Opinion
E052572 Super.Ct.No. RIF153888
10-25-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUTHER DARNELL STAPLETON, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Rex Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Rafael A. Arreola, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed with directions.
Rex Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Luther Darnell Stapleton, Jr., pled guilty to possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted four prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was placed on probation with the requirement that he "comply with all the other terms and conditions in the sentencing memorandum." Defendant contends, and the People concede, that the sentencing minute order should be corrected to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement that the terms in the sentencing memorandum were to be imposed.
The sentencing memorandum is a Superior Court of Riverside County form that states, "The following checked terms and conditions are ordered by the court," and then provides a checklist of items that may be ordered. The boxes requiring payment of probation supervision costs and reimbursement of attorney fees are not marked, but the box imposing the following term is marked: "Report to Enhanced Collections . . . regarding ability to pay attorney fees; total hours 1."
However, the sentencing minute order includes the following probation terms: "Pay costs of probation supervision in an amount to be determined by probation. [¶] Based on the level of supervision, the costs will range from $591.12 to $3744.00. [¶] Deft ordered to report to Financial Services immediately or w/in 2 business days after release— re: Ability to pay attorney fees; Total hours 1. [¶] Court finds defendant has the ability to reimburse the county for attorney fees in the amount of $119.51 payable to the court through Enhanced [Collection]."
The trial court's oral pronouncement controls over the clerk's minute order. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.) The trial court orally imposed the terms included in the sentencing memorandum, but did not find defendant had the ability to pay for costs of probation supervision or reimburse the county for the cost of appointed counsel. Instead, defendant was directed to financial services for a determination about his ability to pay for a single hour of attorney time. We have the inherent power to correct clerical errors to make records reflect the true facts. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Accordingly, we will direct the correction of the sentencing minute order.
DISPOSITION
The superior court clerk is directed to remove the following two probation terms from the sentencing minute order: 1) "Pay costs of probation supervision in an amount to be determined by probation. [¶] Based on the level of supervision, the costs will range from $591.12 to $3744.00," and 2) "Court finds defendant has the ability to reimburse the county for attorney fees in the amount of $119.51 payable to the court through Enhanced Collection." In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
J.
RICHLI
J.