Opinion
No. 1-11-2536
03-29-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD STEELE, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 02 CR 22574
Honorable
Thomas V. Gainer,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Neville and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Held:The trial court properly dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition at the second stage where defendant did not make a substantial showing that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2010)), under which he was sentenced, was unconstitutionally vague. ¶ 1 Defendant Ronald Steele appeals the second-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition. On appeal, defendant contends that the 25-year to natural life sentencing enhancement prescribed by section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Code of Corrections is unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The facts underlying defendant's conviction were set forth in detail on direct appeal, and we repeat only those germane to the claims defendant raises in his postconviction petition. Defendant was tried by a jury on two counts of first-degree murder while committing attempted robbery and robbery. He was found guilty of first-degree murder and personally discharging a weapon that proximately caused the victim's death. Following his conviction, he was sentenced to 95 years in prison, which included a 55-year sentence for first degree murder plus a 40-year penalty for personally discharging a weapon that caused great bodily harm. ¶ 4 On direct appeal, defendant argued he was denied a fair and impartial jury due to interference by the trial judge, and this court affirmed defendant's conviction. (People v. Steele, No. 1-05-0926 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). ¶ 5 Defendant timely filed the instant postconviction petition pro se on November 27, 2007, arguing generally that he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and that his due process rights were violated. Defendant also alleged that his "additional sentence" violated the Constitution and the sentencing statute was "void for vagueseness [sic] in that it fails to describe with specific particularity what type of hearing [sic] mandated and what factors are to be considered [sic] the party sentencing the defendant." The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant, and in August 2010, counsel supplemented defendant's postconviction petition. The supplemental petition incorporated all arguments from the pro se petition and elaborated on defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. ¶ 6 On November 17, 2010, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition on the basis that defendant's claims of ineffective assistance were without merit, and that his arguments as to trial court errors were waived due to the failure to raise them on direct appeal. After hearing argument, the trial court entered a written order in August 2011 granting the State's motion. Defendant timely filed this appeal.
¶ 7 ANALYSIS
¶ 8 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) allows a defendant who is imprisoned in a penitentiary to challenge his conviction or sentence for violations of his federal or state constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2010); see also People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (2005). A defendant electing to proceed under the Act must first file a petition, verified by affidavit, in the circuit court in which the original proceeding occurred. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2010). Because a postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on the conviction, the petition must be limited to constitutional issues that have not been, nor could have been, adjudicated on direct appeal. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). ¶ 9 The Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a postconviction petition in non-capital cases. 725 ILCS 5/122-1. At the first stage, the trial court may dismiss a petition only if it is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 125-26 (2007). If the petition survives dismissal at this initial stage, it advances to the second stage, where counsel may be appointed to an indigent defendant and the State may move to dismiss the petition. Id. at 126. The defendant must then make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation in order to proceed to an evidentiary hearing, which is the third and final stage of the postconviction process. Id. (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2004)). ¶ 10 In the case sub judice, only the second stage is at issue. The trial court may dismiss a petition at this stage if, after reviewing the allegations in the petition and liberally construing the trial record, it finds that the defendant has failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). Our review of the trial court's second-stage dismissal is de novo. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000). ¶ 11 Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition where the enhancement statute under which he was sentenced is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The relevant portion of the challenged statute provides that for the offense of first degree murder, if "during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(d)(iii) (West 2010) (emphasis added). Our supreme court has previously rejected vagueness challenges to the statutory language "during the commission of the offense" and "another person." People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 528 (2005). Today, defendant challenges the statute's sentencing range: "25 years or up to a term of natural life." Defendant argues that this language is unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process where it fails to provide objective criteria to guide the exercise of the trial court's discretion in imposing a sentence within that range. We disagree. ¶ 12 Our analysis is premised on the well-established rule of law that all statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality, and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the statute's validity. People v. Dinelli, 217 Ill. 2d 387, 397 (2005) (quoting People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003)). Therefore, we must construe a statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if reasonably possible. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 595-96 (2006). ¶ 13 A statute satisfies the requirements of due process and the Constitution if its terms are sufficiently clear and persons of ordinary intelligence are not required to guess at its meaning or application. People v. Vasquez, 2012 IL App (2d) 101132, ¶ 54. That is, the statute's prohibitions must be sufficiently definite so as to give a person of reasonable intelligence knowledge of what conduct is prohibited, and must delineate boundaries "sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to administer the law fairly in accordance with the intent of the legislature." People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 415-16 (2003). Sentencing statutes, in particular, must have terms that are not so ill-defined that the decision as to the statute's meaning rests on the " 'opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather than objective criteria.' " Vasquez, 2012 IL App (2d) 101132, ¶ 54 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Vehicle Review Board, 224 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2007)). ¶ 14 We hold that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Code of Corrections does in fact provide objective criteria on which the trial court should base its sentencing determination. It is the role of the legislature to enact statutes such as section 5-8-1 that prescribe sentencing ranges for particular offenses, and it is the role of the trial courts to use their discretion to "fashion an appropriate sentence within the statutory limits." See People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). Trial courts are guided in the exercise of their discretion by sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2 of the Code of Corrections, which list specific factors the court shall consider in aggravation or mitigation. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1, 3.2 (West 2010). More generally, the trial court should impose a sentence based on "the particular circumstances of the individual case, including the nature of the offense and the character of defendant." Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 55. These statutory and judicial directives are sufficiently distinct so as to ensure the trial court does not impose sentences based on its "opinions and whims." See People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 258 (1994) ("[t]rial courts commonly determine sentences within statutorily defined ranges in the sound exercise of their discretion"). ¶ 15 Because we hold that the 25 to life enhancement is not unconstitutionally vague, it follows that defendant did not make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation so as to merit an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction petition. ¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 17 Affirmed.