Opinion
NO. 4-20-0647 NO. 4-20-0648 cons.
05-03-2021
In re A.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jena A. and Steven A. Respondents-Appellants).
NOTICE
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County
No. 20JA68
Honorable John R. Kennedy, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not err in adjudicating A.A. neglected and did not err in finding respondent parents unfit.
¶ 2 In August 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect with respect to A.A., a newborn child of respondents Jena A. and Steven A. In November 2020, the trial court adjudicated the minor neglected. In December 2020, the court entered a dispositional order making the minor a ward of the court and placed custody and guardianship with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 3 On appeal, respondents argue (1) the trial court erred in finding the minor neglected and (2) the court's decision to make the minor a ward of the court and grant guardianship to DCFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 4 We affirm.
¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 In August 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect, alleging A.A., born August 8, 2020, was abused and neglected pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2018)). Count I alleged the minor's environment was injurious to his welfare by residing with respondent mother (Jena), who failed to correct the conditions which resulted in prior adjudications of parental unfitness (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)). Count II alleged A.A. was neglected due to an injurious environment caused by his exposure to the effects of Jena's mental disability (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)). Count III alleged A.A. was a dependent minor who was without proper care because of Jena's mental disability (705 ILCS 405/2-4(1)(b) (West 2018)). Count IV alleged A.A.'s environment was injurious to his welfare when residing with respondent father (Steven), in that said environment exposed A.A. to domestic violence (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)). In August 2020, at the shelter care hearing, the trial court found probable cause the minor was neglected and placed temporary custody with DCFS.
¶ 7 Prior to the October 2020 adjudicatory hearing, the State dismissed count IV of the petition. At the hearing, the State called Orren Reeves, a DCFS child protection specialist who had been assigned to the case after A.A. was born in Springfield. She said she spoke with the mother by phone, informing her there was a pending investigation and the department would be taking protective custody of the minor. Jena told Reeves about her history with DCFS, indicating she previously had two of her children removed from her care due to her failure to complete services in a timely manner. Jena also informed Reeves that after losing parental rights to those two children, she and her ex-husband moved to Texas, where she had two more children, one of whom drowned in a bathtub while in her care. She surrendered parental rights to
the other child after she was convicted and sentenced to prison for the death of the 17-month-old. The mother informed Reeves she was not scheduled to be released from parole until 2024.
¶ 8 Jena testified she was incarcerated for three years of a nine-year sentence for the conviction in 2016. She testified about her mental health issues and the completion of parenting classes, counseling, and mental health assessments as part of her previous case with DCFS in 2010, as well as additional parenting and cognitive intervention classes while incarcerated. Since her release, Jena said she had been attending additional parenting and domestic violence classes as well as counseling. She testified she is diagnosed as having borderline personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), for which she has had a service dog since her release from prison. According to her, she has never been prescribed medication for either condition. She also said she had done "a lot of research" about her disabilities and believed she was better able to cope with them. On cross-examination by the guardian ad litem (GAL), she described how she was awaiting a mental health assessment and had an appointment to start counseling "next month." She described some of the symptoms of her borderline personality disorder as anxiety, where she would "overreact when things get overwhelming or tough." She stated she has been better able to control herself over time by employing different coping mechanisms. Describing her behavior previously, Jena said, "[I]t was very easy for me to blow up and completely lose it to the point of scaring people," "say things that were completely outrageous," and "become belligerent and threaten people." She explained her giving birth in Springfield instead of Champaign, where she lived, came about because they were visiting a friend. In response to questions by her own counsel, Jena outlined the courses taken and completed while in prison. These included Peer Health Education, completed in 2017, which involved learning how to "make better choices about relationships that are healthy environments, healthy
lifestyles"; four Bible study classes; Parenting from the Inside, a parenting class, completed in 2016; and Bridges to Life, a prison-based victim sensitivity program. Jena testified that since her release, she participated in a "parenting, problem solving, emotional management" program completed in 2019 and was attending counseling, which was also part of her parole.
¶ 9 After her testimony, the State introduced and admitted Jena's medical records, over respondents' objection, and the trial court took judicial notice of its prior orders and findings in Jena's previous abuse and neglect case involving her two other daughters. At the State's request, the court also took judicial notice of the orders and findings in the 2007 guardianship case for Jena where there was "a finding on allegations of mental deterioration or physical incapacity and mental illness with a developmental disability." The court also noted the guardian was discharged years later.
