Other divisions of the court of appeals have performed similar analyses. See Moss, ¶ 11, 520 P.3d at 696; Dvson, ¶ 15, 492 P.3d at 1074; People v. Rice, 2020 COA 143, ¶ 22, 478 P.3d 1276, 1281–82, overruled on other grounds by Peoplev.Weeks, 2021 CO 75, 498 P.3d 142; People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 7, 471 P.3d 1159, 1162–63; People v. Jaeb, 2018 COA 179, ¶ 39, 434 P.3d 785, 792. In doing so, these divisions all applied the test outlined in People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973), and all that accompanies it.

¶ 77 On remand, we expect that the prosecutor will abide by the case law addressing the quality and quantity of evidence the prosecution must present to obtain a restitution award. See People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 6, 471 P.3d 1159, 1162 (stating that the prosecution "must establish ‘the amount of restitution owed and, generally, that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the victim’s loss’ " by a preponderance of the evidence (quoting People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 15, 439 P.3d 33, 36)).

Some of the victims paid for these "additional classes," such as high school general equivalency diploma classes, medical English classes, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation classes, or phlebotomy classes, because they had been informed that these classes were prerequisites to the certified nursing assistant class. SeePeople v. Stone , 2020 COA 24, ¶ 6, 471 P.3d 1159 (stating that the prosecution must prove the amount of restitution owed and that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's loss).

¶ 15 Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a restitution award is a matter we review de novo. People v. Stone , 2020 COA 24, ¶ 7, 471 P.3d 1159. In undertaking such review, we ask "whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that amount of loss."

Consequently, the record further supports our imposition of modified restitution of $500 in consideration of the dismissed count of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft with a minimum damage component. See People v. Stone , 2020 COA 24, ¶ 5, 471 P.3d 1159 (noting that the purpose of imposing restitution against defendants is to compensate victims, and that "the Restitution Act is to be ‘liberally construed’ to accomplish that purpose" (quoting People v. McCann , 122 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Colo. App. 2005) )). IV. Conclusion

The district court's order that the settlement funds be paid to Brooks for deposit into his inmate trust fund account, permitting the Colorado Department of Corrections to determine what percentage should go toward his criminal restitution order under state law, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-18.5-106(2), is consistent with the terms of the parties' settlement agreement and Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I), (4)(c) (Restitution Act, providing that an order of restitution is a "final civil judgment in favor of the state and any victim," which "remains in force until the restitution is paid in full" and "creates a lien by operation of law against the defendant's personal property and any interest that the defendant may have in any personal property"); People v. Stone, 471 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Colo.App. 2020) (provisions of the Restitution Act should be liberally construed). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to consider constitutional and other legal arguments that Brooks failed to raise in a timely manner.

The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's losses. People v. Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 6.

(In a separate appeal, we address defendant's contentions concerning a restitution order. See People v. Stone , 2020 COA 24, 471 P.3d 1159.)