Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR573857.
RIVERA, J.
Crystal Strand appeals from a judgment upon her plea of no contest to felony animal neglect (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)). She contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring alcohol use restrictions, random chemical testing and warrantless searches as conditions of probation. We agree that the alcohol use and chemical testing conditions are invalid and must be stricken. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 24, 2010, an information was filed charging defendant with felony animal neglect in violation of section 597, subdivision (b), alleging that she deprived her horse, Shiloh, of necessary sustenance and drink. The charges resulted following a report of animal cruelty. For approximately a year, Shiloh had been kept on property next to that owned by Deanna Holm in Sebastopol. Holm allowed her granddaughter, Amanda Holm, and defendant to board Shiloh on the property on the condition that they ensure that he was cared for and fed. Amanda, in turn, had an agreement with defendant that she would feed Shiloh and defendant would provide the food. Defendant, however, failed to provide food for a period of three to four months. Amanda contacted defendant to request more food but defendant never complied.
Amanda was also charged and was convicted of misdemeanor animal neglect on March 11, 2010.
On October 22, 2009, Sonoma County Animal Regulation responded to a report of animal cruelty. Shiloh was found to be in an emaciated condition requiring immediate medical attention. Defendant had not been at the property for several months while Amanda was last there on October 9, 2009. On October 26, 2009, Shiloh collapsed, was unresponsive to efforts to revive her, and was euthanized to prevent further suffering.
On September 8, 2010, the court suspended imposition of judgment and placed defendant on probation for two years on conditions including 110 hours of community service, random chemical testing, warrantless search and seizure, and that she not possess large animals or use alcohol or controlled substances or be in places where alcohol is the primary item of sale. Defendant objected to the substance abuse testing and search conditions as unrelated to her case, but the court imposed the conditions as standard terms.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to section 1203.1, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions of probation to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety. (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....’ [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.)
“Whether an alcohol-use condition of probation is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion is determined by the particular facts of each case.” (People v. Lindsay (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1644.) Here, defendant contends that there is no evidence in the record that alcohol was related to the crime or that she has an alcohol or drinking problem that would jeopardize her rehabilitation. We agree. The alcohol-use and random chemical testing conditions are not reasonably related to defendant’s crime nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest that defendant abuses alcohol or drugs. Thus, we cannot uphold the conditions as aimed at preventing future criminality. There is simply no nexus between defendant and the alcohol-use condition. We therefore will strike the condition. (See People v. Burton (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 382, 390 [reversing alcohol-use condition where there was no evidence that defendant consumed alcohol prior to committing the offense]; cf. (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 62 [upholding alcohol testing probation condition where defendant was under the influence of alcohol when offense was committed].)
The probation report notes that defendant, age 23, began consuming alcohol at the age of 21 and admits to drinking two to three times a week. She denies any problem with alcohol. She admitted experimenting with marijuana after graduating from high school but denied any use for the past two years or any use of any other drugs.
Defendant also contends that the warrantless search condition is not reasonably related to her crime or to her future criminality. While defendant’s offense is not one involving the use of drugs, alcohol, or firearms, these factors are not exclusive in the establishment of a relationship between the offense and a warrantless search condition. (See, e.g., People v. Chardon (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 205, 217-218 [in case involving false personation and driving with a suspended license, search condition deemed necessary to aid in reformation and rehabilitation]; People v. Kay (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 759, 762 [upholding vehicle search condition because offense involved the use of blunt instruments that could be concealed in a car].)
Here, while a search condition is somewhat related to defendant’s crime of animal neglect, it also serves to “promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795.) Warrantless searches are justified in the probation context because they aid in deterring further offenses by the probationer and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation. (Ibid.) We therefore conclude that the court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in imposing the search condition.
The Attorney General notes that defendant might conceal a large animal in violation of her probation, justifying the search condition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the probation conditions requiring defendant to not possess any alcohol, to stay out of places where alcohol is the primary item of sale, and to submit to random chemical tests as directed by the probation department. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.