Opinion
G052793
01-27-2017
In re CALVIN S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALVIN S., Defendant and Appellant.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Annie Featherman Fraser and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. DL051007) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Annie Featherman Fraser and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Calvin S. was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court after the court found he had committed a battery against his stepfather. On appeal, Calvin does not challenge the finding of battery, but instead argues the court erred by imposing a probation condition that requires him to "take medications as prescribed by doctors." (Capitalization omitted.) Calvin contends the condition is overly broad and should be modified to apply only to medications taken for treatment of Asperger's syndrome and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and to encompass the trial court's oral statement that he should have some flexibility to stop taking a prescribed medication for good cause, without being found in violation of his probation. He suggests the condition be modified to state he is required to "'[t]ake medications as prescribed by doctors for the treatment of ADHD or Asperger's Syndrome unless a medical necessity prevents him from doing so.'"
We agree the condition must be modified. It is undisputed Calvin has Asperger's syndrome and ADHD, that he was taking prescribed medications at the time of the dispositional hearing, and that he believed those medications were helping him to focus, sleep better and stabilize his mood. Calvin acknowledged his need for medication to help with those issues. Consequently, it was not error to impose, as a condition of probation, the requirement he continue taking the medications prescribed to address those conditions.
However, a condition requiring Calvin to take all medications as prescribed, without regard to what conditions those medications relate to, does not comply with the requirement that probation conditions be tailored to correlate with the purposes of his probation. Moreover, as the juvenile court made clear in its oral comments, Calvin must be allowed some flexibility to make adjustments in his medication regime on the basis of medical necessity, without risking a claim that any deviation constitutes a probation violation.
FACTS
The district attorney filed a delinquency petition against Calvin, age 17, in August 2015. It alleged he committed one count of assault in violation of Penal Code section 240, and one count of battery in violation of Penal Code section 242. Both counts stemmed from a confrontation between Calvin and his stepfather, after his stepfather insisted Calvin stop playing video games, and Calvin did not comply.
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the battery count to be true, and sustained the petition on that basis. The court immediately proceeded to disposition, at Calvin's request.
During the dispositional hearing, the court solicited information from Calvin's mother, and from Calvin himself, about his circumstances. Calvin's mother told the court Calvin suffered from ADHD, Asperger's syndrome and problems with "impulse control," and was attending an alternative high school, which included a therapy component to address those issues. She suggested that Calvin's Asperger's caused him to act aggressively when he is afraid—as she expressed it, "for Aspergers children, when they become afraid, the fight or flight response is actually reversed."
The court then asked Calvin what medications he was currently taking. Calvin responded "I take Focalin and it helps with my focusing and then I take Wellbutrin, which is my mood stabilizer, and Risperdal that helps me sleep at night." Calvin acknowledged there were times in the past when he had been resistant to taking his medications, but he had come to understand he needed it and he no longer minded taking it. He also stated he got along well with his therapist. The court then said to Calvin "[s]o we'll ask that you continue in your therapy and take your medication also; okay?" Calvin responded "Okay."
The court then inquired about anger management, and Calvin responded that was a component of the therapy he was receiving: "[t]hat's what we're specifically working on right now."
The juvenile court elected to place Calvin on probation, with conditions, including that he: (1) not use or possess any dangerous, illegal or deadly weapons, or knowingly be in the presence of an illegally armed person; (2) not associate with any person he knows is disapproved by the court, his parents, or probation officer; (3) have peaceful contact with his stepfather, with whom he would continue to live; (4) attend school; (5) continue therapy; and (6) "take medications as prescribed by doctors."
Calvin's attorney objected to the medication condition, expressing concerns it was too rigid. "Although Calvin hasn't indicated anything wrong, any side effects as of this date, if there were side effects to be experienced in the future, that if his prescription would change and it would affect him negatively, I don't think it [s]hould be required." He argued "I don't want Calvin to be put in a position where he has to take it or else I'm going to be violating probation. I know, I understand, there can be a modification of the petition but that takes time as well, so I would object to . . . taking medication as prescribed."
The court responded "what occurs to me, if a person doesn't take their meds and they get violated and we have a probation violation hearing and they present evidence regarding why they didn't take their medication, and it is because it was making them nauseous or pass out or whatever, then, I mean there's a legitimate defense there. [¶] . . . I just don't see that as a reason to not order him to take his medication."
The prosecutor argued that the person best suited to determine whether Calvin needed to take medication was his doctor, and it should be left to the doctor to determine what medications he should be taking and in what dosages. She then asserted that even if Calvin were charged with a probation violation for failing to take prescribed medication, "we are not a strict liability court. We do listen to reason and if he has a good valid reason for it, we are not going to put him in custody just because he missed a pill."
Calvin's mother then explained that while it was a psychiatrist who prescribed Calvin's medications, he only saw that psychiatrist once per month. And because Calvin had experienced some adverse reactions to his prescribed drugs—even ending up in the hospital as a result—the psychiatrist had instructed him that if he ever had problems with prescribed medications, he should stop taking them and call her so they could try something different.
