On remand, the trial court "found the State had failed to fulfill its promise to nol-pros the charge if defendant passed a polygraph examination." People v. Starks, 146 Ill.App.3d 843, 844 (1986). In accordance with this court's mandate, the trial court dismissed the charge.

See Harris v. State, 841 P.2d 597 (Okla.Crim. 1992); People v. Starks, 146 Ill. App.3d 843, 497 N.E.2d 187 (1986); People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975); State v. Sanchell, 191 Neb. 505, 216 N.W.2d 504 (1974); Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla.Dist.App. 1969); State v. Davis, 188 So.2d 24 (Fla.Dist.App. 1966)."Substantial evidence is evidence that possesses both relevance and substance and furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved.

The existence of a plea agreement and its terms and conditions are questions of fact which the trier of fact must determine after assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. ( People v. Starks (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 843.) If disputed, the terms of the agreement are to be judged under objective standards ( People v.Boyt (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 1, aff'd (1985), 109 Ill.2d 403; People v. Davis (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 809; United States v. Quan (9th Cir. 1986), 789 F.2d 711), and the court's determination whether there was a plea agreement should not be reversed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. It will not be necessary for us to consider whether, as the State contends, the circuit court's finding that there was a plea agreement, as the defendant claimed, was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, nor need we decide whether, in making that finding, the court erroneously employed a subjective, rather than an objective, test.

Its terms and conditions are questions of fact that the trier of fact must determine after assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. People v. Starks, 146 Ill. App.3d 843, 846, 497 N.E.2d 187, 189 (1986). If disputed, the terms of the agreement are to be judged under objective standards.

I note, parenthetically, that while no agreement has been found to exist instantly, there is authority in support of the view that an agreement between the state and a defendant that charges will be dropped if the defendant successfully passes a lie detector examination is enforceable. See People v. Starks, 146 Ill.App.3d 843, 100 Ill.Dec. 307, 497 N.E.2d 187 (2d Dist. 1986); Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla.App. 1969); State v.Davis, 188 So.2d 24 (Fla.App. 1966), cert. denied, 194 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1966). Because estoppel is used most often in an attempt to enforce agreements or contracts in civil settings, it is worth noting that contract law principles find their way into situations analogous to the instant appeal. For instance, the Court of Appeals in United States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 301-2 (2d Cir. 1990) stated:

More recent cases decided in other sister jurisdictions have also held that the prosecutor is bound by the terms of an agreement not to prosecute if the defendant passes a polygraph test. See generally, People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975); People v. Starks, 146 Ill. App.3d 843, 100 Ill.Dec. 307, 497 N.E.2d 187 (2d Dist. 1986). These cases differ from the present case in several respects; in some of the cases the non-prosecution agreement, conditioned on the passing of a polygraph test, was approved by the court, and, in all of the cases noted above, the agreement was entered into between the defendant and the prosecution rather than a municipal police officer investigating the charges as in the present case.

Office Rust remarked, also, that he was able to drive his marked squad car in the westbound lane closest to the curb and that the vehicles parked alongside the curb did not impede his progress. Even allowing for the trial court's function of weighing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony ( People v. Starks (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 843, 846, 497 N.E.2d 187), we conclude that the trial court's decision to rescind the statutory summary suspension of the defendant's driver's license and to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the standard of review we must employ ( People v. Angelino (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 632, 638, 513 N.E.2d 1132; Vanderver, 158 Ill. App.3d at 180-81; Fox, 155 Ill. App.3d at 262). The undisputed evidence presented in this case establishes that the defendant was driving his vehicle, late at night, in a potentially hazardous manner that contravened section 11-709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-709(a)).