People v. Sosa

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Gonzalez

    2016 Ill. App. 2d 150714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    ¶ 77 In contrast, courts have held that inflammatory, undisclosed statements made on the witness stand before juries did not warrant mistrials, i.e., did not constitute manifest necessity. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 134-36 (1986) (the defendant was charged with murder, and a witness testified before the jury that the defendant placed a pillow over a shotgun muzzle and said "this is what Jews and Italians do when they want to snuff somebody out"; motion for mistrial denied and later affirmed, with the court noting that the undisclosed statement did not have a bearing on the defendant's guilt, and the court can usually correct any error by sustaining an objection and instructing the jury to disregard the improper remark); People v. Sosa, 195 Ill. App. 3d 828, 831, 833-35 (1990) (arresting officer testified that, when he handcuffed the defendant, "he told me [he] would have shot me if he had his chance"; the trial court denied the request for mistrial, instead striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard it; the appellate court affirmed, noting, in part, that the statement did not, by itself, relate to the defendant's guilt and that, for a discovery violation, "declaring a mistrial is a drastic sanction, and the court can, by sustaining an objection and instructing the jury to disregard an improper remark, usually correct any error"); People v. Loggins, 134 Ill. App. 3d 684, 691 (1985) (State's police officer witness testified that the defendant saw the officers and said "Come in and get me, fuckers"; the State never disclosed the statement, and defendant's motion for mistrial was denied; the appellate court affirmed because the requested sanction, mistrial, was disproportionate to the violation and because the defendant "made no showing as to

  2. People v. Mompier

    276 Ill. App. 3d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    Bail deposits are not presumptively the defendant's, for example, for purposes of paying attorney fees. People v. Wood (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 414, 414 N.E.2d 759; see also People v. Sosa (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 828, 552 N.E.2d 1298 (bond money posted by a third party should not be considered as one of the defendant's financial resources for purposes of determining the propriety of a fine). The Attorney General has provided no authority that a bond deposit is presumed to belong to a defendant for purposes of paying a tax assessment.

  3. People v. Alduino

    260 Ill. App. 3d 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    (134 Ill.2d R. 415(g).) However, declaring a mistrial is a drastic sanction ( People v. Sosa (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 828, 834), and a new trial is not warranted unless the requested materials were "material" in a constitutional sense ( People v. Gutirrez (1990), 205 Ill. App.3d 231, 255). The correct sanction to be applied is left to the trial court's discretion, and the judgment of the trial judge is to be accorded great weight.

  4. People v. Bowen

    241 Ill. App. 3d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 87 times
    Holding that a victim's testimony should not be rejected "merely because she did not report the incident to the police immediately"

    Moreover, this was a bench trial, and a trial judge is presumed to know the law, and such presumption is rebutted only when the record affirmatively shows the contrary. People v. Sosa (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 828, 836, 552 N.E.2d 1298, 1303. C. Analysis

  5. People v. Gonzalez

    212 Ill. App. 3d 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 5 times

    Therefore, his conviction for aggravated battery provided the basis for imposing an extended-term sentence. Moreover, since a trial judge is presumed to know the law ( People v. Sosa (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 828, 552 N.E.2d 1298), we may properly conclude that when the trial court in the present case imposed an extended-term sentence it was relying on the aggravated battery conviction and not the robbery conviction. This resolution of the issue is in accord with the analysis in Tackett, and we conclude that because the prior felony of robbery was an element of the offense, no double enhancement occurred here.