Opinion
January 11, 1999.
Appeal from the County Court, Suffolk County (Weissman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends, inter alia, that he was not given sufficient notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 regarding a version of his oral statement that was subsequently related by a police officer at trial. We disagree. The notice provided by the People adequately apprised the defendant of the sum and substance of. the oral statement and a verbatim recitation of the statement was not required ( see, People v. Bennett, 56 N.Y.2d 837, 839; People v. Jordan, 216 A.D.2d 489, 490; People v. Reid, 215 A.D.2d 507; People v. Noto, 188 A.D.2d 490). Moreover, there was no appreciable difference between the noticed statement and the statement testified to at trial, and the defendant received an adequate opportunity to timely move to suppress it ( see, People v. Chase, 85 N.Y.2d 493; People v. Rodney; 85 N.Y.2d 289).
The defendant's contention that his guilt of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree was not established beyond a reasonable doubt because the People did not prove that he knowingly possessed stolen property ( see, Penal Law § 165.45) is unpreserved for appellate review ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant was observed in exclusive possession of the stolen vehicle, led a police officer on a high-speed chase, and fled after crashing the vehicle into a tree. After his arrest, he initially made a false statement to police, but then admitted "[he] needed wheels to get around. It was cold." Accordingly, the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knowingly possessed a stolen automobile ( see, People v. Cordero, 177 A.D.2d 499; People v. Clark, 172 A.D.2d 679, 681; People v. Zuccaro, 140 A.D.2d 733, 734). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The trial court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion ( see, People v. Mattiace, 77 N.Y.2d 269, 275-276; People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292; People v. Jamison, 228 A.D.2d 698).
Sullivan, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein and Luciano, JJ., concur.