Opinion
4-23-0698
12-12-2023
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 21JA36 Honorable Francis M. Martinez, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
TURNER JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating respondent's parental rights where the court's fitness findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 In June 2023, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Stefanie B., as to her minor child, M.B. (born in 2015). M.B.'s father, Robert B., is not a party to this appeal. However, he appealed the termination of his parental rights in appellate court case No. 4-23-0708. In August 2023, the trial court granted the State's petition and terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 3 Respondent appeals, asserting the trial court erred in determining she was unfit. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On January 26, 2021, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was notified a narcotic warrant had been executed at respondent's home, resulting in the seizure of heroin and packaging materials. M.B., respondent, Robert, and another adult male, Henry, were all present. Henry was a suspect in a drug-induced homicide case, and respondent and M.B. reported he had been a caretaker of M.B. Respondent was smoking cigarettes and repeatedly falling asleep during execution of the warrant. Cigarette burns were found on the floor and a comforter. Robert and Henry were arrested.
¶ 6 On January 27, 2021, a DCFS investigator visited the residence. Respondent reported she was in a methadone program and had last used heroine on January 26, 2021. On January 28, 2021, respondent completed a drug screen with positive results for methadone, heroin, opiates, and benzodiazepines. She told the investigator Robert was an active heroin user and had sold the drug due to financial hardship. In February 2021, DCFS took protective custody of M.B.
¶ 7 On February 5, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging M.B. was neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) in that M.B.'s environment was injurious to her welfare. The State alleged respondent had substance-abuse issues preventing her from properly parenting. Respondent agreed to the trial court granting DCFS temporary custody. In May 2021, the court held a dispositional hearing. Respondent stipulated to the allegations in the petition, and the court adjudicated M.B. a neglected minor. M.B. was placed in foster care with her maternal aunt.
¶ 8 On June 14, 2023, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights, alleging respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022)) for failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of M.B. during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. The State alleged two nine-month periods: May 17, 2022, to February 17, 2023, and July 18, 2022, to April 18, 2023. The State also alleged respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)) for failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.B. to her care during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect. The State alleged two nine-month periods: December 12, 2021, to September 12, 2022, and July 18, 2022, to April 18, 2023.
¶ 9 On July 12, 2023, the trial court held a fitness hearing. Charo Garlitz testified she had been M.B.'s caseworker for the duration of the case. Respondent was unemployed and shared a home with Robert. She had also suffered a stroke and a heart attack and took numerous medications for various health conditions. Respondent did not participate in an integrated assessment due to illness, and tasks were assigned based on other documentation. Respondent had been assigned tasks to participate in substance-abuse counseling, individual counseling, and a parenting class and cooperate with DCFS. Respondent had stayed in contact with Garlitz and generally provided the necessary releases, but she did not sign releases for her medical records.
¶ 10 Garlitz identified service plans, which were introduced into evidence without objection from respondent. The most recent service plan admitted into evidence showed, as of February 4, 2023, respondent was rated unsatisfactory on tasks related to completing a parenting class, mental health, and maintaining drug screening. The evaluation of the plan noted, although respondent completed a parenting class, she nevertheless spent parts of her visits with M.B. arguing with staff about appropriate boundaries with M.B. Regarding mental health, the evaluation noted respondent took part in services, but DCFS was not able to see progress. Respondent had not tested positive for drug use but had missed most of her drug screens, and DCFS was concerned about the levels of her prescription medications, which impaired her ability to function. The evaluation stated respondent did not believe her substance-abuse issues had a negative impact on her relationship with M.B., and respondent did not see overmedicating herself with legal medications as an issue.
¶ 11 A summary of the family's progress noted respondent struggled to stay awake during visits with M.B. She also sought to sit and rock M.B. and refused to acknowledge that was not age appropriate. The summary reported there were times when respondent and Robert steered the conversation to their own interests, including their mental health, and engaged in inappropriate conversation, such as using profanity and complaining about Garlitz. Robert also spoke inappropriately to respondent, often telling her to "shut up." Due to respondent's and Robert's behavior, visits had been changed from being in the community to occurring at DCFS offices at M.B.'s request. M.B. also had a "safe sentence" to use when she needed time away.
¶ 12 Garlitz testified respondent had an ongoing issue with substance abuse. Respondent had been receiving services through KP Counseling, but there was a period of time when respondent was not engaged in services after her stroke. Garlitz testified respondent's medications impaired her daily functioning and caused problems with her "[s]taying awake, incontinence, [and] speech." In particular, Garlitz testified she had concerns about respondent's parenting because respondent was unable to stay awake, even while smoking. Garlitz stated respondent's drowsiness had been "an ongoing issue for the two years we've had two hour visits. It's rare that she can stay awake for the entire two hours."
