Opinion
H046373 H046867
03-04-2020
In re S.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.T., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 18JV000169)
In 2018, when he was 24 years old, S.T. admitted committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age at some time between 2009 and 2011, when he was between 15 and 17 years old. After he made the admission, but before the juvenile court declared wardship, S.T. turned 25 years old. Then, after a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared him a ward of the court and committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a term of 10 years.
On appeal, S.T. contends that under Welfare and Institutions Code section 607, subdivision (b) (Section 607(b)), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to declare wardship and commit him to the Division of Juvenile Justice once he turned 25. Arguing the disposition was unauthorized, S.T. asks us to reverse the order committing him and remand to the juvenile court with directions to dismiss the charge against him.
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
We conclude S.T. impliedly consented to the juvenile court's continued exercise of jurisdiction; he is thereby estopped from raising the claim on appeal. (See People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 289 (Ford) [defendant's implied consent to the court's continued exercise of jurisdiction estopped him from challenging restitution order that was made after the term of probation expired].) We will affirm the order declaring him a ward and committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
In February 2018, when S.T. was 24 years old, the prosecution filed a wardship petition alleging three counts of a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The petition alleged S.T. committed the acts between 2009 and 2011, when he was 15 to 17 years old. As to all three counts, the petition alleged the statute of limitations had been extended under Penal Code section 803, subdivision (f)(1). S.T. admitted to one count and the other two counts were dismissed "with facts considered."
Because S.T. was engaged to be married and had scheduled his honeymoon for July 2018, he asked for a contested dispositional hearing to be held in August 2018. In September 2018, while S.T. was still 24, the trial court held the first day of the dispositional hearing. In discussing the limited availability of probation, the juvenile court raised the fact that S.T. would turn 25 in the next month. At the end of the first day of the hearing, the trial court proposed dates for the second day of the hearing. Counsel for S.T. selected a date of October 19, which was after S.T. was due to turn 25.
In early October 2018, S.T. turned 25. Later that month, after S.T. had turned 25, the court held the second and third days of the dispositional hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court declared him to be a ward of the court and committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice for a maximum term of 10 years. S.T. timely appealed.
While that appeal was pending in this court, S.T. filed a motion in the trial court to change, modify, or set aside the disposition under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 775 and 778. S.T. argued that the dispositional order was unlawful under Section 607(b) because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him once he turned 25. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. S.T. timely appealed, and we ordered the appeal from that order considered together with the pending appeal for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.
The facts are taken from the probation department's intake disposition report. The parties stipulated that the report provided a factual basis for the admitted offense.
In May 2017, when the victim was 12 years old, she alleged S.T. (her uncle) had molested her five years earlier. In a forensic interview, she told police S.T. molested her multiple times on different dates. She said S.T. made her perform oral sex on him, and he touched the inside and outside of her vagina with his fingers. She told her mother, who in turn told the victim's grandfather. The grandfather instructed the mother not to tell police.
In a pretext phone call, S.T. admitted molesting the victim on one occasion and he apologized for it. After the police contacted him, he told them it happened when he was a freshman in high school. He admitted she touched his penis and put it in her mouth on one occasion. He said she tried to touch him on other occasions, but he claimed he told her to stop. He denied that he had ever touched her.
II. DISCUSSION
S.T. contends the juvenile court imposed an unauthorized disposition because it lacked jurisdiction to declare wardship and commit him to the Division of Juvenile Justice once he turned 25. S.T. contends this jurisdictional age limit is set forth in Section 607(b). He requests that we reverse the order committing him and remand with directions to dismiss count 1. The Attorney General contends S.T. waived his right to contest the court's jurisdiction by remaining silent, but the Attorney General argues the trial court had jurisdiction regardless under sections 602 and 607.
We requested supplemental briefing on whether the juvenile court had "fundamental jurisdiction" over the subject matter and the parties, and if so, how the doctrine of estoppel affects this appeal. (See People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771; Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th 282). S.T. concedes the juvenile court had fundamental jurisdiction over him at the outset of the proceedings, and he argues the court did not retain jurisdiction to declare wardship over him after he turned 25. S.T. further contends he is not estopped from raising his claim on appeal. The Attorney General argues the juvenile court had fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, and to the extent the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, the doctrine of estoppel precludes S.T. from raising his claim here.
A. Legal Principles
1. Relevant Statutes
The version of section 602 in effect at the time the prosecution filed the wardship petition provided, in part, "Except as provided in Section 707, any person who is under 18 years of age when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court." (Former § 602, subd. (a).)
Section 707 grants the district attorney the discretion to make a motion to transfer certain cases to adult criminal court, but the prosecution made no such motion in this case.
Section 607 provides that the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a ward of the court until the ward turns 21 years of age, with an exception set forth in subdivision (b), among others: "The court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, until that person attains 25 years of age if the person was committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities." (§ 607, subd. (b).) Subdivision (g)(2) of that section further provides, in part, "A person who, at the time of adjudication of a crime or crimes, would, in criminal court, have faced an aggregate sentence of seven years or more, shall be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control, or when the person attains 25 years of age, whichever occurs later . . . ." (§ 607, subd. (g)(2), italics added.)
2. Jurisdiction and Estoppel
The California Supreme Court has recognized two different ways in which a court may lack jurisdiction. "A court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case. [Citation.] If a court lacks such ' "fundamental" ' jurisdiction, its ruling is void. [Citation.] A claim based on a lack of fundamental jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citation]. Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations." (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287.) "When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted 'in excess of its jurisdiction.' [Citation.] Because an ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction does not negate a court's fundamental jurisdiction to hear the matter altogether [citation], such a ruling is treated as valid until set aside. [Citation.] A party may be precluded from seeking to set aside such a ruling because of waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 287.)
