Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04F07362
BUTZ, J.Following a court trial, defendant Allan Solis was convicted of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) On appeal, he contends there was not substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation. We disagree and shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2004, Ruby Pena’s mother found her dead in defendant’s apartment. She had been stabbed twice in the neck.
The relationship between Ruby and defendant
Defendant and Ruby met each other in 2000, when she was 12 years old and he was 15 years old. At first they were friends. Within about a year, they were dating each other. Over the years, Ruby and defendant were together “all the time.” Defendant moved into an apartment in the middle of 2004 and Ruby stayed with him there frequently. To friends, they seemed to have a “pretty good” relationship.
By July 2004, the relationship was starting to show signs of deterioration. They argued on the phone a lot. Defendant was having difficulty trusting Ruby and thought she was cheating on him. Defendant felt Ruby’s attitude towards him was changing. When he discussed this with her, she told him he was “trippin’.”
Defendant spoke with his friend Edward Sabala, Jr., about his concerns in his relationship with Ruby. Defendant was upset, but as they talked, he calmed down. Sabala reminded defendant that Ruby was young and had her own mind. He advised defendant to either accept Ruby as she was or eliminate the situation and leave her alone. He thought leaving her alone was defendant’s best option. When Sabala recommended defendant leave Ruby alone, defendant replied that Ruby was all he had and he loved her. Although Sabala never saw defendant get physical with Ruby, he was concerned that defendant might hit Ruby, end up in jail and lose his job. Sabala was concerned the situation might be building to a point defendant could not handle it, but he had never seen defendant get angry or physical with Ruby. Defendant told Sabala he was going to do what he could to make things better between himself and Ruby.
A month before the killing, defendant believed Ruby was talking to other men. He was upset by her conduct and felt it was disrespectful of him and their relationship.
About a week before the stabbing, defendant was asleep at the apartment. When he awoke, he heard Ruby’s voice and a male voice in the apartment. Defendant investigated and saw a man leaving through the sliding-glass door and stepping over the balcony of his apartment. Defendant chased the man, but could not find him. When he got back to the apartment, Ruby had left with her clothing.
Sabala testified this incident happened about a month before the murder. Defendant, however, clarified it was only a week before the murder.
The night before the murder, defendant and Ruby were talking on the telephone. He heard her end of the phone drop and what sounded like Ruby having sex with another man. Defendant heard the other man say something like, “This is fucked up” and Ruby responded, “Fuck him. He’s annoying.” At that point, defendant wanted to end the relationship with Ruby.
The day of the killing
On August 12, 2004, Ruby went to juvenile court with her mother, Patricia Castellano. They left court around 11:00 or 11:30 a.m. and went to a sandwich shop. They got sandwiches around 12:00 or 12:30. While they were driving, Ruby was on the phone with defendant. Castellano heard Ruby tell defendant she did not want to go to his apartment because he was “going to start acting stupid” or he was going to “act different.” Nonetheless, Ruby asked her mother to drop her off at defendant’s apartment. Castellano dropped Ruby off between 12:40 and 1:00 p.m.
At the time, Castellano did not know it was defendant’s apartment; she thought the apartment belonged to Ruby’s friend, Melissa.
Within five minutes of being dropped off, Ruby called her mother and asked to be picked up. Castellano returned to the apartment complex but Ruby was not outside and she did not know where in the complex Ruby was. She called Ruby’s cell phone a number of times, but got no answer. After waiting about five to 10 minutes, Castellano left. Ruby called her friend’s mother, Michelle R., at around 1:00 p.m. She was crying and sounded upset. Michelle could hear things being thrown around in the background.
At trial, Michelle R. denied making these statements to a police officer on the day of the murder.
Defendant stayed home from work on August 12, because he was overwhelmed with stress due to the increasing tension in his relationship with Ruby. He planned to go to Sabala’s house and again seek his advice. Instead, he and Ruby ended up talking on the phone and Ruby came to his apartment. Ruby came in and used the bathroom. When she came out, they started arguing. They argued for about 15 minutes. Then, the fighting turned physical.
Defendant testified that Ruby called him. Castellano did not indicate whether Ruby had placed or received the call she overheard Ruby having with defendant.
Defendant claimed Ruby got mad when he told her he was ending the relationship. She started swinging at him and scratching his face. Then, she grabbed a knife from the kitchen counter. He claimed, he was scared because he thought she was going to stab him. They wrestled for the knife, “both tryin’ to stab each other.” As they wrestled over the knife, they tripped on the air mattress and he stabbed Ruby in the neck. She was on her back both times she was stabbed in the neck.