¶ 13 Garlitz also testified respondent engaged in inappropriate behavior toward M.B. For example, respondent had tried to burn a tag off of M.B.'s clothing while M.B. was still wearing the item. She also embarrassed M.B. at one of M.B.'s team sporting events by sitting "in the huddle" with the team when no other parents were doing so. Respondent also inappropriately rocked M.B. on her lap like a baby, even when told not to do so, and upset M.B by using an infant brush on her hair. Garlitz testified respondent also upset M.B. by talking about her medical issues. Garlitz testified respondent failed to complete two parenting classes but completed a third one. Respondent had also engaged in parenting coaching. However, her inappropriate behavior did not change. Respondent missed a few visits with M.B. and never progressed to unsupervised visits. On cross-examination Garlitz stated, since February 2023, respondent had stopped rocking M.B. Robert was not concerned about respondent's behavior.
¶ 14 Garlitz testified family counseling had been a recommended service but did not occur because it was not yet clinically appropriate. She explained respondent and Robert were "kind of combative," and it would not be appropriate for M.B. to be in sessions where her views might not align with those of respondent and Robert.
¶ 15 Respondent testified she completed a parenting class, signed releases related to substance-abuse treatment, and took part in treatment. According to respondent, no one contacted her about missing drug screens. Respondent stated she had been helped by her counseling sessions.
¶ 16 Respondent also testified about her extensive medical issues. Respondent testified her stroke caused her to slur her speech and she had temporary memory issues. She sometimes walked with a cane. She also had anxiety, which was treated with medication. She took other medications that made her sleepy. Respondent testified she spoke to M.B. about her medical issues because she was wearing a medical heart vest, which M.B would notice, and she had to explain it to her.
¶ 17 Respondent testified she joined the huddle at the sporting event because she did not realize what it was. She denied sitting with M.B and stated she merely walked up and put her arm around M.B. Respondent stated she had difficulty realizing M.B. was growing up and admitted some of the things she had been doing, such as sitting with M.B. in her lap, were things a person did with a younger child. She maintained she no longer did those things, and M.B. now sits in her own chair. Respondent testified she had learned to accept M.B.'s growth.
¶ 18 Respondent testified she had a good relationship with Robert. Respondent admitted Robert sometimes spoke harshly toward her, but she was not afraid of him mistreating her. She admitted she still got drowsy but offered that Robert could help her when she was tired. However, the record also indicated Robert would at times need to leave M.B. in respondent's care to attend his own treatment sessions. Respondent also admitted relapsing with heroin use when M.B. was removed from the home and that she did not sign releases for her medical records. However, she gave Garlitz permission to talk to her doctor.
¶ 19 The trial court found the State proved respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence. In particular, the court found, although respondent completed parenting education, the evidence showed she was not incorporating those skills into her interactions with M.B. The court also noted respondent had multiple health issues and was prescribed numerous medications, which may have been the reason for her sleepiness. However, the court did not believe respondent meaningfully attempted to mitigate her excessive sleepiness. As a result of those deficits, respondent did not move to unsupervised visits, and the case was no closer to reunification than it was at the time of adjudication. Thus, the court found respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of M.B. during a nine-month period after the adjudication of neglect and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.B. to her care a during a nine-month period.
¶ 20 The trial court next moved to the best-interest portion of the hearing. Testimony was provided about M.B.'s placement with her aunt. The evidence showed M.B.'s aunt met M.B.'s needs and M.B. was thriving in her care. M.B. wanted to stay with her aunt, and her aunt wanted to adopt her. The court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it was in the best interest of M.B. to terminate respondent's parental rights and change the goal to adoption.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in finding the State proved she was unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 24 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is "unfit," as defined in the Adoption Act. In re DonaldA.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). If the State proves unfitness, it then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 363-66, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1226-28 (2004).
¶ 25 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make because "the trial court's opportunity to view and evaluate the parties *** is superior." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. A trial court's finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29, 115 N.E.3d 102. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29.
¶ 26 The trial court found respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.B. during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). Illinois courts have defined "reasonable progress" as "demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill.App.3d 1036, 1046, 871 N.E.2d 835, 844 (2007). This court has explained reasonable progress exists when a trial court "can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody." (Emphasis in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991).
¶ 27 Here, there was ample evidence respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward reunification. Respondent engaged in instances of inappropriate conduct toward M.B. that were only minimally mitigated by parenting classes. Respondent also did not address her ability to move past her issues with sleepiness, which the State showed could present a danger to M.B. While respondent believed Robert could care for M.B., the record did not adequately show he could do so, and at times he would have to leave M.B. in respondent's care to engage in his own services. Meanwhile, respondent had never progressed to unsupervised visits with M.B. Indeed, visitation had regressed to in-office visits at M.B.'s request. Thus, the State showed respondent could not progress to a return of M.B. in the near future, if ever. Accordingly, the trial court's determination respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.B. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 28 "A parent's rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence." In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 349, 830 N.E.2d 508, 514 (2005). Accordingly, we need not, and do not, discuss the trial court's alternate finding respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of M.B.
¶ 29 Respondent also does not argue the trial court erred in its ultimate determination that it was in the best interest of M.B. to terminate her parental rights. Accordingly, we need not address that matter. However, we nevertheless note the facts do not demonstrate the court should have reached the opposite result in its findings. Accordingly, the court's determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 32 Affirmed.