People v. Steffens

81 Citing cases

  1. People v. Romero

    387 Ill. App. 3d 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 32 times
    Finding prosecutor's comment referring to the defendant as an "experienced knife fighter" was not error where "as the prosecutor pointed out in closing rebuttal argument, the nature of [the victim's] wounds—even in the midst of the excitement of the incident, defendant was able to stab [the victim] twice 'in the core of [his] body'—could certainly support an inference that defendant was capable in handling the knife."

    " To support his argument that the circumstances of the offense warranted a lower sentence, defendant relies on four cases: People v. Steffens, 131 Ill. App. 3d 141 (1985); People v. Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d 899 (1985); People v. Newell, 196 Ill. App. 3d 373 (1990); and People v. Nolan, 291 Ill. App. 3d 879 (1997). Each of those cases is distinguishable.

  2. People v. Batson

    144 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    In People v. Batson (1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 1027, 495 N.E.2d 154, the fact that the defendant backed her car at a high rate of speed, knowing that the victim was in close proximity to her car, was sufficient to show recklessness.

    While defendant testified that she backed up her car at a normal speed, both Strawhacker and the bartender testified that defendant backed up rapidly, throwing dust and gravel. In People v. Steffens (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 141, 475 N.E.2d 606, the defendant ran over the victim and dragged the victim underneath his car for almost a block. In reviewing the evidence to determine whether it was sufficient to sustain a murder conviction, the court noted that the defendant admitted seeing the victim in front of his car before he hit him.

  3. People v. Floyd

    160 Ill. App. 3d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    The State, however, need not prove defendant had the intent to murder; the State need only show that defendant voluntarily and willfully committed an act, the natural tendency of which was to cause death or great bodily harm. (See People v. Whitt (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 42, 50, 487 N.E.2d 1246, 1251; People v. Steffens (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 141, 148, 475 N.E.2d 606, 612-13.) This intent may be implied or inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances, including defendant's words and actions, and from the character of the acts themselves.

  4. Fointno v. State

    487 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 1986)   Cited 71 times
    Finding sentence unconstitutionally harsh where the trial court enhanced multiple counts stemming from same criminal act citing the same aggravating factors

    The reviewing court modified the sentence to probation because the defendant had no criminal record, and a stable employment and family history. In the very recent case of People v. Steffens (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 141, 86 Ill. Dec. 392, 475 N.E.2d 606, the defendant had been convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment. Reviewing several Illinois authorities, the Court of Appeals modified the sentence to a 20-year term in light of mitigating evidence, and particularly concluded that the defendant's rehabilitative potential had not been given adequate consideration.

  5. People v. Garry

    2024 Ill. App. 5th 230535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    ¶ 32 It is well settled that the trial court is afforded broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and a trial court's sentencing decision will not be disturbed upon review absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 209 (2000); People v. Steffens, 131 Ill.App.3d 141, 151 (1985). An abuse of discretion will be found only where the sentencing court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.

  6. People v. Perkins

    2024 Ill. App. 221449 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    On appeal, defendant argues his sentence of seven years above the minimum sentence, or 27 years' imprisonment, in excessive, in light of his minimal, nonviolent criminal history; history of mental illness and periods of homelessness; family support; and because a lengthy sentence is an inefficient means of returning him to useful citizenship. ¶ 18 In support of his argument the 27-year sentence is excessive in light of defendant's nonviolent and minimal criminal background, defendant primarily relies on People v. Steffens, 131 Ill.App.3d 141, 153 (1985), in which this court found, in part, that "[i]n the light of *** the defendant's *** lack of a significant criminal record, we believe that defendant's rehabilitative potential was not given adequate consideration." This court described the analysis this way:

  7. People v. Hill

    2022 Ill. App. 2d 200416 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    See People v. Smith, 178 Ill.App.3d 976, 985 (1989); People v. Steffens, 131 Ill.App.3d 141, 152-53 (1985).

  8. People v. Ressa

    2019 Ill. App. 2d 170439 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 13 times
    In Ressa, the defendant challenged the introduction of, inter alia, his own writings and his online searches pertaining to children who had been murdered and sexually molested.

    ¶ 50 It is well settled that the trial court is afforded broad discretion in imposing a sentence and that its decision will not be disturbed upon review absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Stacey , 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209, 250 Ill.Dec. 4, 737 N.E.2d 626 (2000) ; People v. Steffens , 131 Ill. App. 3d 141, 151, 86 Ill.Dec. 392, 475 N.E.2d 606 (1985). The trial court is granted such deference because it is generally in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence, as it has the opportunity to weigh factors such as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.

  9. People v. Etherton

    2017 Ill. App. 5th 140427 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 84 times
    Encouraging supreme court to review sentences for whether trial court followed article I, section 11

    ¶ 26 As discussed throughout this opinion, it is well settled that the trial court is afforded broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and a trial court's sentencing decision will not be disturbed upon review absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Stacey , 193 Ill.2d 203, 209, 250 Ill.Dec. 4, 737 N.E.2d 626 (2000) ; People v. Steffens , 131 Ill.App.3d 141, 151, 86 Ill.Dec. 392, 475 N.E.2d 606 (1985). An abuse of discretion will be found only where the sentencing court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.

  10. People v. Meeks

    2013 Ill. App. 4th 110704 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    See id. ¶ 45 Even though a sentence is within the statutory range, we should overturn the sentence if it is so severe as to be an abuse of discretion, that is, if no reasonable person would regard the sentence as corresponding to both " 'the seriousness of the offense' " and " 'the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.' " People v. Steffens, 131 Ill. App. 3d 141, 151 (1985) (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11); People v. Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103228, ¶ 33 ("Abuse of discretion will be found where no reasonable person could agree with the position of the lower court."). ¶ 46 A "useful citizen" is one who refrains from committing crime. If a person keeps on committing crime despite being punished, a more substantial prison term can have the effect of restoring the person to useful citizenship by deterring that person from committing further crimes when he or she is released.