Opinion
C088902
07-08-2020
In re S.U., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.U., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16 JD SQ 3078001)
The minor, S.U., appeals an order of the juvenile court sustaining the allegations of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition and declaring him a ward of the court. The minor contends (1) that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a police interview because he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and (2) that his confession was involuntary. We will affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
The victim, C.E., who was 56 years old when the crime occurred, was cleaning her brother's house when the minor entered and grabbed her. The minor was wearing only a pair of shorts, no shirt or shoes. The minor and C.E. struggled. The minor continued to grab C.E. as she pushed him away and asked what he was doing. The minor told her, "Shut up, you fucking bitch. Just go with it. Just go along with it." As C.E. continued to struggle and tried to get outside, the minor again told her to shut up and threatened to snap her neck. The minor groped her, and as they struggled, they fell. The minor then pulled a pair of scissors out of his pocket. C.E. grabbed one of the blades, believing the minor was trying to kill her, and they continued to struggle. C.E. kicked the minor in the groin and then she rolled down some stairs. The minor started punching C.E. She fell to the ground on the front lawn, and began screaming as the minor kicked her. A neighbor heard her screams, went outside and saw the minor standing over C.E. with scissors in his hand. He asked the minor what was going on, the minor stopped, and when the neighbor asked, the minor gave him the scissors.
As a result of the attack, C.E. sustained cuts on her finger and hand from the scissors, scrapes and bruising on her face, chest, back, knees, legs, arms, and feet, a skinned toe, a strained neck, and an abdominal injury. She thought the minor was going to rape and kill her.
Redding Police Officer Robert Garnero interviewed the minor at the police station. The minor was wearing shorts with no shirt or shoes, had bloody fingers, a bloodstain on his shorts, and an abrasion on his neck. As discussed in greater detail below, Garnero read the minor his Miranda rights and the minor acknowledged that he understood those rights. The minor confessed that he "saw the victim drive by in her car, stop at the house down the road, and he walked into the house and made threats to her and eventually attacked her and was pulled off by neighbors." The minor stated that he was trying to rape and have sex with C.E., that "the voices" were telling him, " 'Go . . . . You could do it,' " and that he did not want to kill C.E., but did try to stab her and "tried to cut her hair." The minor said he told C.E., " 'I don't wanna kill you but you're gonna have to listen to me.' " His description of the assault and struggle was consistent with C.E.'s.
Officer Garnero recognized that the minor appeared to have a mental health problem and that he made a number of nonsensical statements. Before the assault, the minor had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and chronic paranoid schizophrenia. He had visual and auditory hallucinations, which included voices directing him to have sex with his therapist. He previously had been committed to mental health facilities and received mental health treatment.
Drs. James McKellar, Ray Carlson, and Kent Caruso evaluated the minor in connection with the proceedings below. Each concluded he was in a state of psychosis at the time of the offenses. Each also acknowledged a person in that state could form the intent to kill and the intent to rape.
The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging the minor committed attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 189/664; count 1); residential burglary (§ 459; count 2); assault to commit rape in the commission of a residential burglary (§ 220, subd. (b); count 3); attempted forcible rape (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2)/664; count 4); assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5); and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The minor moved to suppress his statements made to police during the custodial interrogation. Following an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the juvenile court denied the motion.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true as to counts 2 through 6, and as to count 1, found true the lesser included offense of attempted murder without premeditation and deliberation. After a sanity-phase hearing, the juvenile court determined the minor was not guilty by reason of insanity. The juvenile court ordered the minor committed to the State Department of State Hospitals for a minimum of 180 days.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made during his interview with Officer Garnero. He contends the waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary, intelligent, or knowing. He also contends his confession was not voluntary. We disagree.
A. Background
1. Interview
Officer Garnero interviewed the minor. The minor was in the interview room for approximately three hours, but there were significant periods of time when the minor was in the room alone. Actual interview time was approximately one hour. The room was about 10 feet by 12 feet. At the beginning, another officer obtained various samples from the minor's hands and clothing and took photographs of him. The interview was video recorded and the trial court viewed the recording.
