Subsequently, in response to a jury request for clarification on the elements of the offense, the court reinstructed the jury on, inter alia, the defense of temporary innocent possession. On the whole, considering the reinstruction on this defense in conjunction with the initial charge, the proper standard regarding the burden of proof was not clearly and unequivocally conveyed to the jury ( see People v Victor, 62 NY2d 374, 377-378; People v Moran, 84 AD2d 753; see also People v Perez, 127 AD2d 707, 710; see generally People v Drake, 7 NY3d 28, 33-34; cf. People v Sterling, 151 AD2d 522). There was no reason for the trial court to go beyond the standard instruction ( see People v LaDolce, 196 AD2d 49, 55) on the law of temporary possession ( see 1 CJI[NY] 9.65). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the error was harmless ( see generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242; People v Jones, 74 AD2d 854, 856). The defendant's claim that a portion of the court's charge as to reasonable doubt was erroneous is unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.

Accordingly, the defendant's contention is without merit. We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit (see, People v Sterling, 151 A.D.2d 522). Harwood, J.P., Balletta, Rosenblatt and Copertino, JJ., concur.