Summary
In Spring, agents of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms arrested Spring in Kansas City, Missouri on charges of firearms violations.
Summary of this case from Jones v. PeopleOpinion
No. 80CA1081
Decided February 24, 1983. Rehearing Denied April 7, 1983. Certiorari Granted October 31, 1983.
Appeal from the District Court of Moffat County Honorable Claus J. Hume, Judge.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Attorney General, Mary J. Mullarkey, Assistant Attorney General, Susan P. Mele, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Margaret L. O'Leary, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Division III.
Appealing his conviction for first degree murder in the death of Donald Walker, defendant, John Spring, contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress three separate statements made while in custody for an unrelated offense. We find error in the suppression rulings, and accordingly, we reverse and remand for new trial.
I
Federal Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms (ATF) agents in Kansas City, Missouri, learned from an informant that Spring was selling stolen weapons and that he had been involved in the early February shooting of Donald Walker near Craig, Colorado. At ATF's request, this informant contacted Spring, and on March 22, 1979, recorded a phone conversation which arguably implicated Spring in Walker's death. Spring ultimately was arrested in Kansas City on March 30, 1979, by undercover ATF agents to whom he was selling stolen weapons.
Spring signed a formal waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) with reference to the charges for which he was in ATF's custody, and the arresting agents questioned him about weapons transactions. Later in the interview, however, these same agents questioned him about the Colorado shooting. At no time was Spring informed that the agents already suspected him of murder in Walker's death, and he was not readvised of his rights when questioned in that regard.
Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must also be knowing, intelligent acts done with an awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
An advisement of the privilege against self-incrimination and of right to counsel is sufficient if the accused fully knows the general nature of the crime involved. People v. Weaver, 179 Colo. 331, 500 P.2d 980 (1972). If knowledge of the crime is withheld, a suspect cannot intelligently make the decision as to whether he wants counsel. Schenk v. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp. 26 (D. Montana 1968). Therefore, Spring's waiver of his rights to silence and the presence of counsel with regard to the weapons-related conduct did not operate as a waiver of those rights with regard to unrelated criminal conduct which had occurred some two months previously in Colorado. See U.S. v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
The agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect, or to readvise him of his Miranda rights, before questioning him about the murder. See McClain v. People, 178 Colo. 103, 495 P.2d 542 (1972). Because the agents failed to so advise, any waiver of rights in regard to questions designed to elicit information about Walker's death was not given knowingly or intelligently. U.S. v. McCrary, supra. Spring's responses are accordingly rendered inadmissible, and his conviction must be reversed.
II
ATF forwarded the results of its March interrogation to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, and CBI agents traveled to Missouri and obtained a written statement from Spring on May 26, 1979. The record is silent as to what other information was in CBI's possession to link Spring to the Walker homicide.
Defendant argues that, if the March 30 statement to the ATF is inadmissible, the statement obtained by the CBI on May 26 is "fruit of the poisonous tree," and must be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
If the May 26 statement was obtained by means significantly distinguishable from that used in obtaining the March 30 statement so as to be purged of the primary taint arising from the March 30 questioning, the statement would be admissible. People v. Founds, 621 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1981). It is the People's burden to establish that the statement was not the product of Spring's prior incriminating statements. People v. Lowe, 200 Colo. 470, 616 P.2d 118 (1980). This burden was not met.
III
The trial court also erred in admitting the statements Spring made to ATF agents on July 13, 1979. The agents came to Spring for the stated purpose of "tying up loose ends" in the weapons case, to which by then he had pled guilty. Spring orally waived his Miranda rights and spoke freely with the agents. However, when the agents began asking about the homicide, Spring answered, "I'd rather not talk about that." The agents shifted the interview to other topics, but returned again to the homicide. This process was repeated until the agents obtained an incriminating response.
A waiver of Miranda rights must be established by clear and convincing evidence based on all circumstances, including details of the interrogation and defendant's conduct. While Spring waived his rights to silence and counsel as to the weapons charges, he did invoke his right to silence as to the homicide. People v. Lowe, supra. Officers who meet with a refusal to make any statement during an attempted in-custody interrogation are not permitted periodically to repeat the procedure until the accused finally makes a statement. Dyett v. People, 177 Colo. 370, 494 P.2d 94 (1972). Further, we hold that Spring was entitled to renewed Miranda warnings when the agents began to question him on crimes unrelated to the stated purpose for their inquiry. U.S. v. McCrary, supra; McClain v. People, supra.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for new trial, with directions that if the People seek the introduction of the May 26 statement on retrial, the trial court must first resolve the issue of attenuation from the tainted statement of March 30.
JUDGE KIRSHBAUM concurs.
JUDGE VAN CISE dissents.