Williams, P.J., Saxe, Buckley, Sullivan, Ellerin, JJ. Review of defendant's claim that he was denied his right to be present at robing room discussions with prospective jurors is precluded by the lack of a record establishing his absence (see, People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318, 325; People v. Hogan, 251 A.D.2d 43, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Styles, 237 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864). To the extent the record permits review, it indicates that defendant was present during the robing room conferences at issue.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Harold Silverman, J.), rendered September 13, 1996, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 2+ to 7+ years, unanimously affirmed. Review of defendant's claim that he was denied his right to be present at robing room discussions with prospective jurors is precluded, since defendant has failed to provide this Court with a record showing any such absence (see, People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318, 325; People v. Kinchen, 60 N.Y.2d 772). The existing record, which contains two days of voir dire transcribed by different reporters, viewed as a whole together with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, establishes instead that defendant was present at the robing room proceedings in question (People v. Hogan, 251 A.D.2d 43, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Styles, 237 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864; People v. Rivera,225 A.D.2d 360, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 941). In any event, each of the prospective jurors in question was excused on "consent" after expressing some degree of bias against defendant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Harold Silverman, J.), rendered September 13, 1996, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 2+ to 7+ years, unanimously affirmed. Review of defendant's claim that he was denied his right to be present at robing room discussions with prospective jurors is precluded, since defendant has failed to provide this Court with a record showing any such absence (see, People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318, 325; People v. Kinchen, 60 N.Y.2d 772). The existing record, which contains two days of voir dire transcribed by different reporters, viewed as a whole together with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, establishes instead that defendant was present at the robing room proceedings in question (People v. Hogan, 251 A.D.2d 43, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Styles, 237 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864; People v. Rivera, 225 A.D.2d 360, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 941). In any event, each of the prospective jurors in question was excused on "consent" after expressing some degree of bias v. defendant.

We conclude that the court's actions were a proper exercise of its discretion. Review of defendant's claim that he was denied his right to be present at robing room discussions with two prospective jurors is precluded since defendant has failed to provide this Court with a record demonstrating his absence ( see, People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318, 325; People v. Hogan, 251 A.D.2d 43, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 926; People v. Styles, 237 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864). In any event, the existing record overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that defendant was present during the subject discussions ( People v. Hogan, supra; People v. Styles, supra).

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Joseph Cerbone, J.). Review of defendant's claim that he was denied his right to be present at robing room discussions with prospective jurors is precluded, since defendant has failed to provide this Court with a record showing any such absence ( see, People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 318, 325; People v. Kinchen, 60 N.Y.2d 772). The existing record, viewed as whole, establishes defendant's presence at the robing room proceedings in question ( see, People v. Styles, 237 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864; People v. Rivera, 225 A.D.2d 360, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 941). Concur — Milonas, J. P., Wallach, Tom, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.

Additionally, defendant's offer of proof was based on hearsay and speculation and the court properly determined that the probative value of the matters sought to be elicited was outweighed by the danger that the issues before the jury would be obscured ( see, People v. Quinones, 210 A.D.2d 176, 177). The existing record, viewed as a whole and in light of the course of conduct of the court and counsel ( see, People v. Styles, 237 A.D.2d 206, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864), sufficiently establishes that the challenged portions of the voir dire occurred in the courtroom after the court excused all individuals not concerned, and that defendant was actually present ( see, People v. Snow, 237 A.D.2d 118, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864). The court properly discharged a sworn juror as grossly unqualified to continue service ( People v. O'Kane, 224 A.D.2d 182, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 939). The court properly concluded, based on the totality of the juror's responses, the court's observation of the juror's demeanor, and the fact that a friend of defendant had approached the juror, asserting defendant's innocence, that the juror possessed a state of mind that would prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict ( People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214, 219). There was no prejudice to defendant from the fact that the juror's statements initially were made to the court, on the record and in the absence of defendant and his counsel, since the colloquy w