We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's request for a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 [D.C. Cir.] to determine the admissibility of testimony concerning the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of the accident based upon retrograde extrapolation. In light of the acceptance of such evidence by the courts of the State of New York (seePeople v. Menegan, 107 A.D.3d 1166, 1169, 967 N.Y.S.2d 461 ; People v. Dombrowski–Bove, 300 A.D.2d 1122, 1123, 753 N.Y.S.2d 259 ; People v. O'Connor, 290 A.D.2d 519, 520, 738 N.Y.S.2d 55 ; People v. Cross, 273 A.D.2d 702, 703, 711 N.Y.S.2d 533 ; People v. Hagin, 238 A.D.2d 714, 716, 657 N.Y.S.2d 105 ; People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753, 754, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139 ; People v. MacDonald, 227 A.D.2d 672, 674–675, 641 N.Y.S.2d 749, affd 89 N.Y.2d 908, 653 N.Y.S.2d 267, 675 N.E.2d 1219 ), a Frye hearing was not necessary (seePeople v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 458, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374 ; People v. Gibson, 163 A.D.3d 586, 80 N.Y.S.3d 392 ; People v. Foster–Bey, 158 A.D.3d 641, 641, 67 N.Y.S.3d 846, affd 35 N.Y.3d 959, 124 N.Y.S.3d 591, 147 N.E.3d 1129 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People established that their expert toxicologist was sufficiently qualified to render an opinion as to the defendant's blood alcohol content (seePeople v. Dombrowski–Bove, 300 A.D.2d at 1123, 753 N.Y.S.2d 259 ; People v. O'Connor, 290 A.D.2d at 520, 738 N.Y.S.2d 55 ; People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d at 754, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139 ; People v. MacDonald, 227 A.D.2d at 674–675, 641 N.Y.S.2d 749 ).

Unfortunately, the majority of this court now encourages the entire State of New York to imitate the "rough justice" of the City. See e.g. People v Anderson (932 NYS2d 561, 564 [3d Dept 2011]); People v Weber (40 AD3d 1267, 1267-1268 [3d Dept 2007]); People v Kirton (36 AD3d 1011, 1013 [3d Dept 2007]); People v Young (13 AD3d 716, 718 [3d Dept 2004]); People v Porter (304 AD2d 845, 846 [3d Dept 2003]); People v De Chellis (265 AD2d 735 [3d Dept 1999]); People v Hagin (238 AD2d 714, 716 [3d Dept 1997]); People v Stiffler (237 AD2d 753, 754 [3d Dept 1997]); People v Noonan (220 AD2d 811, 813 [3d Dept 1995]; People v Elkins (211 AD2d 921, 922 [3d Dept 1995]; People v Mahan (195 AD2d 881, 883 [3d Dept 1993]; People v Szczepanski (172 AD2d 884 [3d Dept 1991]); People v Benson (123 AD2d 470, 471 [3d Dept 1986]); People v Handly (96 AD2d 649 [3d Dept 1983]); see also e.g. People v Cooke (101 AD2d 983, 984 [3d Dept 1984]). See e.g. People v Murad (55 AD3d 754, 755 [2d Dept 2008]); People v Pennetti (182 AD2d 647 [2d Dept 1992]; see also e.g. People v Michalek (194 AD2d 568, 569 [2d Dept 1993]); People v Durham (154 AD2d 615 [2d Dept 1989]); People v Powe (146 AD2d 718, 719 [2d Dept 1989]); People v Banks (143 AD2d 677, 678 [2d Dept 1988]); People v Padilla, 123 AD2d 364, 365 [2d Dept 1986]).

