Opinion
November 24, 1986
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Winick, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Based on the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, we are in agreement with the hearing court's determination that while the Miranda warnings issued to the defendant were legally deficient, his statements made subsequent to his arrest were spontaneous and thus admissible (see, People v Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289; People v Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139).
Moreover, the circumstantial evidence elicited at the trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v Lewis, 64 N.Y.2d 1111, 1112), was sufficient to permit the jury to draw the inference that the defendant had knowledge that the credit card which he possessed was stolen. On this point, we also note that the jury charge as a whole properly conveyed the principles regarding the permissive presumption of knowledge.
We find that the jewelry store clerk was properly permitted to testify as to the value, as reflected on the price tag, of the two gold chains that the defendant attempted to "purchase" with the stolen card. A proper foundation was laid as to her knowledge of the subject (see, People v Womble, 111 A.D.2d 283, citing State v Hammond, 6 Wn. App. 459, 493 P.2d 1249; People v Gross 51 A.D.2d 191, 195). Moreover, such evidence was sufficient to prove the value of the items (see, People v Irrizari, 5 N.Y.2d 142, 146).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.