From the time Ruby grabbed the knife to the time she was stabbed was about 20 seconds. Ruby was “coughing up” and defendant knew she was badly hurt. He grabbed a towel from the bathroom and put it on her neck, but she had stopped breathing. Defendant testified his finger was cut by the knife when they were wrestling. He also claimed he put the knife in the sink.
After the killing
Defendant did not call the police because he knew Ruby was dead and he was “freaked out” and very scared. Instead he went to his brother’s house, which was about a 10-minute walk from his apartment. He arrived there between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Defendant appeared scared and nervous to his sister-in-law, Roxanne Galmadez. She did not see a knife and he did not appear to have any blood on his clothing. Defendant asked Galmadez to give him a ride because some guys were chasing him. She agreed to give him a ride, and told him to sit in the third row of seats of her van.
Defendant then went to Sabala’s grandmother’s house. Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. Sabala returned and found defendant in the back yard. Defendant seemed nervous and shaken up. Because defendant seemed so nervous, Sabala asked him what was wrong. Defendant replied, “I fucked up, man. I fucked up.” Sabala asked what happened and defendant told him, “I stabbed Ruby.” Defendant told Sabala he had stabbed Ruby in the neck and she had been choking on her blood. Sabala noticed scratches on defendant’s right cheek and that he had something wrapped around his finger. Defendant told him that he cut his finger near the fingertip when he grabbed the knife from his pocket. Sabala did not see any blood on defendant.
At trial defendant denied ever having a knife in his pocket.
Sabala asked if Ruby was all right and if they could go check on her. Defendant told him it was too late, she was already dead. Sabala asked what had happened and defendant told him “they were arguin’ and he flashed. He blacked out.” Sabala told defendant to leave. Sabala thought there was a chance Ruby might still be alive, so he called his girlfriend to try to get help to Ruby.
Around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. one of Ruby’s friends, Monica, called Castellano. Monica told Castellano she thought defendant had hurt Ruby and left her to bleed. Monica also called her own mother, Michelle R., and asked her to check on Ruby. Castellano went back to the apartment complex, where she met Michelle. Michelle told Castellano she needed to get into defendant’s apartment because she needed to help Ruby. Castellano asked Michelle to take her to defendant’s apartment. Castellano called Ruby’s phone. She could hear it ringing in the apartment, but no one answered the phone and no one answered the door. Castellano and Michelle’s grandsons broke down the door to defendant’s apartment.
Castellano went into the apartment and saw Ruby. She was on an air mattress, covered by a comforter and a pillow. She was lying on her back, with her hands up, looking straight up. Castellano threw everything off Ruby and tried to “scoop Ruby up” under her back and legs. She could not lift Ruby, so she put her back down. The firefighters arrived and removed Castellano from the scene. They told her she was “messing up” the evidence at the scene.
A few days after the murder, defendant called Sabala. He threatened to commit suicide. Sabala counseled him to turn himself in. On August 16, 2004, defendant followed Sabala’s advice and turned himself in to police.
Sacramento Police Detective Eric Schneider arrived at the scene at 7:05 p.m. on August 12, 2004. The door frame of the front door to the apartment was splintered from the family kicking in the door. The air mattress was in the dining room area of the apartment, just a few steps away from the kitchen. Near the air mattress, officers found a comforter and a blood-soaked pillow and towel. The air mattress was also soaked with blood. There were drops of blood in other locations in the apartment, but the majority was concentrated near the mattress. There were heavy drops of blood on Ruby’s arm. There was an apparent drop of blood in the kitchen sink. In the bathroom, there was an apparent drop of blood on a toilet paper roll and near a cap.
The door frame to the bathroom was also damaged. Although there was no indication of how long the bathroom door had been damaged, it appeared the damage was old damage, unlike the front door’s recent damage. Ruby’s purse and uneaten sandwich were in the bathroom.
Dr. Elizabeth Albers, a forensic pathologist for the Sacramento County Coroner’s Office, arrived at the scene at approximately 11:00 p.m. on August 12. When she arrived, Ruby’s body was lying on her back on the mattress. Her hands were above her head and her elbows were flexed. She opined this was close to the position Ruby died in. There was a great deal of blood around Ruby’s head, hair and the area beneath her head and neck.
There were two stab wounds on either side of Ruby’s neck and some superficial puncture injuries to her face. The autopsy revealed Ruby had died from loss of blood from the two stab wounds on her neck, either of which alone would have been fatal. The injury on the right side of her neck went into her trachea. The injury on the left side of her neck cut the left carotid artery in half. Without medical attention, it would have taken only a few seconds or minutes for her to die. There were four stab or puncture-type wounds to the right side of her face and another puncture wound on the left side of her face. These injuries could have been consistent with being poked with a knife. There were no injuries to Ruby’s hands or forearms and no defensive injuries.
