Opinion
G062213
12-19-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CIRON BENTAY SPRINGFIELD, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard L. Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 98NF3130, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, J.
Defendant Ciron Bentay Springfield appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Although his appellate attorney was unable to find any arguable issues in the record, defendant has filed a supplemental brief challenging the trial court's order on various grounds. We find defendant's arguments unpersuasive and affirm the court's denial order.
Effective June 30, 2022, that section was renumbered without substantive change as Penal Code section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will cite to Penal Code section 1170.95 for ease of reference. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 22, 1998, defendant, then age 15, and his 18-year-old codefendant George Fitzgerald III entered an Orange County liquor store and attempted to rob the cashier at gunpoint. During the heist, the cashier was shot and killed by one of the defendants.
At trial, the prosecution contended defendant was guilty of first degree murder under two theories: 1) Premeditation and deliberation, and 2) felony murder. It did not argue, nor was the jury instructed on, the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. Without revealing the basis for its decision, the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, as well as attempted robbery. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664/211.) It also found true the allegation that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death during his crimes. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced him to prison for 50 years to life, and we affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Springfield (Dec. 14, 2000, G026780) [nonpub. opn.].)
On June 24, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court appointed defendant an attorney, but he chose to represent himself at the hearing on the petition. (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835 [a criminal defendant has the right to represent himself if he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives his right to counsel].) Defendant argued he was entitled to relief because the prosecution relied on the felony murder rule, he was only 15 years old at the time of the shooting, and there was nothing in the record showing he "pulled the trigger." However, the trial court determined the true finding on the firearm enhancement proved the jury found defendant was the actual killer, which rendered him ineligible for resentencing. It therefore denied his petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief.
The trial court also recognized there was a Franklin motion pending that defendant had filed in propria persona. (See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) [youthful offenders have the right to make a record of information that may be relevant to their future parole hearing].) However, the court took that motion off calendar because it was improperly filed. In so doing, the court made it clear that action was without prejudice to defendant refiling the motion at another time.
Defendant appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing and was appointed an attorney to represent him on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief informing us he was unable to find any arguable issues to raise on defendant's behalf. At our invitation, defendant then filed a supplemental brief challenging the trial court's denial order. Consequently, our review is limited to the issues raised in defendant's brief. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232.)
DISCUSSION
Given that his jury was instructed on the felony murder rule, defendant contends the trial court should have issued an order to show cause and conducted an evidentiary hearing on his entitlement to resentencing. However, because the jury found defendant personally killed the victim during the course of a felony he is statutorily ineligible for relief. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial order.
Defendant's contention is grounded in Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437), which narrowed the scope of California's murder statutes in two ways. First, the bill eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting for the crime of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Second, SB 1437 reined in the felony murder rule so that it can only be applied in cases in which the defendant was the actual killer, he aided and abetted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder, or he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted in a manner that was recklessly indifferent to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).) These changes were intended to ensure the defendant's punishment is commensurate with his culpability. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).)
As part of SB 1437, the Legislature also enacted section 1170.95, which is the procedural mechanism for challenging a murder conviction that was based on vicarious liability. To obtain relief under that section, the defendant must show 1) he was tried for murder under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or some other theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime, 2) he was ultimately convicted of first or second degree murder, and 3) and he would not be liable for murder today because of how SB 1437 redefined that offense. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing to that effect, the trial court is required to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d).) At the hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is ineligible for resentencing because his conduct did in fact rise to the level of murder as redefined by SB 1437. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Otherwise, the defendant is entitled to vacatur and resentencing pursuant to the terms of section 1170.95.
In deciding whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing for relief, the trial court may rely on the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970972.) That doesn't mean the trial court assumes a factfinding role in the proceedings; to the contrary, the court "should not engage in 'factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 972.) But if the record of conviction, including the jury instructions and verdict forms in the underlying trial, contains readily ascertainable information establishing the defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, the trial court may deny his petition without issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 971; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47; People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 968, 980, overruled in part on another ground in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962970.)
In this case, the first two requirements for establishing a prima facie case for resentencing were met, in that defendant was prosecuted for murder under the felony murder rule, and he was ultimately convicted of first degree murder. His petition hinges on the third requirement, which looks at whether he would still be liable for murder in light of how SB 1437 redefined that offense.
As to that issue, defendant contends the trial court engaged in improper fact finding. However, the trial court did not assess any facts in ruling on defendant's petition. Rather, it relied on what the jury found in his underlying trial. Therefore, there was no improper factfinding. (See People v. Curiel (Nov. 27, 2023, S272238) Cal.5th [trial courts are generally permitted to rely on the jury's findings in determining a defendant's eligibility for resentencing].)
Defendant further contends the record of conviction fails to show he was the actual killer, so as to render him ineligible for resentencing. But in rendering its verdict, the jury found defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death during the commission of his crimes. This shows defendant was the actual killer in the eyes of the jury, which is significant because even though SB 1437 narrowed the felony murder rule in some respects, it still applies when the defendant personally kills the victim during the course of a felony. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1); People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 967.) Therefore, despite the changes wrought by SB 1437, defendant would still be liable for felony murder based on what the jury found at his trial. (Ibid.)
Defendant also faults the trial court for failing to consider his age at the time of the shooting. He contends this was unfair because, as compared to their adult counterparts, juvenile offenders are generally less culpable, due to their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity. (See Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354.) This claim might have merit if defendant's eligibility for resentencing depended on whether he was an aider and abettor who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 987.) However, as we have explained, defendant's jury found he personally killed the victim during the commission of a felony. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the killing, that finding renders defendant ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [SB 1437 was not designed to provide resentencing relief for defendants who actual killed their victims].)
Moreover, defendant's youth has already been factored into the length of his incarceration. Because he was under the age of 18 at the time of his offenses, he is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing after 25 years of imprisonment. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261.) That effectively amounts to a 25-year reduction in his prison sentence, which otherwise would have required defendant to spend 50 years in prison before being eligible for parole. Therefore, he has no basis to complain his age was not considered yet again in connection with his request for resentencing.
Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying his Franklin motion to make a record of youth-related factors that would be relevant at his parole hearing. But the court did not deny the motion, it simply took the motion off calendar due to improper filing. That action is not appealable. (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651-652.) However, as the trial court pointed out, defendant is free to refile his Franklin motion at any time.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying defendant's petition for resentencing is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J., DELANEY, J.