Officer Garnero testified that he generally begins interviews with questions to build rapport, such as the person's background, family, and hobbies. This gets the person more comfortable discussing difficult subjects, helps ensure they are voluntarily providing information, and helps Garnero evaluate their honesty and ability to provide truthful responses. Garnero recognized juveniles are more vulnerable than adults, so he takes more time building a rapport and is gentler in his questioning.
Officer Garnero could tell the minor was "going through some kind of an episode" and was somewhat traumatized by his own actions. He maintained a soft, mild conversation with the minor.
Before the interview, an officer spoke with the minor's mother, who told the officer that the minor had recently been released from a mental health facility and was having mental health problems. During the interview, Garnero told the minor that his mother was concerned about him and wanted him to talk to the officers and get help. The minor's mother was concerned about the minor, but Garnero had no information that she wanted the minor to speak to the officers.
When Garnero interviewed the minor, he was wearing a dress shirt and slacks. To make the minor more comfortable, the handcuffs on the minor were moved from the back to the front and he was given some water. Garnero began the interview by discussing the minor's personal history, family, and hobbies. The minor told Garnero he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar conditions.
Officer Garnero read the minor each of the four portions of the Miranda advisement separately, and waited for him to respond. After the first advisement, when the minor made a head movement rather than a verbal response, Garnero asked him if he had said "yes." The minor responded yes to each advisement and appeared to understand. Garnero did not obtain an express waiver of the Miranda rights, but the minor continued to answer questions.
The minor made odd statements throughout the interview; for example, he indicated he lived alone, was unsure of the date, and that bad people had taken his mother when she got in the shower. Officer Garnero would then ask clarifying questions. Garnero asked additional questions to eliminate the possibility that the minor's answers were unreliable given his mental health issues. At times, the minor would simply repeat what Garnero had said in his question, so Garnero asked additional questions to get beyond that and clarify the minor's answers. The minor knew the year, his location, and the current president. Because the minor had some mental health problems, to ensure the minor was knowingly answering questions, Garnero also asked questions about the minor's understanding of the difference between right and wrong, and a lie and the truth. The minor also answered questions and provided details about the assault that were accurate. The minor's answers led Garnero to conclude the minor was able to understand the questions, the difference between a lie and the truth, and to knowingly give an accurate statement. Based on his training and experience, the rapport built with the minor, and the minor's answers, Garnero opined the minor understood his Miranda rights and voluntarily and intelligently waived them.
At numerous points throughout the interview, Officer Garnero told the minor he was there to help him. He also asked the minor what he thought they should do to help him.
Dr. McKellar, a clinical psychologist, also testified about the minor's pretrial statements. He conducted two evaluations of the minor; the first, to determine his competence to stand trial, and a second to understand the minor's diagnostic profile as relevant to his sanity in committing the offense. In the course of those evaluations, he interviewed the minor, nursing staff, the minor's mother, and reviewed medical records. He also watched the video of the interview with Garnero. The doctor's first interview took place approximately one month after the assault. At that time, Dr. McKellar concluded the minor was competent to stand trial, as he (1) understood why the doctor was interviewing him; (2) knew his attorney's name and the purpose of an attorney; (3) gave an accurate and concrete description of the role of a judge, attorney, and prosecutor; (4) understood the charges he faced; and (5) provided a basic description of the difference between a misdemeanor and a felony. The second interview was conducted approximately five months after the assault. The minor remembered the doctor and understood the significance of the interview.
The trial court initially limited the testimony of Dr. McKellar. The trial court later reopened the motion to suppress to allow additional testimony from Dr. McKellar. This summary of evidence includes both portions of Dr. McKellar's testimony.
Dr. McKellar noted the minor had auditory hallucinations connected to his mental health disorder, and had low intelligence, with borderline intellectual functioning. He noted people with schizophrenia are easily suggestible and have poor episodic memory. In his evaluation of Garnero's interview, Dr. McKellar stated the minor sometimes appeared confused and other times appeared clear. Based on the minor's shifting responsiveness, Dr. McKellar believed the minor was in and out of orientation, and still in the midst of psychosis. He also believed, and later testing confirmed, the minor had poor verbal skills, and a compromised ability to comprehend language. Dr. McKellar concluded that at the time of the interview with Officer Garnero, the minor was psychotic and prone to cognitive confusion, as such he believed it was a "mistake to consider that interview to be a reliable interview." Dr. McKellar believed the minor was saying things he thought could be true, but did not necessarily know they were true. Given a number of leading questions by Garnero, and the minor's low comprehension and state of psychosis, Dr. McKellar questioned the reliability of the minor's statements in the interview.
