Opinion
October 13, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.).
Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the prosecutor's summation did not constitute reversible error. Upon consideration of the record as a whole ( see, People v. Dermon, 237 A.D.2d 530; People v. D'Alessandro, 184 A.D.2d 114), the prosecutor's remarks constituted an appropriate response to defense counsel's summation and fair comment upon the evidence ( see, People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396; People v. Ceus, 207 A.D.2d 905).
Similarly unpersuasive is the defendant's contention that reversible error took place as the result of the prosecutor's extensive voir dire regarding the qualifications of the defendant's handwriting expert. The prosecutor's questions were directly relevant to whether the defense expert was "possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience" from which it could be assumed that his testimony was reliable, and thus the questions were not improper ( Matott v. Ward, 48 N.Y.2d 455, 459).
The defendant's claim of improper bolstering is partially unpreserved for appellate review ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245), and, in any event, lacks merit. In this case, where identification was the critical issue, the police witness' description testimony was properly admitted, as it involved the officer's own personal observations of the defendant and the codefendant (whose case was subsequently severed from this case and tried separately) as they attempted to flee from the scene of the crime. The testimony was probative of the officer's ability to accurately transfer the mental images made during his pursuit to the time and place of the corporeal identification ( see, People v. Huertas, 75 N.Y.2d 487, 493; see, CPL 60.30; People v. Ross, 186 A.D.2d 1006; People v. Guerra, 168 A.D.2d 394).
The defendant's sentence was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
Upon our review of the record, including the transcript of the postjudgment hearing, we conclude that the defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (g) to vacate his judgment of conviction based upon newly-discovered evidence was properly denied. Neither in his motion papers nor at the hearing did the defendant establish that the proffered evidence created the probability of a more favorable verdict or that the evidence could not have been produced by him at trial by the exercise of due diligence ( see, People v. Robinson, 211 A.D.2d 733; People v. Boyette, 201 A.D.2d 490, 491; People v. Johnson, 208 A.D.2d 562, 563; People v. Copeland, 185 A.D.2d 280, 281-282).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Ritter and Luciano, JJ., concur.