Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard W. Stanford, Jr., Judge, Super. Ct. No. 05NF4687.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and Raquel M. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
Defendant was convicted on two felony counts arising from an altercation with his former girlfriend’s current boyfriend and on two subsequent counts of failure to appear. He argues that after the trial, there was a prima facie case of jury misconduct and that his motion to release juror information should have been granted. He also claims there was insufficient evidence to support the two counts of failure to appear. We disagree and affirm.
I
FACTS
We need not go into detail about the underlying facts in this matter, as they are not directly pertinent to defendant’s appeal. In brief, defendant became angry one night after speaking to his ex-girlfriend about the custody of their child. He rammed his truck into the car driven by Gabriel Nieto, the man currently dating his ex-girlfriend. He then got out of his truck, hit the car’s windows and scratched it with a knife, yelling at Nieto to get out. He ultimately left the scene.
Defendant failed to appear at two hearings in this matter. He was ultimately charged with aggravated assault (count one, Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), vandalism causing damage of $400 or more (count two, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), two counts of failure to appear while on bail (counts three and four, § 1320.5), and brandishing a deadly weapon (count five, § 417 subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged numerous priors.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty on counts one through four. Defendant then admitted each of the prior convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to release personal identifying information about a juror based on allegations of misconduct that arose after the trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 237.) The court denied the motion. The court also denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, also based on separate allegations of jury misconduct. Defendant received a sentence of 18 years, and now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
Release of Juror Information
Defendant’s key contention on appeal is that the court erred by denying his motion for disclosure of personal information about the jurors in order to explore the issue of jury misconduct. He argues the minute orders fail to reflect express findings on the absence of a prima facie showing of good cause, and further claims the trial court relied on an improper standard and abused its discretion in denying the motion.
Some background is in order. The jury retired to deliberate at 10:00 a.m. on August 8, 2006. At 2:20 p.m. on the same day, the jury reported it had reached a verdict. The verdict forms identified Juror No. 5 as the foreperson. The record shows that the court read the verdicts aloud, then polled each juror as to their consent to the verdicts. All 12 jurors replied “yes” when asked if these were their verdicts. Prior to release, the jury was instructed with Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006-2007), CALCRIM No. 3590 and advised the jury that the court would be available, at the jurors’ option, to answer any questions or hear any concerns. Following discharge, Juror No. 5 spoke jointly with both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Defendant then brought a motion seeking release of personal information about the jurors for the purpose of investigating jury misconduct.
Defendant’s motion stated that Juror No. 5 “disclosed that he did not agree with the verdict, and while d[e]scribing the jury as a “Lynch Mob” said he only went along with the vote of the other eleven jurors. After repeated questioning, [Juror No. 5] would not commit if he did or did not participate[] in the final vote.” (Emphasis omitted.) Defendant also claimed Juror No. 5 had also stated that the jury had “never got to” the issue of which event constituted the assault.
The prosecutor’s version of this meeting was more detailed, as he was apparently approached by the juror first. His affidavit stated that the juror approached him in the hallway and “[t]hat Juror Number Five looked noticeably upset, and that he told me that the conduct proven in this case did not warrant a ‘life sentence,’ and that the conduct did not rise to a level of a felony in his mind; [¶] . . . That Juror Number Five then told me that he was upset with the other jurors . . . because they did not consider ‘the length of defendant’s possible sentence’ during deliberations; [¶] . . . That Juror Number Five also wanted to talk to defense counsel to ‘figure out why he had left a cop on the jury’[.]” At this point, the prosecutor found defense counsel and he joined the conversation. The juror then “continued to voice his concerns about the possible length of defendant’s sentence; [¶] . . . That Juror Number Five was noticeably upset, speaking rapidly, talking over questions that were being asked of him, and ignoring questions posed to him by both attorneys . . . [¶] . . . That in regards to deliberations, Juror Number Five told defense counsel ‘I was working for you in there,’ but that the other jurors were convinced of defendant’s guilt and there was ‘no changing their minds’; [¶] . . . That defense counsel then asked Juror Number Five if he participated in, and agreed with the verdicts, and Juror Number Five answered affirmatively; [¶] . . . [¶] That defense counsel asked Juror Number Five if the jury had agreed on which conduct was the basis for the assault charge, and Juror Number Five answered affirmatively; [¶] . . . That after the exchange between Juror Number Five and the attorneys, the juror left the courthouse without either attorney attempting to exchange contact information with him in any way.”
