Opinion
F071751
03-27-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRODERICK JEROME STEELE, Defendant and Appellant.
Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Melissa Lipon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CF06904028)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Houry A. Sanderson, Judge. Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Melissa Lipon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
Broderick Jerome Steele appeals from an order of the trial court extending his involuntary commitment pursuant to the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act). He contends there is insufficient evidence that his mental illness caused him to pose a substantial risk of physical harm to others if he were released. We disagree and affirm the commitment order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The petition to extend Steele's involuntary treatment, filed on November 6, 2014, alleged Steele had been convicted of a felony, and later committed as a Mentally Disordered Offender pursuant to Penal Code section 2962. The petition sought to extend his commitment by one year because Steele met the requirements of the statute.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. --------
On May 11, 2015, Steele waived a jury trial and a court trial was held the same day. The prosecution's only witness was Kevin Perry, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist at Atascadero State Hospital. Perry's primary duties are evaluating patients and offering opinions about whether they meet the criteria of the mentally disordered offender law.
Perry met with Steele three times in formulating his opinion. Perry opined that Steele had a severe mental disorder, specifically schizoaffective disorder bipolar type. In forming his opinion, Perry reviewed Steele's medical records at Atascadero State Hospital, including prior psychiatric evaluations, progress notes, prior mentally disordered offender evaluations, and the probation officer's report for the committing offense, met with Steele's treating health care professionals, met with some of the nurses who work with Steele, and spoke with Steele for approximately 40 minutes.
Perry's review established that Steele had a history of auditory hallucinations, including reports that he has heard the voice of Satan, demons, God, and sometimes other people. Sometimes the voices tell Steele to harm other people. Steele has also expressed a number of delusional beliefs, such as he is an operative for the Central Intelligence Agency, and possesses the country's nuclear secrets. He has also expressed persecutory delusions such as claiming he is being tracked by various governments. He has received messages from the television in the past. Steele has also had many mood disorder symptoms that are characteristic of bipolar disorder, such as rapid mood changes, decreased need for sleep, increased energy, and pressured speech.
When Steele arrived at Atascadero State Hospital in 2009, he continued to display evidence of these symptoms. He continues to have many of the same symptoms, although some of the bipolar mood symptoms have lessened. There is recent evidence of hallucinations, delusions, and paranoid ideas. There is recent documentation in Steele's chart that he continues to respond to internal stimuli, such as talking or laughing to the voices he hears. In the past, Steele had acted aggressively in response to his symptoms.
Steele's symptoms impair his ability to accurately perceive reality, disrupt emotional functions and thought processes, and at times negatively impact his judgment and behavior.
Steele is being treated for his symptoms with medication and group therapy, with the goal of bringing his symptoms into remission so he would not pose a risk to others if released into the community. However, Perry opined Steele is not currently in remission, and his symptoms are not well controlled.
Steele had been under an involuntary medication order requiring him to take medication until shortly before trial, although he continued to take his medication after the order expired. In the past, Steele has refused to take his medication, and at times has been caught pretending to take his medication but not actually doing so. Steele reported he refused to take the medication because he was being poisoned.
Steele has also been uncooperative in the therapy groups to which he is assigned. Over the past year, he had attended only 25 percent of the sessions and, when he does attend, does not appropriately participate.
In June 2011, Steele was expressing grandiose delusions, having manic symptoms, and, as a result, acted in an aggressive manner towards hospital staff. Steele did not assault anyone, but he was required to be put into restraints or seclusion. Steele's committing offense was similar. He was at a casino accusing casino employees of being members of the Ku Klux Klan, and/or trying to rape him. He brandished a knife during the incident, and had to be restrained by police.
Steele also has a history of drug abuse that worsens his psychiatric symptoms. Steele is assigned to a substance abuse program at the hospital, but does not attend any meetings.
While the treatment Steele receives has alleviated some of his symptoms, it is likely the symptoms will return if he ceases to receive the same level of treatment. In Perry's opinion, Steele continues to meet the requirements of a patient who has a severe mental disorder within the meaning of section 2970. Steele has a lack of insight into his condition. His lack of insight contributes to his failure to comply with the treatment program. In the absence of a structured setting, Steele is likely to refuse treatment and thereby pose a danger to himself or others. Perry opined that Steele's mental disorder causes him serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior, and he would pose a substantial danger of physical harm to others if placed in a less controlled environment.
Perry opined that Steele is not currently a suitable candidate for outpatient placement because of his noncompliance in the structured setting in which he is currently housed. If returned to the community, Perry was concerned Steele would abuse controlled substances and again demonstrate violent behavior.
On cross-examination, Perry confirmed Steele had not physically assaulted anyone in the hospital since he arrived in 2009, nor has he had any violent incidents in the year preceding the hearing. He also confirmed that Steele had been attending group therapy sessions with more frequency for the past few months. Perry was not aware of any incident when Steele acted violently as a direct result of a command from one of his hallucinations.
Steele testified in his defense. Steele was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic in 1984. He sought treatment at the Veterans Administration hospital, and was provided with Haldol. "The Haldol works for the voices. Keeps them to a low key where I just hear God and not [S]atan." Steele denied hearing voices for the last two years, although he sometimes hears God speaking to him. Steele became ordained through the University Life Church in Modesto, and God told him to be a minister. God has never told Steele to do anything violent.