2. Minor's Incriminating Statements
The minor told Officer Garnero it was almost like he had to go to the neighbor's house to make his problems better. He said he was "tryin' to have sex with—I was tryin' to rape her. That's what the voices told me." He said he had seen her when she drove by his house in a green Toyota and the voices told him to go get her. He ran out of the house without a shirt or shoes on. When he got to her and she asked what he was doing, he told her, "Just listen. Um, I don't wanna kill you." Then he had scissors in his hand and tried to stab her and cut her hair. She started screaming and he kicked and punched her repeatedly. He kicked her in the gut and she fell on the ground. He said he then was trying to leave. He did not remember stabbing her with the scissors, but thought he was holding the scissors when the victim "stab[bed] herself in the leg." At that point, he was not trying to rape her. Later he said he might have accidentally stabbed her. He did not want to stab her, but brought the scissors to threaten the victim so he could rape her. He did not try to kill her, and knew he was not going to stab her, but did try to "snap her neck." The assault ended when a neighbor told him to stop hitting the victim.
The minor stated he had been kicked out of school for sexual harassment. He also stated the voices in his head frequently told him to do things to women. He considered sex with women an obsession and he thought about it a lot. The previous day he had walked around the neighborhood asking women about "sexual stuff." He also said he had homicidal thoughts and thoughts about hurting himself.
3. Trial Court Ruling
After the initial hearing on the motion to suppress, proceeding on the basis that the minor was in a psychotic state at the time of the interview, that he was young, and had low intellectual ability, the trial court ruled the minor's statements were admissible. The trial court noted none of those facts precluded admission of his statements. After the trial court reopened the motion to suppress and allowed additional testimony from Dr. McKellar, the trial court found Officer Garnero gave the minor the proper advisement of his Miranda rights and the minor did not invoke them, but chose to continue speaking, which constituted a voluntary waiver. The trial court also found there was no evidence of coercion, intimidation, threats, or improper promises. The trial court noted schizophrenia, in and of itself, does not make a confession involuntary or preclude a waiver of Miranda rights. The trial court acknowledged there were answers with questionable accuracy and some leading questions. Nonetheless, it found under the totality of the circumstances the waiver and confession were both voluntary. Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
I
Waiver of Miranda Rights
The minor contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, as his Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Specifically, he argues his youth, mental illness, and borderline intellectual functioning precluded him from understanding his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them.
" ' "In order to combat [the] pressures [of custodial interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights" to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. [Citation.] "[I]f the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and any statement obtained from him during interrogation thereafter may not be admitted against him at his trial" [citation], at least during the prosecution's case-in-chief [citations].' [Citation.] 'Critically, however, a suspect can waive these rights.' [Citations.] To establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [Citations.]" (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 374-375 (Nelson).) Like adults, juveniles may impliedly waive their Miranda rights. An implied waiver occurs when, after being apprised of his rights, a defendant "willingly answer[s] questions after acknowledging that he understood those rights." (People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1169.)
"When a court's decision to admit a confession is challenged on appeal, 'we accept the trial court's determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda . . . .' [Citation.]" (People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169.) "Determining the validity of a Miranda rights waiver requires 'an evaluation of the defendant's state of mind' [citation] and 'inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' [citation]." (Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 375.) Factors to consider include the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and whether the juvenile has capacity to understand the warnings given, the nature of his or her Fifth Amendment rights, and consequences of the waiver. (Ibid.) "This approach allows the necessary flexibility for courts 'to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 379.) "[T]here is no presumption that a minor is incapable of a knowing, intelligent waiver of his rights." (In re Eduardo G. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 745, 756.) " ' "Neither a low I.Q. nor any particular age of minority is a proper basis to assume lack of understanding, incompetency, or other inability to voluntarily waive the right to remain silent under some presumption that the Miranda explanation was not understood." ' " (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384 (Lewis).)
