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People v. Stanley

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 30, 2020
G056255 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)

Opinion

G056255

01-30-2020

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM DALE STANLEY, Defendant and Appellant.

Tyrone A. Sandoval and Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17NF2932) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Megan Wagner, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Tyrone A. Sandoval and Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted William Dale Stanley of assault with a deadly weapon and making a criminal threat. Stanley contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior acts to prove motive. He also argues this case should be remanded pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 to allow the court to exercise its discretion to dismiss his serious felony prior. Finally, Stanley argues if the case is not remanded to allow the court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike his serious felony prior, his prior prison enhancement should be stricken because both are based on the same offense. We find no error with the court's admission of evidence. Because it is clear the court would not have dismissed Stanley's serious felony prior even if it had the power to do so, remand is unwarranted. However, the court erred by imposing and staying Stanley's one-year prison term enhancement because it was based on the same conviction as the serious felony prior. The proper procedure is for the court to strike the prison term enhancement. In all other aspects, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Stanley, who was homeless, would regularly become intoxicated and camp with shopping carts on or near E.R.'s property. Stanley and others would block E.R.'s garage and driveway. On July 20, 2017, a police officer responded to the alleyway near E.R.'s residence based on the report of a male causing a disturbance. The officer encountered Stanley, asked him to leave, and Stanley complied.

I. Criminal Threat (count 2)

On July 25, 2017, E.R. was driving out of his driveway when he "bumped" Stanley's cart with his vehicle. In response, Stanley "banged" on the window, and threatened to kill E.R. after he exited the vehicle. Stanley threw a "40 ounce beer bottle" at E.R.'s car, damaging the car and shattering the bottle. E.R. stated he was in fear for his life and called 911 to report the incident.

II. Assault With a Deadly Weapon (count 1)

On July 27, 2017, Stanley and two other homeless people were drinking beer on E.R.'s property. E.R. told them to leave and kicked over a can of their beer. Stanley responded by pulling a knife from his nearby shopping cart, chasing E.R. with the knife, and swinging the knife at him. While pointing the knife at E.R., Stanley came within six feet of him. E.R. called 911 and reported the incident. Police later arrested Stanley at a nearby gas station. They recovered the knife in his shopping cart.

III. Pre-trial and Trial

The information charged Stanley with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2). The prosecution further alleged Stanley suffered two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(2)(A)), one prior conviction of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. --------

At trial, the prosecution sought to admit evidence of uncharged prior acts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The defense objected, arguing the prior acts were too dissimilar from the underlying charges to be relevant and the evidence was actually being offered to show Stanley committed the crimes in accordance with a propensity for violence. Ultimately, the court admitted only two prior incidents pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), finding those prior acts "probative as to the emotional reaction that Mr. Stanley had to these two situations that are charged." The first prior act occurred on December 3, 2013. Stanley and another individual were drinking alcohol at a shopping center when a security guard asked them to leave the property. Stanley responded by throwing a can of beer at the security guard's chest. Next, on September 1, 2016, Stanley was in an alley of a strip mall with his possessions when a city code enforcement officer asked him to leave the area. Stanley threw liquid, consisting of water and beer contained in a bucket, at the officer, screamed at the officer, and made a threatening motion with his hands.

A jury convicted Stanley of both counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true Stanley's two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (b) & (C)(2)(A)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court struck one of Stanley's strike convictions for the purposes of sentencing. It opted not to strike the other prior strike conviction, stating it would not be in the interest of justice. The court noted the prior strike conviction it declined to strike "was not just the same charge, but with the same type of weapon." It also explained the decision to strike the prior was that Stanley would otherwise face a sentence of 60 years to life. The court explained it did not strike the prior lightly and it would not have stricken it if both strikes did not arise out of the same altercation in 2003. All of the priors stemmed from two convictions of section 245, subdivision (a)(1), from the same 2003 case.

The trial court sentenced Stanley to an aggregate term of 14 years and four months in prison, consisting of eight years as to count 1, a consecutive term of 16 months as to count 2, and a consecutive five-year term as to the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), enhancement. The court chose the upper term for count 1, noting Stanley's unwillingness to follow the law, on-going willingness to use a knife, willingness to use violence, and his poor performance on probation and parole. The court noted while consecutive terms were mandated for counts 1 and 2, even if they were not mandated, the court would have found consecutive sentences warranted. The one-year term for the prison prior was imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654 pending completion of the five-year term for the serious felony prior.

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Evidence

Stanley asserts the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence of prior acts under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Not so.

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." As an exception to this general rule, however, evidence of prior acts by a defendant are admissible when relevant to prove motive, opportunity, intent, plan, absence of mistake or accident, and lack of self-defense. (§ 1101, subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) In order to be admissible to prove intent or motive, an uncharged prior bad act must be sufficiently similar to the charged act to support the inference that the defendant "'"probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) There are different degrees of similarity required between the prior act and the charged offense when offered to show intent, motive, common design or plan, or identity. The least degree of similarity is required in order to show intent or motive. (Ibid.) We review this admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.)

The Supreme Court has identified three factors to be considered when reviewing the admission of evidence of other acts: (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the probative value of the other act evidence to prove or disprove the fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence. (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1243.) Evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct becomes relevant and admissible where the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference, to establish any facts material to the prosecution, or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense. (People v. Bergschneider (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 144, 161.)

