Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. 202862
Margulies, J.
Lorenzo Leon Speed appeals from his conviction after a jury trial. His counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.) Counsel has notified defendant that he can file a supplemental brief with the court. No supplemental brief has been received. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review, and affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was charged in a first amended information, dated March 6, 2008, with assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, § 240), false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236), causing injury while evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (a)), evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)), reckless driving with bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23104, subd. (a)), and transportation and sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). As an enhancement, it was alleged that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d), (e); 1170.12, subds. (b), (c).)
Defendant was originally represented by an appointed attorney from the Office of the Public Defender, Matthew Rosen. Prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant retained LeRue Grim to replace Rosen. When Grim interviewed the assault victim, however, he realized he had “provided legal advice” to her in the past and, as a result, was aware of information about “her lifestyle and illegal activities” that could be used to impeach her testimony. Grim was relieved on the basis of this conflict, and Frank Rodezno was appointed. Within a short time, Floyd Andrews replaced Redezno as defense counsel. Although Andrews had a possible conflict of interest, having represented the People in the prior prosecution of defendant that was alleged as an enhancement, defendant expressly waived the conflict. Following trial, defendant made an unsuccessful Marsden motion to replace Andrews.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
The matter was called for trial on July 7, 2008. The court conducted a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 regarding suppression of statements made by defendant to a police officer and by the alleged assault victim to an officer at the scene. The court refused to exclude the first and deferred decision on the second.
Testimony began on July 14, 2008. The first witness was an employee of a self-storage company in San Francisco, Eric Heckenlaible. He testified that on June 10, 2007, he saw a white Cadillac stop on the street outside the company. The driver emerged from the front seat, entered the back seat, and engaged in a struggle. A woman then opened the other rear door and ran from the vehicle. The driver got back in the car, caught up with her, and tried to force her back into the car. Alarmed, Heckenlaible went inside to call 911. At trial, he was able to give only a very general description of the driver and woman and could not identify either defendant or the alleged victim with any certainty, but he identified defendant’s car as identical to the one he saw. A second employee testified that he went outside when Heckenlaible ran inside to call the police. This employee watched as the driver beat the woman severely, shoved her back into the car, and then “floored it” as he drove up the street. The driver then stopped the car, removed the woman from the car, threw her to the ground, “stomped” on her forcefully, picked her up and forced her back into the car, and drove off again. Shortly afterward, the employee saw the Cadillac come back into view, followed by a police car at a distance of 100 feet. This witness, too, could not identify the people involved, but he recognized the car.
San Francisco Police Sergeant Michael Moran testified that while he was in a nearby police station on that day he responded to a report of a possible kidnapping. As he drove from the parking lot, a white Cadillac passed him at a high rate of speed and ran through a stop sign. Turning on his lights and siren, Moran began to follow the car through a mixed residential and industrial neighborhood. The chase that followed ran for two miles at speeds of 45 to 65 miles per hour, with the Cadillac running several stop signs and traffic lights. It ended when the Cadillac crashed into another car, seriously injuring the driver of the struck car. As he pulled up, Moran saw a small canister thrown from the driver’s window of the wrecked Cadillac. Police tests later found a small amount of cocaine base in the canister. When he approached the car, Moran saw defendant behind the wheel and a woman in the back seat, crying and seemingly in shock.
Officer Alex Rodatos arrived at the scene of the accident soon after the collision. He ordered defendant from the car, handcuffed him, and eventually placed him in an ambulance for transportation to the hospital. As Rodatos was traveling with defendant in the ambulance and while they were at the hospital, defendant said, several times without prompting, that he “didn’t mean to do it” and “panicked.” Officer Cullen Cahill drove up to the scene with Rodatos. Cahill approached the wrecked Cadillac, opened the rear passenger door, and tended to the woman inside. He confirmed she was not seriously injured. Shaking and crying, she thanked him. The passenger did not testify.
Defendant testified that the passenger in his car was a mentally ill woman for whom his sister was paid by the state to provide care and with whom he had a romantic relationship. On the morning of his arrest, defendant went out for a drive with the woman. He denied beating her or forcing her into the car. Although he admitted driving at a high rate of speed, he said he was unaware of the pursuing police and was hurrying to get to church.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, defendant made a motion for acquittal of the assault and the false imprisonment charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1, arguing that no one was able to identify the passenger in defendant’s car as the woman he was seen beating and that the presumed victim had not testified that she was required to enter the car against her will, as required for false imprisonment. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant was acquitted of the charges of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, felony false imprisonment, and transportation of cocaine base, but he was convicted of misdemeanor assault and false imprisonment and the various driving-related counts. After defendant waived a jury trial on his prior serious felony conviction, the court found the allegation to be true. Defendant’s motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), to strike his prior conviction was denied, and he was sentenced to the midterm of five years on the charge of causing injury while evading a police officer, which was doubled to 10 years as a result of the enhancement. The remaining, shorter terms were to run concurrently. A restitution order was entered in the amount of $44,465, based on the victim’s documented medical expenses and lost wages.
DISCUSSION
Defendant was represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings. Although he had four different attorneys at various stages, there is no indication in the record that the changes of counsel prejudiced defendant’s defense in any way. For a sufficient period prior to trial and throughout trial, he was represented by a single attorney, Andrews. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s denial of defendant’s posttrial Marsden motion to replace Andrews, which was made after a full inquiry into the basis for defendant’s dissatisfaction. (See People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1128.) Further, that denial did not result in prejudice.
While the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of defendant’s statements to the police shortly after his arrest, these statements were spontaneous and unsolicited. Accordingly, there was no error in their admission. (Evid. Code, § 1220; In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 596–597.) The only admitted or permitted hearsay statement by the passenger—asking the officer whether he heard her screaming—even if erroneously admitted was not prejudicial. (E.g., People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
There was substantial evidence to support conviction on each of the charges on which defendant was found guilty and to support the finding of a prior “strike” conviction. While the witnesses did not positively identify the passenger as the victim in the assault and false imprisonment charges, the jury could infer from the evidence that the passenger was the same person defendant was seen assaulting earlier and that her participation was not voluntarily. There was no impropriety or misconduct in closing arguments. The trial court properly instructed the jury, including on the elements of the charged offenses and the burden of proof.
The trial court’s sentence was within statutory limits and was supported by the underlying facts, circumstances, and record. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant’s Romero motion.
We find no arguable issues that require further briefing and accordingly, affirm the judgment.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Dondero, J.