¶ 10 Steven testified he has known Jena for 15 years. He said he was aware "she has PTSD and split personality disorder" but has no concerns about her mental health issues. They are married and live together in a one-bedroom apartment. He stated Jena received prenatal care up until the twenty-eighth week of her pregnancy but after 28 weeks, they could not find a medical facility that would accept her insurance. He detailed the preparation he and Jena undertook in anticipation of A.A.'s arrival and listed friends and family on whom they could rely, both within and outside the community. He said A.A. was born in Springfield because he and Jena travelled to visit his friend and stayed for a couple of days. They did not expect Jena to go into labor "one day early." After A.A. was born, Steven said the DCFS caseworker arrived at the hospital and told Jena she was taking the baby into protective custody "due to Jena's history." On cross-examination, Steven described the change in Jena since he first met her as "a
complete 180." "She is literally a different person." It was his opinion she was capable of parenting A.A.
¶ 11 Jena's father, Donald Manning, also testified. According to Manning, since her return to Illinois, he has seen a "groundbreaking difference" in Jena's "ability to handle stressful situations" and has no concerns regarding Jena's ability to care for A.A. On cross-examination, he noted her earliest mental diagnosis was for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and she had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons "numerous times." He explained the earlier guardianship had always been intended to be temporary and was intended to obtain residential treatment for her. He and his wife have constant contact with Jena and Steven, visiting with them several times a week.
¶ 12 After hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court briefly took the matter under advisement in order to more thoroughly review documents submitted as part of the case.
¶ 13 At the next hearing, the trial court found the State proved counts I and II by a preponderance of evidence as to both respondents but it failed to prove count III. The court noted Jena's "long history of mental disability," including borderline personality disorder and PTSD. She was adjudicated as mentally disabled in 2004 and appointed a guardian. The guardianship was not terminated until 2016. In addition, she had spent "a lengthy amount of time" in residential care, all of which evidenced the long-term nature of her mental disability. The trial court also noted she had been previously adjudicated unfit and had her parental rights terminated for two of her children. She had also been sentenced to nine years in prison for the drowning of her infant daughter while she was left unattended in a bathtub. The trial court pointed out how both parents showed poor judgment when, while Jenna was at full-term pregnancy with A.A., they decided to drive to Springfield during the COVID-19 pandemic to visit a friend, with Jena
ultimately giving birth to A.A. in an unfamiliar hospital away from any previous prenatal care she received. While there, what subsequently prompted the DCFS investigation were the observations made by the hospital's primary care team, who noticed her "odd affect" and "delusional statements." As a result, they recommended a psychiatric consultation, which she refused. Although the court acknowledged some evidence of improvement in Jena's behavior, the court found the minor's environment to be injurious when residing with Jena due to exposure to her disability. The court also found Jena had failed to correct conditions regarding her mental disability that resulted in previous adjudications of unfitness as to two other children. The court set the dispositional hearing for December 2020.
¶ 14 At the dispositional hearing, the trial court accepted as evidence the dispositional report submitted by DCFS from which all parties argued. The State and the GAL presented no evidence. Steven's counsel submitted proof of completion of parenting classes, proof of employment, his substance abuse assessment, and evidence of counseling appointments without objection. Jena's counsel submitted a parenting skills course certificate, her scheduled counseling appointments, and a letter from Jena's parents without objection. The trial court indicated it was considering the evidence and findings of the adjudicatory hearing and the evidence offered at the dispositional hearing.
¶ 15 The trial court found Jena unfit due to her "lengthy and significant history of mental illness." In the dispositional order filed the next day, the court elaborated somewhat, noting how Jena "also has a history of being in abusive and violent relationships." As a result, the court concluded it would be contrary to the health, safety, and best interests of the minor to be in her custody. With regard to the father, Steven, the court noted his prior indicated history with DCFS, and in the dispositional order it also found he "has a history of violence in
relationships and has been previously indicated for abuse to a minor in his household." The court found it would be contrary to the minor's health, safety, and best interest for A.A. to be in Steven's custody as well. Although both respondents initiated and engaged in recommended services, the court found they had been unsuccessful in rectifying the conditions leading to the finding of unfitness. Therefore, the court found it was in the best interests of A.A. to be adjudged neglected and to place custody and guardianship with DCFS.