Here, the minor was 16 years old. He responded appropriately to the officer's directives throughout the interview. And, although some of his answers may have been "odd," they did not suggest a lack of understanding or confusion about the meaning of the questions. He was able to understand and respond to questions regarding his mental health diagnoses, his educational background, his time at a mental health facility, and his hobbies. Dr. McKellar questioned the reliability of some of the minor's answers given his mental health problems and intellectual limitations, but he did not suggest the minor lacked an understanding of the questions or of the Miranda warnings, the nature of his rights, or the consequences of the waiver. To the contrary, in the context of a competency determination conducted one month after the interview and which included review of Garnero's interview, Dr. McKellar concluded that in spite of the minor's mental health problems and intellectual limitations, he understood why he was being interviewed by the doctor, the purpose of his attorney, the role of a judge and attorneys in trial, the charges he was facing, and the difference between a felony and misdemeanor. The minor's ability to understand these concepts supports the conclusion that the minor was similarly capable of understanding the Miranda warnings, the nature of the rights at stake, and the consequences of waiving those rights. The minor was informed of each of his Miranda rights. He indicated he understood each of those rights. Nothing in the recording of the interview indicates the minor had any confusion on these points. His youth, low intellectual function, and mental illness did not preclude him from making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. (See Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 384.) Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the minor voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.
We recognize, as the minor notes in his briefing, that there has been a movement in the area of juvenile justice to recognize differences between juvenile and adult offenders. Among other things, this recognition has led to the enactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 625.6, requiring a minor 15 years of age or younger to consult with an attorney before waiving their Miranda rights. However, nothing in these recent enactments affects the admissibility of the minor's statements in this case. As noted, the statute does not apply to the minor here, who was 16 at the time of interrogation. Further, even if it applied to this minor, a violation of that statute would not preclude admission of his statements. (In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 449-450 (Anthony L.).) The standards for exclusion of a minor's statements remains whether federal law compels exclusion. (Ibid.) --------
II
Admissions and Confession
The minor also contends the admissions and confession he made during the interview were not voluntary. Specifically, he argues Officer Garnero "used coercive and improper psychological interrogation techniques designed to overbear [the minor's] will."
"[E]ven when a juvenile has made a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, a court may consider whether the juvenile gave a confession after being ' "exposed to any form of coercion, threats, or promises of any kind, [or] trickery or intimidation." ' " (Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 379.) " 'A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of " 'a rational intellect and free will.' " [Citation.] The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's "will was overborne at the time he confessed." [Citation.]' " (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346-347.) "A confession that is obtained through threats or violence, direct or implied promises, or improper influence may be found involuntary. [Citation.] We look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. [Citation.]" (Anthony L., supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) The totality of the circumstances includes the minor's age, intelligence, education, experience, and capacity to understand the meaning and consequences of his confession. (In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 576; see Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 383.) We also consider the element of police coercion, the location and length of the interrogation, and the minor's physical condition and mental health. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411.) "[A] determination that a confession was involuntary requires a finding of coercive police conduct" and the exertion of any improper influence by the police will suffice to find that coercive conduct. (Elias V., at p 577.)
The trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances of the interrogation are reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 296.) Where, as here, a defendant's statement is recorded in full, we review the voluntariness of the confession independently. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1177; Anthony L., supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) We find no improper coercion.
The interrogation was conducted in a private room in the police station. The room was approximately 10 feet by 12 feet and kept between 70 and 75 degrees. The minor's hands were cuffed in front of his body and he was given water. Officer Garnero was armed, but in street clothes, not his uniform. He was the only officer conducting the interview. Through most of the interview, Garnero remained seated and in a relaxed posture leaning back away from the minor. He spoke to the minor in a quiet, calm, conversational tone throughout the interview. He did not accuse the minor, or insist on his guilt, although there was independent evidence both of the assault and the minor's culpability. (See Anthony L., supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 454-455.) Garnero was calm and quiet, worked to put the minor at ease and develop a rapport. The minor was in the interrogation room for a total of about three hours, and was subject to questioning for approximately one hour. As above, the record does not suggest based on the minor's age, intellect, and mental health that he did not understand the interview, the questions, or the consequences of speaking with Garnero. Upon our independent review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the minor's admissions and confession were voluntary. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 412.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
KRAUSE, J. We concur: ROBIE, Acting P. J. RENNER, J.