Opinion
D070070
02-08-2017
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No response for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD255688) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Affirmed. Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No response for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Amy Marie St. John appeals from a judgment following her guilty plea to two counts: (1) one count of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)), with the further allegation that she fled the scene of the crime (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)); and (2) one count of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury while committing an act in violation of the law (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), with the further allegation that she had a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578). As to both counts, St. John also admitted the allegations that she personally inflicted great bodily injury on two victims (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 1192.8, 12022.7, subd. (a)), and proximately caused bodily injury or death to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558). According to the stipulation of the parties in the guilty plea, the trial court imposed a prison term of 17 years eight months.
Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). In response to our invitation, St. John has filed a supplemental brief. After having considered the briefing and having independently reviewed the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2014, at approximately 2:20 a.m., St. John drove the wrong way onto the freeway, causing a head-on collision with another car. After the driver of the other car exited his vehicle, he was thrown into traffic lanes and killed. Another vehicle, driven by Patrick J., also collided at the accident scene. Patrick J. was taken to the hospital for treatment of injuries. St. John fled the scene of the accident and was later located by police. An expert concluded that St. John's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident was between 0.25 and 0.27.
We base our recitation of the facts on the preliminary hearing transcript and the factual statement signed by St. John as part of her guilty plea. --------
In an amended information St. John was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) (count 1); gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)), with the further allegation that she fled the scene of the crime (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) (count 2); hit and run with death or permanent serious injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)) (count 3); driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury while committing an act in violation of the law (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), with the further allegation that she had a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578) (count 4); and driving with measurable blood alcohol causing injury, with the further allegation that she had a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578) (count 5). As to counts 2, 4 and 5, it was also alleged that St. John personally inflicted great bodily injury on two victims (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 1192.8, 12022.7, subd. (a)), and proximately caused bodily injury or death to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558).
On November 30, 2015, St. John pled guilty to counts 2 and 4, along with admitting all of the allegations set forth in those counts. As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a stipulated sentence of 17 years eight months, and the People agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. As the basis for the guilty plea, St. John stipulated to the facts in the preliminary hearing transcript and signed the following factual statement:
"On April 19, 2014, I drove a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages with a blood alcohol level of .27, and unlawfully drove the wrong way upon the lanes of Highway 5, and failed to use ordinary due care while driving. With gross negligence, I crashed head on into another car, which proximately caused the death of Anteneh [M.] and infliction of great bodily injury upon Patrick [J.] After which, I intentionally and willfully fled the scene of the accident with knowledge that I had been involved in an accident that injured another person."
At sentencing, consistent with the stipulation in the plea agreement, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of 17 years eight months. St. John filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause, stating that she "felt forced to take the plea." The trial court denied the certificate of probable cause.
Upon receiving St. John's notice of appeal, we issued an order on April 4, 2016, stating, "Appellant's request for a certificate of probable cause was denied and, as part of her plea, she waived issues relating to any suppression motion denials, any prior strike convictions and her stipulated sentence. The issues on appeal are thus limited to matters occurring after the plea that do not involve prior strike convictions or the sentence."
II.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and proceedings in the trial court. Counsel presented no argument for reversal but invited this court to review the record for error in accordance with Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.
Counsel has identified the following issue that "might arguably support the appeal" (Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 744): "Did the trial court err in permitting the defendant to enter a guilty plea and imposing sentence based on great bodily injury to Patrick [J.] in light of his testimony indicating he did not sustain significant or substantial physical injuries?"
After we received counsel's brief, we gave St. John an opportunity to file a supplemental brief, and upon St. John's request, we extended the deadline for the filing of her brief.
On January 17, 2017, St. John filed a supplemental brief. Summarizing the purpose of her supplemental filing, St. John states that she is requesting that we "review the charges and sentences for errors in case of a chance for Sentence Modification."
St. John's supplemental brief raises several issues with respect to whether the facts, as St. John understands them, support the charges against her (including those charges to which she did not plead guilty and which were dismissed). St. John further takes issue with some of the trial court's rulings on motions in limine that were filed and ruled upon prior to the guilty plea, and which concerned evidence that St. John wished to have admitted at trial. Finally, St. John questions whether some of the charges against her might be lesser included offenses of other charges; whether the sentence on some of the charges should be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 as arising out of the same course of conduct; and whether some of the sentence should have been run concurrently.
Although we understand the issues that St. John is raising in her supplemental brief, we reject them because they are beyond the scope of the issues that St. John is permitted to raise in this appeal. We are not unsympathetic to St. John's assertions that she understands the grave consequences her actions have wrought and she is genuinely remorseful. Nor have we ignored her plea that this court find some error that would reduce her sentence and allow her to begin her life anew with her two daughters. However, as we explained in our April 4, 2016 order, because of the guilty plea and the trial court's denial of a certificate of probable cause, the issues on appeal are limited to matters occurring after the plea that do not involve the negotiated sentence. (See § 1237.5 [restricting the right to appeal from a guilty plea in the absence of a certificate of probable cause]; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 89 [appeal from a sentence imposed pursuant to a stipulated sentence in a guilty plea is not permitted without a certificate of probable cause].) Each of the issues raised by St. John either challenge her plea, in that that they challenge the factual or legal basis for the convictions agreed to in that plea, or they challenge the stipulated sentence agreed to by the parties.
The arguable issue identified by counsel suffers from the same deficiency, as it concerns the guilty plea and the sentence.
In sum, a review of the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the issue suggested by counsel and the issues raised by St. John, discloses no reasonably arguable appellate issue. St. John has been adequately represented by counsel in this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. NARES, J.