive attorney fees, improperly distributed the assets, and negligently failed to inventory and provide an accounting to the court. See People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Colo. 1990) (charging and collection of excessive estate fees warrants six-month suspension). Under the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986) ( ABA Standards), in the absence of aggravating or mitigating factors, suspension is an appropriate sanction "when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client."