1. See e.g.People v. Anderson, 89 A.D.3d 1161, 1163, 932 N.Y.S.2d 561 (3d Dept.2011); People v. Weber, 40 A.D.3d 1267, 1267–1268, 836 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dept.2007); People v. Kirton, 36 A.D.3d 1011, 1013, 827 N.Y.S.2d 352 (3d Dept.2007); People v. Young, 13 A.D.3d 716, 718, 786 N.Y.S.2d 238 (3d Dept.2004); People v. Porter, 304 A.D.2d 845, 846, 759 N.Y.S.2d 773 (3d Dept.2003); People v. De Chellis, 265 A.D.2d 735, 697 N.Y.S.2d 711 (3d Dept.1999); People v. Hagin, 238 A.D.2d 714, 716, 657 N.Y.S.2d 105 (3d Dept.1997); People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753, 754, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139 (3d Dept.1997); People v. Noonan, 220 A.D.2d 811, 813, 632 N.Y.S.2d 675 (3d Dept.1995); People v. Elkins, 211 A.D.2d 921, 922, 621 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dept.1995); People v. Mahan, 195 A.D.2d 881, 883, 601 N.Y.S.2d 638 (3d Dept.1993); People v. Szczepanski, 172 A.D.2d 884, 568 N.Y.S.2d 184 (3d Dept.1991); People v. Benson, 123 A.D.2d 470, 471, 506 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dept.1986); People v. Handly,96 A.D.2d 649, 466 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept.1983); see also e.g.People v. Cooke, 101 A.D.2d 983, 984, 477 N.Y.S.2d 730 (3d Dept.1984). 2.

In that circumstance, the court held that evidence offered by the defendant of the lack of observable signs of intoxication was irrelevant and properly excluded. Of greater relevance are Anderjeski v. City Court, 135 Ariz. 549, 663 P.2d 233 (1983); State v. Carter, 810 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Hadden v. State, 180 Ga. App. 496, 349 S.E.2d 770 (1986); State v. Coulombe, 143 Vt. 631, 470 A.2d 1179 (1983); and People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1997), all holding or implying that the traditional intoxication and the intoxication per se offenses are separate crimes, and that the latter is not simply a device for facilitating proof of the former. (B) Whether Driving While Intoxicated Per Se Was Properly Charged

The breathalyzer test was administered within two hours of defendant's arrest and revealed a BAC of .11%, which is sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2). Such proof, coupled with defendant's admissions, slurred speech, glassy eyes and failed field sobriety tests, as well as Schmidt's observations of defendant's vehicle, support the finding that defendant operated a motor vehicle with a BAC of .08% or greater in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2) ( see People v. Mertz, 68 N.Y.2d 136, 146, 506 N.Y.S.2d 290, 497 N.E.2d 657 [1986]; People v. Arnold, 2 A.D.3d 975, 975, 768 N.Y.S.2d 244 [2003],lv. denied1 N.Y.3d 594, 776 N.Y.S.2d 226, 808 N.E.2d 362 [2004];People v. Poje, 270 A.D.2d 649, 650–651, 706 N.Y.S.2d 733 [2000],lv. denied95 N.Y.2d 802, 711 N.Y.S.2d 170, 733 N.E.2d 242 [2000];People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753, 754, 655 N.Y.S.2d 139 [1997],lv. denied90 N.Y.2d 864, 661 N.Y.S.2d 191, 683 N.E.2d 1065 [1997];see also People v. Mojica, 62 A.D.3d 100, 110–111, 874 N.Y.S.2d 195 [2009],lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 856, 881 N.Y.S.2d 668, 909 N.E.2d 591 [2009];People v. Lundell, 24 A.D.3d 569, 570, 806 N.Y.S.2d 685 [2005] ). Defendant's remaining contentions, including her assertion that Menegan's limited testimony violated the marital privilege ( seeCPLR 4502[b]; CPL 60.10), have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

The certified breathalyzer technician who had administered the test explained that the breathalyzer machine reports a “deficient test” when there is not a sufficient sample of deep lung air to get a thoroughly accurate reading, and when it also displays a reading, here .2%, it means the measured blood alcohol content is higher than what is displayed. Thus, defendant's admission that he was “highly intoxicated,” his inability to complete field sobriety tests, and the results of the breathalyzer test showing that his blood alcohol content exceeded .2% adequately established that he was intoxicated ( see People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753 [1997] ). In conducting an independent weight of the evidence review ( seeCPL 470.15 [15] ), we view the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged in this jury trial (People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348–349 [2007] ) and accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor ( see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644–645 [2006];People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004];People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987];People v. Ramirez, 58 AD3d 757, 758 [2009] ).

