See Stice v. State, 799 P.2d 1204 (Wy. 1990) (defendant pleaded guilty to attempted voluntary manslaughter; untimely appeal permitted where district court had failed to inform defendant of maximum penalty for that crime; issue whether error harmless). Here, defendant relies on an Illinois Court of Appeals case, People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 376, 555 N.E.2d 1074 (1990). In that case, defendant Stephen Stevenson had telephoned the home of his ex-paramour and her husband and had threatened to kill the husband.

However, the jury was instructed before deliberation that the indictment and the closing arguments were not to be considered as evidence against defendant. ¶ 63 The State cites People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill.App.3d 376, 381–82 (1990), 144 Ill.Dec. 555, 555 N.E.2d 1074 (1990) in which the appellate court found that the State's opening statement and the defendant's closing argument were sufficient to overcome any ambiguity of the issues of defendant's mental state, which was allegedly caused by the jury instruction. People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill.App.3d 376, 381–82, 144 Ill.Dec. 555, 555 N.E.2d 1074 (1990).

Defense counsel neither objected nor included this matter in a posttrial motion, resulting in the issue's forfeiture on appeal. See People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill.App.3d 376, 382 (1990). Despite the forfeiture, this court may consider substantial defects if the interests of justice require it.

{17} Jurisdictions that refuse to recognize attempted voluntary manslaughter as a crime do so because they conclude it would be illogical to apply the crime of attempt, a specific intent crime, to the general intent crime of voluntary manslaughter. See State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 212 (Me. 1979) ("The crime of manslaughter . . . is predicated upon a different mental state from that found in the attempt statute . . . . Because of the discrepancy in culpable mental states between criminal attempt on the one hand and manslaughter on the other, the proffered crime of `attempted manslaughter' is a logical impossibility."); see also People v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 738, 739, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (N.Y.App.Div. 1964); Westbrook v. State, 722 So.2d 788, 792 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335, 926 P.2d 1258, 1273 (1996); People v. Martinez, 81 N.Y.2d 810, 595 N.Y.S.2d 376, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278 (1993); Curry v. State, 106 Nev. 317, 792 P.2d 396, 397 (1990); People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill.App.3d 376, 144 Ill.Dec. 555, 555 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (1990). {18} Although we have implicitly recognized attempted voluntary manslaughter as a crime, we have never squarely held it exists in New Mexico.

¶ 33 The State relied below on People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill.App.3d 376, 384-85 (1990), where a police officer testified that the defendant, charged with attempted murder, admitted that "I stuck the m-----f-----. I'm going to jail.

charge was by the indictment, which was read during voir dire, and the State's opening and closing arguments. People v. Valadovinos, 2014 IL App (1st) 130076, ¶¶ 34-35; see also People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 376, 381-82 (1990) (finding that comments made by both the State and defense counsel were sufficient to overcome ambiguity in the jury instructions). ¶ 68 Mr. Willingham also argues that the instruction given in his case improperly failed to tell the jurors that, to find him guilty, they had to determine he possessed the specific intent to kill Mr. Scott and not Shiquita Fleming.

People v. Valadovinos, 2014 IL App (1st) 130076, ¶¶ 34-35. See also People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 376, 381-82 (1990) (finding that comments made by both the State and defense counsel were sufficient to overcome ambiguity in the jury instructions). ¶ 46 Mr. Willingham also argues that the instruction given in his case improperly failed to tell the jurors that, to find him guilty, they had to determine he possessed the specific intent to kill Mr.

Where jury instructions are unclear or ambiguous, a reviewing court can look to the opening statements and closing arguments for clarification. See People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 376, 382 (1990). ¶ 24

Rather, Illinois courts have repeatedly held that a single offense of attempt can encompass multiple acts. People v. Woods, 24 Ill. 2d 154, 158, 180 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1962) ("an attempt does exist where a person, with intent to commit a specific offense, performs acts which constitute substantial steps toward the commission of that offense" (emphasis added)); People v. Paluch, 78 Ill. App. 2d 356, 359, 222 N.E.2d 508, 510 (1966) ("The crux of the determination of whether the acts are sufficient to constitute an attempt really is whether, when given the specific intent to commit an offense, the acts taken in furtherance thereof are such that there is a dangerous proximity to success in carrying out the intent" (emphases added)); People v. Stevenson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 376, 383, 555 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (1990) ("Attempt requires an intent to commit a specific offense and an act or acts constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense" (emphasis added)). To my knowledge, only one case has held that each substantial step is a separate offense of attempt.

If the evidence is not closely balanced, instructional error which may allow a conviction for attempted murder without a finding of a specific intent to kill has not been considered plain error. ( People v. Leger (1992), 149 Ill.2d 355, 404, 597 N.E.2d 586, 608; People v. Stevenson (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 376, 383, 555 N.E.2d 1074, 1078.) In this case substantial evidence was presented to show that defendant acted with the intent to kill Danny Plunkett and Mary Ashley. The defendant stabbed each victim numerous times with a knife, causing deep lacerations.