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Respondents argue the trial court erred by finding A.A. was neglected at the adjudicatory hearing and by finding respondents unfit at the dispositional hearing. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 19 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process the trial court must utilize to decide whether a minor child should be made a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18, 981 N.E.2d 336. The first step involves the adjudicatory hearing, where the court considers whether the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. See 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2018); A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 19. At an adjudication hearing, the burden is on the State to prove the allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463-64, 819 N.E.2d 734, 747 (2004). Cases involving allegations of neglect are sui generis, taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances presented in the record. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463. Under the Juvenile Court Act, neglect can be intentional or unintentional, depending on the circumstances and facts of each case. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d. 338, 346, 730 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (2000). On review of a trial court's finding of neglect, the court's
ruling will "not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464.
¶ 20 Children are neglected if their environment is injurious to their welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). Although "injurious environment" is an amorphous concept and dependent upon the facts of each case, it is based on the premise "[p]arents have the duty to protect their children from harm, and their refusal to provide their children with safe and nurturing shelter *** [constitutes] neglect." In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826, 649 N.E.2d 74, 79 (1995). Under the concept of injurious environment, "evidence that a parent has neglected or abused one child is relevant in determining whether another child may be at risk for abuse or neglect." In re L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623, 683 N.E.2d 1292, 1295 (1997). "When faced with evidence of prior abuse by parents, the juvenile court should not be forced to refrain from taking action until each particular child suffers an injury." In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339, 379 N.E.2d 872, 881 (1978).
¶ 21 At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court noted how both respondents demonstrated poor judgment and how Jena has "continued to show current affects of [her] mental disability," for example, driving to Springfield to visit friends during the COVID-19 pandemic while she was at full-term pregnancy. In addition to hearing testimony regarding Jena's borderline personality disorder and PTSD, the court, by way of an admitted exhibit, was also able to consider Jena's medical records. Those records reveal Jena made statements alarming to the hospital staff, which prompted DCFS involvement. She informed staff this was her sixth pregnancy but the previous pregnancies were surrogate pregnancies for other couples, arousing the suspicion of medical personnel. The medical documentation she provided to hospital staff showed limited prenatal care. Her statements prompted the staff to do an Internet
search of her name, finding prior court and DCFS involvement. They requested she undergo a psychiatric consultation, which she refused.
¶ 22 Furthermore, the trial court heard how Jena previously lost her parental rights to two children before moving to Texas, and it took judicial notice of its prior orders and findings in those cases. The court also heard how, while living in Texas, she had two more children, one of whom, only 17 months old, died while in her care. She ultimately relinquished parental rights to the other child when convicted and sentenced to a nine-year prison sentence for causing the death of the 17-month-old child. The court had also taken judicial notice of a 2007 guardianship established for Jena due to her mental disability, which was not terminated until 2016. The evidence before the trial court showed a long history of mental instability and mental health issues that, at one point, led to termination of her parental rights to her first two children because she failed to comply with services in a timely manner. Dramatic errors in judgment led to the death of her 17-month-old daughter, due primarily to her reckless endangerment. As a result, she served three years in prison. Although she acknowledges serious long-term mental health issues, according to Jena, she does not need medication but has a service dog instead. Most recently, she gave birth to A.A. a long distance from home and away from her prenatal care provider because she and her husband decided to go visit a friend in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic she frequently mentioned as being of great concern to her. The comments of the court revealed its disbelief in this explanation, perhaps suspecting instead it was more likely she had gone to Springfield to deliver her child to avoid the Champaign DCFS's intervention. This suspicion would prove later to be reasonable since the disposition report indicated previous efforts to hide a pregnancy from DCFS for the same reasons. Further, any reasonably competent obstetrician-gynecologist involved in A.A.'s delivery would know she had previous births, so her
efforts to explain them as surrogate pregnancies would have allowed her to explain the births with no further history. The record showed three prior adjudications of unfitness, a guardianship lasting nine years, and a history of mental health problems, which did not yet appear adequately treated.
¶ 23 There was ample evidence presented that Jena continued to demonstrate the "current affects of [her] mental disability" and neglected or abused previous children, which was relevant in determining whether A.A. may be at risk for abuse or neglect. See In re L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d at 623. The possibility of future harm to newborn A.A. was real. Based on Jena's prior abuse and neglect toward her children, the trial court was not required to refrain from taking action until A.A. was actually injured. Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 339. We find the evidence sufficient to establish the allegations of neglect by a preponderance. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463-64.