Steele attends groups at the hospital, but some days it is difficult to get out of bed because of the medication he is given. Steele's medications were changed about three months ago, which has produced fewer side effects. As a result, he is able to attend most group meetings at this time. Steele asked to be removed from the substance abuse program at the hospital because he had been drug free for two years before he was arrested. Steele would be willing to participate in a substance abuse program if he was transferred to an outpatient setting. Steele felt he would be motivated to attend group meetings if he were in an outpatient program because he would not want to return to the hospital.
Steele acknowledged he had a mental disorder, either paranoid schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, and would be willing to take medication for that disorder if he was released to an outpatient setting. He stated he would follow doctor's orders and recommendations if released. If he started experiencing psychotic symptoms, Steele would tell the staff at the outpatient facility, who would then take him to the hospital. Steele also has family in Fresno who have offered to provide him help if he is released. Steele did not believe he was dangerous to himself or others, and denied committing the offense for which he was incarcerated.
On cross-examination, Steele admitted he heard God's voice in his head the previous night, but has not heard Satan's voice for the last two years.
The trial court found Perry's testimony more convincing. While complimenting Steele for his recent progress, the trial court felt Steele had limited insight into his condition and the behavior that resulted from the condition. Accordingly, it granted a one-year extension of Steele's involuntary commitment.
DISCUSSION
While Steele concedes he has a severe mental disorder, he repeats in this court the same argument made in the trial court: his commitment is improper because there is insufficient evidence that Steele posed a risk of danger to others.
"The Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act), enacted in 1985, requires that offenders who have been convicted of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who continue to pose a danger to society, receive mental health treatment during and after the termination of their parole until their mental disorder can be kept in remission. [Citation.] Although the nature of an offender's past criminal conduct is one of the criteria for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO), the MDO Act itself is not punitive or penal in nature. [Citation.] Rather, the purpose of the scheme is to provide MDO's with treatment while at the same time protecting the general public from the danger to society posed by an offender with a mental disorder." (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 9.) The mentally disordered offender law is codified in section 2960 et seq.
"A prisoner certified as an MDO is treated by the State Department of Mental Health as a condition of parole. (§ 2962.) Unless good cause is shown, at least 180 days before parole is to end, the medical director of the state hospital 'shall' inform the district attorney in writing if the parolee's 'severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment.' (§ 2970.) The district attorney 'may' then petition the superior court for another year of treatment. (Ibid.) The trial on the extension petition 'shall' begin at least 30 calendar days before 'the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless the time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown.' (§ 2972, subd. (a).) If the patient is found to have a severe mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and by reason thereof represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the patient shall be recommitted for one year. (§ 2972, subd. (c).)" (People v. Cobb (2010) 48 Cal.4th 243, 247.)
The petition in this case alleged Steele had previously been found to be an MDO, and the district attorney was seeking to extend his commitment pursuant to the provisions of sections 2970 and 2972. "At an extension proceeding, the questions are: Does the defendant continue to have a severe mental disorder? Is the disorder in remission? Does the defendant continue to represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others? (§ 2972, subd. (c).)" (People v. Cobb, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 252.)
Steele's argument focuses only on the third question, does Steele continue to represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others? Steele contends there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that he posed a danger to others. It appears, in substance, Steele argues that since he has not acted in a dangerous manner in the last year, then there is no evidence to support the finding that he posed a danger of physical harm to others.
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. We review the whole record in the light most favorable to the trial court's order to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could issue the same order. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) We focus on the whole record, not isolated bits of evidence. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1203, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1189-1190.) We presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence that supports the judgment or order. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035.) We will not substitute our evaluations of a witness's credibility for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078.)
It is clear Steele's argument lacks merit. The issue of dangerousness is a question of fact to be resolved with the assistance of expert testimony. (People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165.) A single psychiatric opinion may constitute substantial evidence to support the commitment order. (Ibid.)
Here, Perry opined that Steele posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others if released. Steele did not present any psychiatric testimony to support his argument, instead relying only on evidence that he had not committed any violent acts in the recent past.
Perry's opinion was supported by a strong foundation. Steele continued to experience delusional beliefs, and his symptoms impaired his ability to accurately perceive reality. Moreover, Steele had made a poor effort to participate in therapy, and completely refused to participate in substance abuse groups because he believed he no longer had a substance abuse problem. Steele admitted medication helped minimize his symptoms, but had refused to voluntarily take any medication for most of the past year.
Steele's commitment offense demonstrated that if not in remission his psychiatric condition created a substantial danger of physical harm to others. While Steele denied at the hearing he committed any such act, he admitted he continued to hear voices, including the voice of God. He attempted to minimize his refusal to take medication, claiming it was blood pressure medication that he did not need, but admitted he now realized he does need the medication and was taking it voluntarily.
Steele's testimony demonstrates poor insight into his illness. He ignores the fact that recovery from substance abuse is an ongoing process that requires constant treatment. He denied committing a dangerous offense despite the conviction. He refused to voluntarily take necessary medication. He made little effort to benefit from the therapy offered at the hospital.
Perry opined that without continued structured treatment it was likely Steele would conclude he no longer needed treatment, would stop taking his medication, would begin abusing drugs, and would once again pose a substantial risk of harm to others. We cannot fault Perry's reasoning or conclusions considering Steele's well documented lack of insight into his illness, and his mercurial refusal to accept treatment.
DISPOSITION
The order extending Steele's treatment at Atascadero State Hospital for one year is affirmed.