On appeal from a judgment convicting her of two counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.12), one count of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192), and various traffic infractions, defendant contends that she was denied a fair trial by the admission of the opinion testimony of a pharmacologist who made a "reverse extrapolation" of defendant's blood-alcohol content at the time of the accident. We conclude that the pharmacologist qualified as an expert and that a proper foundation was laid for his testimony, and that the testimony thus was properly admitted ( see People v. MacDonald, 227 A.D.2d 672, 674-675, affd 89 N.Y.2d 908, rearg denied 89 N.Y.2d 983; People v. Cross, 273 A.D.2d 702, 703; see also People v. O'Connor, 290 A.D.2d 519, 520, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 758; People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753, 754, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864). Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the blood test results. It was unnecessary for police to make a telephonic application for a court order authorizing them to seize defendant's blood, inasmuch as the requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1) were satisfied ( see People v. Hall, 91 A.D.2d 1002, 1003, affd 61 N.Y.2d 834; People v. Zawacki, 244 A.D.2d 954, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 889; cf. People v. Demetsenare, 243 A.D.2d 777, 780, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 833).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in making its Sandoval ruling (see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375). The trial court properly struck a balance between the probative worth of the evidence of the defendant's prior criminal history and its prejudicial effect, as it permitted the prosecutor to ask the defendant on cross-examination about the existence of two felony convictions for burglary, but not the nature or underlying circumstances (see, People v. Espinoza, 241 A.D.2d 554, 555; People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753). Moreover, as the conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and his misdemeanor weapon conviction are indicative of the defendant's willingness to place his own interests above those of society, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to inquire with respect to the nature and the underlying circumstances of those crimes (see, People v. Sobers, 272 A.D.2d 418, 419; People v. Dwyer, 243 A.D.2d 645; People v. Coward, 248 A.D.2d 397, 398; People v. Turner, 239 A.D.2d 447, 448). BRACKEN, P.J., LUCIANO, FEUERSTEIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

It is axiomatic that it is the duty of a trial court to strike a balance between the probative value that prior criminal convictions may have upon the credibility of a defendant and the risk of unfair prejudice that those convictions may present (see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375). While we recognize that there are cases standing for the proposition that the mere similarity of a prior conviction to the charge for which a defendant stands trial does not automatically preclude inquiry, the prevailing case law provides that striking a balance between the probative value that a similar conviction will have upon the credibility of a defendant and the risk of unfair prejudice requires that the trial court permit cross-examination as to the existence of a prior conviction, but not the nature of the conviction or the underlying circumstances thereof (see, e.g., People v. Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753, 754, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 864; People v. Noonan, 220 A.D.2d 811, 813). Indeed, in both People v. Stiffler (supra) and People v. Noonan (supra), the People were permitted to demonstrate that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony and misdemeanor, respectively, without allowing the People to prove that those convictions involved driving while intoxicated, for which each defendant was on trial.

Notably, the People's toxicologist, Donald Loomis, was able to determine that the vials had not malfunctioned and that their seals remained intact because of the existence of a vacuum at the time of his testing. Under the circumstances, we conclude that Loomis' trial testimony provided "reasonable assurance of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence" ( People v Slater, 166 A.D.2d 828, 830, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 1024). Nor are we persuaded that the gas chromatograph test or Loomis' method of "back calculation" to estimate defendant's blood-alcohol level to be 0.26% at the time he drove his vehicle were flawed or in any way incompetent or otherwise inadmissible ( see, People v Stiffler, 237 A.D.2d 753; People v. White, 211 A.D.2d 982, 983-984, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 944). Finally, there being no evidence that records created in connection with the periodic testing of the gas chromatograph were ever available to the prosecution, we are not persuaded that there was any Rosario violation in that connection ( see, People v. Gillis, 220 A.D.2d 802, 805-806, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 921). Turning briefly to certain of defendant's other assertions, we reject the contention that County Court erred in refusing to receive testimony concerning the operability of the passenger door of defendant's vehicle following the crash, offered for the purpose of contradicting Miller's testimony that he exited the vehicle by that door.