Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CR024682
HULL, J.Defendant Cynthia Lynn Stevens entered a straight plea of guilty to the charges of harboring an escapee and unlawfully resisting the performance of a peace officer’s duties, and admitted the two recidivist allegations in the amended information. After denying a motion to exercise its discretion to reduce her felony accessory conviction to a misdemeanor (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 974-975 (Alvarez); Pen. Code, § 17, subds. (b)(1), (b)(3)), the court sentenced her to state prison for four years.
On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The parties stipulated that there was a factual basis for the plea in the transcript of the preliminary hearing, which is not part of the record on appeal. We derive the facts instead from defendant’s motion to reduce her felony to a misdemeanor, and from the probation report (which in turn derived its facts from a police report).
Defendant’s relative (who ran away from a juvenile facility on April 28, 2007) arrived at her apartment on the morning of April 30 when defendant was not home. Her roommate let the juvenile in the apartment. After defendant returned that evening and found him there, she spoke with his father but did not call the police. She claimed to have asked the juvenile, unsuccessfully, to leave.
On the following afternoon, the police determined that the juvenile had been seen entering the apartment, and defendant was on searchable probation. Obtaining a key from the manager of the apartment complex, they knocked on the door. Not getting any response, they let themselves in and saw the juvenile dash into a bedroom. In response to their order, the juvenile came back into the room. He claimed to have just arrived. Emerging from another bedroom, defendant and her roommate admitted that they had heard the knock-notice. Defendant later asserted to the probation officer that she was in her bedroom watching television and had not heard the law enforcement officers knock and announce their presence.
Defendant initially denied any culpability to the officers. She then admitted knowing that the juvenile was an escapee, but claimed that he had arrived just the previous evening. She had not called the police because she did not want to “rat him off.” She also later asserted to the probation officer that she was afraid of the juvenile.
In her motion, defendant argued that she only passively participated in the present offense, which was a de minimus violation of the law at most, and her roommate was not punished at all. She acknowledged her numerous prior convictions, but argued that none of them were for any serious offenses.
Defendant’s convictions included 1990 convictions for misdemeanor welfare fraud, a 1992 conviction for misdemeanor cruelty to a child, three 1993 convictions for misdemeanor and felony drug offenses, two 1995 probation violations, a 1995 felony conviction for possessing a controlled substance, 2001 convictions for possession of a firearm and for the misdemeanor of giving false identification to a peace officer, a 2002 conviction for escape, violations of parole in 2002 and 2003, a 2003 conviction for receiving stolen property, and a 2006 violation of parole.
The court concluded that “Taking this matter in its entire context, the Defendant’s prior experience with escape, it is not a circumstance where a misdemeanor should be the result.” The court also pointed out the lengthy and unremitting nature of her criminal record since 1990.
DISCUSSION
The trial court has a “broad generic” discretion in ruling on a motion to reduce a felony to a misdemeanor (where the crime provides for either sentence in a court’s discretion) that we cannot overturn on appeal absent an affirmative showing of an irrational or arbitrary result. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977.) No criteria peculiar to this context exist to guide a court in the exercise of its discretion other than those that generally apply in making sentencing decisions, such as an individualized consideration of the circumstances of the crime, the characteristics of the offender, and the public interest. (Id. at p. 978.)
Echoing the motion in the trial court, defendant argues it was an abuse of discretion to base a decision on a six-year-old escape conviction, because her participation was passive. We disagree with her characterization and analysis.
As we interpret the trial court’s intent, her prior escape conviction—in connection with her present willingness to harbor her relative in his own escape—demonstrates a cavalier approach to complying with the sanctions that her conduct incurs. Even if the present offense does not represent the most egregious instance of accessory liability, the offender is not one whose ongoing behavior merits lenient treatment.
Defendant points out that a lengthy criminal record did not prevent Alvarez from upholding the trial court’s decision to reduce a present offense to a misdemeanor. In this fact-specific context, it serves little purpose to compare one case with another. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Brown (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 188, 202.) Moreover, defendant overlooks a crucial distinction: Alvarez involved the grant of a motion to reduce, which it was obligated to uphold absent an arbitrary or irrational result. Over the course of 18 years, defendant has engaged in repeated instances of thumbing her nose at the rules, even if we ignore the crimes that are related to her purported addiction. While this may be an 18-year history of relatively minor transgressions, society (in the person of the trial court) is not compelled to define deviancy downward by excusing the flouting of its more minor mandates. An iterated refusal to conform one’s behavior to social strictures merits a greater punishment for the present offense, even if reasonable jurists might differ (which we, in any event, do not). This is not sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in denying the motion. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 981.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur RAYE, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.