The doctrine of estoppel provides that when a court has fundamental jurisdiction over an action, "a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction. Whether he [or she] shall be estopped depends on the importance of the irregularity not only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in some instances on other considerations of public policy. A litigant who has stipulated to a procedure in excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it when 'To hold otherwise would permit the parties to trifle with the courts.' [Citation.]" (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 347-348.) "[E]stoppel can also apply to a party who merely consents to a continuance to a date beyond the court's ordinary authority to act. [Citation.] We have long recognized that a failure to object can constitute implied consent to an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction." (Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 288.)
B. Estoppel Precludes this Claim on Appeal
The parties agree that the juvenile court had fundamental jurisdiction over S.T. from the time the prosecution filed the wardship petition until—and including—the first day of the contested jurisdictional hearing in September 2018. The wardship petition asserted juvenile court jurisdiction under Section 602, subdivision (a), and S.T. does not dispute he was between the ages covered by that statute. Rather, S.T. contends the trial court lost fundamental jurisdiction over him under Section 607(b) once he turned 25 because that section provides the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over any person "until that person attains 25 years of age if that person was committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities." (§ 607, subd. (b).) S.T. argues that he had not yet been committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice when he turned 25 in October 2018, and that the juvenile court thereby lost jurisdiction at that time, nullifying the subsequent dispositional order. The Attorney General argues that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under section 602 and retained jurisdiction under subdivisions (c) and (g)(2) of section 607.
Section 607 is ambiguous on this point. S.T. interprets Section 607(b) to mean that the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a person only until that person attains 25 years of age. But the word "only" does not appear in section 607. (Cf. California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 628 [phrase "only if" sets forth a necessary condition].) Arguably, another code section—e.g., section 602—gave the juvenile court jurisdiction over S.T. beyond his 25th birthday, as the Attorney General argues. (See Rucker v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 197, 200 [juvenile court jurisdiction under section 602 is based on age at the time of the violation].) But we decline to decide whether S.T.'s asserted statutory construction is the proper interpretation because he is estopped from raising that claim here. The record makes clear that both parties, as well as the juvenile court, were aware S.T. would turn 25 in October 2018. Notwithstanding that fact, counsel for S.T. requested a continuance, thereby pushing back the date of the contested dispositional hearing. Then, at the end of the first day of the dispositional hearing, while S.T. was still 24 years old, the trial court proposed dates for the second day of the hearing. Counsel for S.T. selected a date that would continue the hearing until after his 25th birthday. A third day of hearing was also held after his 25th birthday, at the conclusion of which the court declared him a ward of court. Counsel did not make any objection to proceedings continuing beyond S.T.'s 25th birthday until long after the juvenile court had issued the dispositional order. S.T. thereby implicitly consented to the continuing jurisdiction of the court. (See Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 288.)
Because the juvenile court had fundamental jurisdiction when S.T. implicitly consented to the continued dispositional hearing, the doctrine of estoppel may be raised against him. (See In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 347-348.) S.T. argues that the trial court lost fundamental jurisdiction once he turned 25, but this argument misconceives the operation of estoppel. There is no dispute that the juvenile court had fundamental jurisdiction over S.T. at the point in time when he requested a date for the second day of the dispositional hearing. By that point in time, he had consented to the court's continuing jurisdiction, thereby estopping him from mounting a subsequent challenge after he turned 25 years of age.
The procedural timing in this case is similar to that in Ford, supra, 61 Cal.4th 282. In Ford, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay victim restitution for medical expenses and the court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of additional restitution. (Id. at p. 285.) The restitution hearing was continued several times, partly at the request of the defendant. The defendant later argued the trial court had lost jurisdiction to order additional restitution because the defendant's term of probation had expired. (Id. at p. 286.) The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held the trial court had the power to order additional restitution because the expiration of the probationary period did not terminate the court's fundamental jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 287.) Furthermore, the Supreme Court held the defendant's consent to the court's continued exercise of jurisdiction estopped him from challenging it on appeal. (Id. at p. 288.) The high court held: "In the circumstances here, where defendant's own requests played a role in delaying the proceedings and defendant did not object to a continuance of the restitution hearing to a date beyond his probationary term, he can be understood to have consented to the continuance." (Ibid.) S.T.'s consent to the juvenile court's continued exercise of jurisdiction is indistinguishable from that in Ford.
Equitable considerations also support the operation of estoppel here. At the contested jurisdictional hearing, S.T. adduced testimony from multiple experts to support his request for outpatient treatment. The juvenile court took the position that it could not grant probation because S.T. was about to turn 25. Counsel for S.T. nonetheless argued that the juvenile court had the power to continue the disposition to keep S.T. within its jurisdiction. In other words, S.T. expressly asked the court to continue its jurisdiction over him beyond his 25th birthday by postponing the disposition and allowing him to undergo treatment rather than committing him into custody. Had the court agreed to do so, S.T. likely would have continued to consent to such an arrangement. It was not until after the court committed S.T. into custody that he raised the jurisdictional challenge. Accepting the interpretation urged by S.T. would let a party manipulate jurisdictional rules to obtain a favorable outcome only to reverse course if the outcome did not materialize as desired. The purpose of estoppel is to prevent the parties from " 'trifl[ing] with the courts' " in this fashion. (In re Griffin, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 348.)
For the reasons above, we conclude S.T. is estopped from raising this claim on appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
/s/_________
Greenwood, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Grover, J. /s/_________
Danner, J.