Stanley argues the uncharged acts were not sufficiently similar to counts 1 and 2. We disagree. In both prior instances, as well as the current ones, Stanley was drinking alcohol and became belligerent. When someone told Stanley to leave the property, he became abusive and violent. He threw an alcohol-related item at the reporting parties during the prior incidents, and threw an alcohol bottle at E.R. The prosecution asserted Stanley's motive was based on his anger caused by individuals telling him to leave an area in which he believed he had a right to stay. In all of the instances, Stanley was confronted in a certain way he believed threatened his perceived property rights. Thereafter, he reacted unreasonably and violently. Admission of the prior acts helped place in perspective Stanley's physical and verbal threats charged in counts 1 and 2. We find no error. II. Senate Bill No. 1393

Stanley contends we should remand this matter to the trial court to exercise its discretion under recently enacted Senate Bill No. 1393, giving trial courts discretion in imposing a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). Based on the court's comments at sentencing, it is clear the court would not have dismissed his section 667, subdivision (a), serious felony prior even if it had the power to do so. Remand is unwarranted.

Under the law which applied at the time of Stanley's sentencing, trial courts had no authority to strike a prior serious felony conviction in connection with the imposition of a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). (§ 1385, subd. (b); People v. Valencia (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1045-1047.) Senate Bill No. 1393 removed the prohibition on striking a serious felony enhancement by deleting the previous version of section 1385, subdivision (b), which stated: "This section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious felony for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section 667." (Sen. Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) § 2.) The Attorney General concedes the new law applies retroactively to Stanley because his case was not final as of the January 1, 2019, effective date of the new legislation. (People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 971-974.)

Section 1385 is the mechanism that gives trial courts their added discretion under Senate Bill No. 1393. Section 1385 requires dismissal of an enhancement to be "in furtherance of justice . . . ." (§ 1385, subd. (a).) The furtherance of justice analysis generally "'"requires consideration both of the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People, in determining whether there should be a dismissal.' [Citations.]" [Ctiations.]" (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 50.) However, resentencing is not required where the sentencing court "clearly indicated" it would not have exercised such discretion. (Id. at p. 530, fn. 13.) Remand for resentencing would be futile if the record indicated the sentencing court would not have dismissed or stricken the defendant's prior serious felony conviction for sentencing purposes had the court had the discretion to do so. (Ibid., see also People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973.)

Here, the trial court found true Stanley suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(2)(A)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court subsequently struck one of Stanley's two prior strikes for the purposes of sentencing. It explained its decision to strike the prior as follows: "[t]he length of the time since the prior serious felony conviction, which is 14 and a half years from the conviction to the date of violation in the new case" and "[t]he fact that both of the prior strikes arose out of the same incident." The court noted it had "given the [c]ourt considerable pause in whether or not to strike that one strike." It also considered Stanley's age and the fact that he would be well into his sixties or beyond when he is released from prison.

So while the trial court struck one of Stanley's prior strikes, it opted not to strike the other, finding it would not be in the interest of justice. The court explained one of its considerations for striking was that Stanley would otherwise face a sentence of 60 years to life. The court went on to state it did not exercise its discretion lightly, and that it likely would not have stricken the prior strike had it not been for the circumstances surrounding that conviction, i.e., the fact that both strikes arose out of the same altercation many years ago in 2003.

The court chose the aggravated upper term for count 1. In finding the upper term warranted, the court noted Stanley's lengthy criminal history, unwillingness to follow the law, his on-going propensity to use a knife, his inclination to use violence, and his poor performance on probation and parole. Additionally, while the court noted consecutive terms were required for counts 1 and 2, it explained that even if they were not mandated, the court would find consecutive sentences warranted.

Based on the trial court's comments at sentencing, the remark that Stanley would serve time until he was well into his sixties or beyond, and the ultimate sentence imposed, it is clear the court would not have dismissed Stanley's section 667, subdivision (a), serious felony prior for the purposes of sentencing even if it had the power to do so. Consequently, remand is unwarranted. III. Section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement

Stanley contends the trial court erroneously imposed but stayed, rather than striking, his one-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The Attorney General concedes the error, and we agree the enhancement must be stricken.

The trial court determined both the five-year serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and the one-year prior prison term enhancement (§667.5, subd. (b)), were based on a single conviction for assault. The court then purported to impose but stay the one-year prison term enhancement. However, the correct procedure when two enhancements are based on a single conviction is to strike the prior prison term instead of imposing and staying it. (People v. Perez (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 801, 805.)

Additionally, the parties agree Stanley's one-year prison term enhancement must be stricken pursuant to recently amended section 667.5, effective January 1, 2020. Under the current law at the time of Stanley's sentencing, the trial court retained discretion to impose an additional one-year term for each prior prison term served by Stanley. Newly amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), however, limits one-year prior prison terms to cases where the prior was for "a sexually violent offense." Because Stanley's judgment will not be final when the new law takes effect on January 1, 2020, he is entitled to the benefit of the change in the law. (People v. Lara (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307-308; People v. Viera (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306.) The prior prison term enhancement must be stricken.

DISPOSITION

We strike the one-year enhancement imposed for a prison term prior under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Operations. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

O'LEARY, P. J. WE CONCUR: THOMPSON, J. GOETHALS, J.


Summaries of

People v. Stanley

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 30, 2020
G056255 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)
Case details for

People v. Stanley

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM DALE STANLEY, Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Date published: Jan 30, 2020

Citations

G056255 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2020)