The juvenile court responded "Thank you. Well, so, the order is simply going to be that he take medication as prescribed by his doctors and, so, you know, if the doctor says - - if he calls the doctor and says, hey, this stuff is making me throw up, or whatever, you know, so then the doctor can say, well, let's try something else. This court is very flexible about that sort of thing. [¶] . . . If it is causing an adverse [e]ffect, making him sick or making him mentally hallucinating or something, then the court would order that he be permitted to contact his doctor and say, hey, it is not working, I need something else. [¶] I mean, that is just common sense. So I don't know that we really need an order for that. . . . The order is, I want him to take his medication because it helps him. I don't want him to take it if it is hurting him . . . . The only reason it is going to come up is if the doctor says, I want him to take whatever this medication is, and he says, no, I'm not going to take that anymore because it makes me feel bad, then we're going to . . . need to have a hearing to decide what to do but, otherwise, it is not really an issue. I think we're making a big deal out of what is not that important. [¶] I would say if before probation violates him for not taking his medication, that . . . probation should contact his doctor and provide a modification request to the court."
Despite all of that, the probation condition pertaining to medications was unchanged, stating "[m]inor is to take medications as prescribed by doctors."
DISCUSSION
Calvin's sole contention on appeal is that the probation condition requiring that he "take medications as prescribed by doctors" is overbroad and should be modified to reflect (1) it applies only to medications prescribed to him for treatment of ADHD or Asperger's syndrome, and (2) there is an exception to the requirement on the basis of medical necessity.
In his opening brief, Calvin asked that the condition be modified to refer only to medications "prescribed for the treatment of Asperger's." However, acknowledging the Attorney General's point that the record suggests he also suffers from ADHD, Calvin amended his request in his reply brief to reflect the condition should be modified to refer only to medications prescribed for either Aspberger's or ADHD. --------
Calvin relies on In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th, 176 (Luis F.), in which the appellate court modified a similarly broad medication requirement imposed on a minor as a condition of probation. In that case, the minor suffered from a "depression and social anxiety disorder," (id. at p. 180) and he acknowledged medication helped to control the anxiety and panic attacks associated with those conditions. (Id. at p. 186.) Significantly, like Calvin here, the minor in Luis F. did not object to taking the medication already prescribed by his doctor and believed it was helping him. On that basis, the appellate court was able to distinguish the case from those in which a criminal defendant was required to submit to the "involuntary administration of unwanted mind-altering drugs." (Id. at p. 188.)
However, the court also noted the juvenile court's discretion to impose probation conditions is "not boundless" and "the overbreadth doctrine requires that conditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must be tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation." (Luis F., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.)
Thus, the court stated that "[u]nder the circumstances of this case, we uphold the juvenile court's intended exercise of discretion by construing the medication condition in a manner that allows it to pass constitutional muster," explaining "[i]t is proper to use the record of the proceeding below to elucidate the scope of the intended condition, to the extent it is otherwise ambiguous or overbroad." (Luis F., supra, 177 Cal.Appr.4th at p. 192, italics added.) The court then concluded the condition should be modified to specify that the minor "'continue taking medications prescribed for depression and social anxiety disorder, as directed by his doctors.'" (Ibid., italics added.)
We agree a similar modification should be employed here. In its comments, the juvenile court made clear that its focus was on Calvin continuing to take prescribed medications for issues associated with his Asperger's and ADHD—including mood stabilization and focus. There is no indication the court was concerned about other potential health problems, let alone had any basis to conclude that those other problems were connected to the incident which brought Calvin before it. Thus, a probation condition that puts Calvin at risk for a violation if he fails to take medications prescribed for illnesses or conditions unrelated to his Asperger's or ADHD is overbroad.
The Attorney General objects to the modification, for two reasons. First, she argues Calvin "personally agreed to take medications as prescribed by his doctors," suggesting he waived any objection to taking whatever medications were prescribed. However, that agreement was expressed in the specific context of a discussion about the medications Calvin was taking for issues related to his Asperger's and ADHD. He was not agreeing to take whatever medications might be prescribed for him for any other condition. Consequently, the assertion misses the point of Calvin's argument.
And second, the Attorney General claims it is impossible to restrict the scope of Calvin's medication requirement because in the absence of a probation report, the record contains "insufficient information about [Calvin's] medical disorders that require medication." As the Attorney General points out, it was Calvin's mother, rather than a doctor, who informed the court he had been diagnosed with Asperger's and ADHD, and that he suffered from oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) and low impulse control. And it was Calvin himself who reported the medications he was taking, and the symptoms they addressed. Thus, the Attorney General argues "it is not clear what conditions his medications were addressing," and "there was no medical evaluation of the effect of [Calvin's] ADHD, low impulse control, ODD and Asperger's syndrome on his behavior."
While that may be true, we cannot see how it helps the Attorney General's position. To the contrary, the lack of sufficient medical evidence connecting Calvin's known conditions to his misbehavior would seemingly support an argument striking the medication condition entirely, rather than maintaining it in as broad a form as possible, as the Attorney General seems to be suggesting. We therefore reject that suggestion.
And finally, we agree with Calvin that the medication condition should be modified to reflect he would not be in violation if he ceases taking a prescribed medication based on medical necessity, provided he promptly consults with his physician to obtain a modification of his prescription regimen. This is the expectation explicitly stated by the juvenile court during the hearing—"If it is causing an adverse [e]ffect, making him sick or making him mentally hallucinating or something, then the court would order that he be permitted to contact his doctor and say, hey, it's not working, I need something else"—and it should be made explicit in the order as well.
DISPOSITION
The condition of probation requiring Calvin to take medication is modified to state: "Minor is to take medications as prescribed by his doctors for treatment of problems associated with ADHD or Asperger's syndrome unless a medical necessity prevents him from doing so. If a medical necessity prevents the minor from taking those prescribed medications, he must promptly consult with his physician to obtain a modification of his prescription regimen, and comply with that modified regimen."
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
THOMPSON, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. IKOLA, J.