At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the court found there was no good cause for release of juror identifying information. The court found the juror’s statements indicated that the juror “was upset and wanted to talk.” The court found no indication of misconduct or that Juror No. 5 did not consent to the verdict.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, the personal identifying information of jurors is sealed once the verdict is recorded. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2).) A criminal defendant may request this information. (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) The request must be supported by an affidavit that establishes good cause for the information’s release. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) If a prima facie case of good cause is established, the court must set the matter for hearing, and if not, it must state its reasons and make express findings regarding either the lack of a prima facie showing of good cause or the presence of a compelling interest against disclosure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) We review the trial court’s decision regarding the hearing and the release of juror information for abuse of discretion. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 604.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no good cause to release information identifying the jurors. The record shows that the trial court gave due consideration to both the prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s version of their conversation with Juror No. 5 and their agreement that the juror was upset. Juror No. 5, had, however, expressly indicated his assent to the guilty verdicts, and as foreperson, had signed the verdict forms. This indicates that the court’s conclusion that the juror “wanted to talk,” was correct, and the conversation in which he engaged the attorneys does not provide good cause for releasing the jurors’ personal information. We find no abuse of discretion.
Failure to Appear
Defendant’s failure to appear at two hearings in this matter was established by the trial court’s taking judicial notice of its own minute orders demonstrating that defendant was not present at the hearings in question. Defendant argues this was insufficient evidence as a matter of law. Specifically, he claims the evidence does not support the intent required by section 1320.5.
The standard of review is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a rational fact finder could have concluded defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) Evidence is substantial when it is of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Ramsey (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 682.) Further, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence which support the jury’s verdict. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.)
The elements of failure to appear were stated to the jury as follows: “[N]umber one, defendant was charged with a felony; number two, he was released on bail on that felony; number three, he willfully failed to appear in court as required; and number four, his failure to appear was done to evade the process of the court. [¶] Now, in this instruction, somebody commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It’s not required that there be an intent to break the law or hurt someone or gain an advantage, and willful failure to appear within 14 days of the date assigned for purposes of appearance may be found to have been for the purpose of evading the process of the court.”
The court took judicial notice of documents showing defendant failed to appear on October 19, 2004 and June 3, 2005, when he was on bail. The minutes also showed that when defendant failed to appear on October 19, a bench warrant was issued. He did not return to court until almost three months later, after he was arrested on the bench warrant. At the hearing after his arrest, the bench warrant was recalled and defendant was again placed on bail. Defendant once again failed to appear in June and another bench warrant was issued. He did not appear until September 13, 2005, at which time he was remanded into custody.
We find defendant’s argument to be without merit. The jury is entitled to draw rational inferences from the evidence, and the evidence showed that defendant failed to appear on the date appointed and did not appear in court until nearly three months later. This entitled the jury to invoke the presumption that defendant’s purpose was to evade the process of the court. We reject defendant’s suggestion that because the presumption is permissive rather than mandatory, additional evidence is required to invoke the presumption. He cites no authority whatsoever for this proposition.
As to the required state of mind, the jury was entitled to infer that when a defendant misses a court hearing, makes no contact with the court, and does not appear until nearly three months later (in one instance after his arrest) that he did not miss his appearance due to accident or unforeseen circumstance. They were entitled to make the logical inference that his failure to appear was “willful” within the meaning of the statute. Defendant offered no evidence to the contrary. Thus, substantial evidence supports the convictions on the two counts of failure to appear.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.