¶ 24 We also find the evidence presented was sufficient to establish Steven's actions placed the minor in an injurious environment by failing to protect him from potential harm. Despite the evidence of Jena's continued serious untreated mental health issues, Steven, who testified he married her the day before A.A. was born, said he had no concerns about Jena's mental health issues. His explanation for the surprise delivery in Springfield was because A.A. came "one day early," indicating he had no concept of the inexact nature of a pregnant mother's due date. In addition, as the trial court noted, traveling with a full-term pregnant woman to visit not a relative or a lifelong friend, but someone he met a couple years prior while working in Springfield, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic shows singularly poor and dangerous judgment.
¶ 25 The second part of the two-step process in an abuse or neglect proceeding is the dispositional hearing, where the trial court determines whether it is consistent with the health, safety, and best interests of the minor and the public for the minor to be made a ward of the court. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21. At the dispositional hearing, if the trial court finds the parents unfit, the minor may be made a ward of the court, and the court "shall determine the proper disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the public." 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2018). The trial court may place custody and guardianship of the minor with DCFS if the parents are unable or unwilling to protect, train, or discipline the minor and the "health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her parents." 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2018). A trial court's dispositional order will be reversed only if its fact findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the court committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re J.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856, 898 N.E.2d 803, 811 (2008) (citing In re Ta. A., 384 Ill. App. 3d 303, 307, 891 N.E.2d 1034, 1037-38 (2008)).
¶ 26 The dispositional report filed by DCFS in preparation for the hearing in December was noted by the trial court and accepted as evidence. All parties referenced the report in their arguments. The court also considered the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing and the adjudicatory findings, as well as evidence presented at the dispositional hearing. In the report, DCFS recounted the circumstances leading to its involvement with A.A. and the parents. The report outlined Jena's previous DCFS involvement, the loss or relinquishment of parental rights to four other children, and her responsibility and incarceration for causing the death of the 17-month-old. While pregnant with her first child, she was psychiatrically hospitalized for suicidal ideation after learning a male physician would be delivering her baby. While pregnant
with her third child, she "reportedly concealed the pregnancy from child welfare staff in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid [the child's] placement into DCFS custody." She was psychiatrically hospitalized for "extreme irritability and behavior dysregulation" several times spanning from 1995 to 2005. In 2002, some of the psychiatric reports began to describe her behavior and symptoms in terms such as "borderline personality disorder, *** emotional lability, unstable relationships, and threats of harm to self or others." Despite her history, she informed the assessment team she did not need any psychiatric medication because it makes her feel like a "zombie" and she "can function without medication."
¶ 27 Currently, she is "easily dysregulated upon encountering intense emotions and stressors, and she tends to behave impulsively." DCFS expressed the obvious concern for Jena's ability to care for A.A., in light of her conduct and lack of judgment resulting in the death of one of her children while in her care. Overall, the assessment team had legitimate concerns for Jena's ability to consistently engage in services and implement any learned skills, as evidenced by her failure to engage in services in her past DCFS cases. During the assessment, she "exhibited no insight into the possible safety risks posed by [Steven] to their child, nor did she display any understanding of the impact of her behavior and choices (including her pattern of involvement with perpetrating partners and her prior poor supervision of her other children) upon her child's safety and well-being."
¶ 28 DCFS indicated Steven on three occasions for either child abuse or neglect. He was criminally convicted for assaulting his former paramour's child and "has a history of engaging in violative behavior toward others." He has several criminal convictions: one involved grabbing a 14-year-old child by the throat and the other involved grabbing another child by the ankle, both resulting in criminal charges. He was also previously indicated by DCFS for
allegedly engaging in sexually suggestive behavior with a young child. The report found, "[d]espite his attempts to justify, deny, and/or minimize past violence toward others, [Steven] displays a pattern of engaging in violative behavior toward others, including children." DCFS noted its concern for Steven's "lack of insight into his behavior and choices" and his "ability to safely care for a young, vulnerable child."
¶ 29 Reviewing this record, we conclude the trial court's dispositional order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Based on the evidence, the trial court's decision making A.A. a ward of the court and placing custody and guardianship with DCFS was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 32 Affirmed.