The knife that made the injuries was a doubled-edged knife. It could not be determined whether the knife was serrated or not. Although Ruby’s injuries could have been consistent with being stabbed with her hands pinned behind her head, Dr. Albers could not determine the position Ruby’s body was in when she sustained her injuries. If someone had tried to pick the body up and move it, it was possible for the body to have been in a different position when Ruby died than when she was examined. Dr. Albers could not determine the sequence in which the wounds were inflicted.
A day or two after the murder, Galmadez found a knife on the floor, in the last row of seats on the left-hand side of her van, between the body of the van and the seat. She had previously searched the van looking for her purse on August 11, and the knife was not there then. Defendant was the only person who had sat in that part of the van during that time frame.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was charged in count one with Ruby’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a further allegation that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He was charged in count two with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) of an unborn baby also with the allegation that he had personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Following a preliminary hearing, count two was dismissed on the People’s motion.
Defendant waived his right to a trial by jury on June 22, 2006. The court trial commenced on July 10, 2006, and the presentation of evidence concluded on July 13, 2006. The court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found the personal use allegation true. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, with an additional consecutive one year on the personal use enhancement.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation and, therefore, is not substantial evidence of first degree murder.
“Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of premeditated and deliberate murder involves consideration of the evidence presented and all logical inferences from that evidence in light of the legal definition of premeditation and deliberation . . . . Settled principles of appellate review require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in cases such as this where the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘Although it is the duty of the [fact-finder] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the [fact-finder], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.)
“Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “Our role is to determine the legal sufficiency of the found facts and not to second guess the reasoning and wisdom of the fact finder.” (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 946.)
We begin with the legal definitions of “premeditated” and “deliberate.” In the context of first degree murder, “‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand,’ and ‘deliberate’ means ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.’ [Citations.] The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.’” (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767 (Mayfield).) Premeditation and deliberation require more than the reflection necessary to form the specific intent to kill. (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26 (Anderson).) However, to establish this mental state, it is not “necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act.” (§ 189, 4th par.) “The act of planning--involving deliberation and premeditation--requires nothing more than a ‘successive thought of the mind.’” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658.)
In Anderson, the Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence that have been found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation: (1) facts showing planning activity; (2) facts suggesting motive; and (3) facts about the manner of killing which suggest a preconceived design. (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27) “[I]t is not necessary that the Anderson ‘factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight.’” (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 33.) These categories are intended to provide guidance for appellate review and are not prerequisites to establishing premeditation and deliberation. (Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 768.)
From the evidence presented, it was reasonable for the court to find premeditation and deliberation. Defendant stayed home from work because he was upset about his relationship with Ruby ending. He believed she was cheating on him. He apparently had some justification for those beliefs, as he had seen a man leaving his apartment, and the night before the murder he heard her having sex with another man. The day after he heard her having sex with another man, he invited her to his apartment. Within five minutes of being there, she was upset and called her mother to pick her up. Five or 10 minutes later, Ruby called her friend’s mother, Michelle, crying and saying she wanted to leave. Michelle could hear things being thrown around the apartment. Defendant either armed himself with a steak knife prior to her arrival or went to the kitchen to get a knife during their argument. He stabbed her twice on opposite sides of her neck, while she was lying on her back. Thus, as detailed below, there is evidence that supports findings in each of the Anderson factors. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471.)
There is substantial evidence of premeditation as related to the motive for the killing, jealousy. Defendant’s jealousy and suspicions had been increasing over time. He was worried Ruby was cheating on him and was quite upset about the possibility. He discussed this issue repeatedly with Sabala. Defendant and Ruby had been arguing a lot. Sabala was concerned the stress of the relationship was building to a point that defendant would not be able to handle it and would become violent towards Ruby. A month before the murder, defendant believed she was talking with other guys. A week before the murder, defendant came home to find Ruby there with another man. He “couldn’t believe that she brought somebody in the apartment.” The night before the murder, during a phone conversation with Ruby, defendant heard her having sex with another man and telling that man defendant was annoying. Defendant felt Ruby’s behavior was disrespectful of him. The day of the murder, he was “overwhelmed with stress” and just “didn’t want to go through it” any more. That day defendant and Ruby argued again about his belief she was cheating on him. Evidence of jealousy and discord within a relationship establishes a motive and supports an inference of premeditation. (See People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1613; People v. Martinez (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 364, 371-372.)
There is also substantial evidence of planning. Defendant stayed home from work on August 12. He asked Ruby to come over to his apartment. In rejecting defendant’s claim of self-defense, the court necessarily rejected defendant’s claim that Ruby was the aggressor and came at him with the knife. Thus, defendant either put the knife in his pocket before Ruby arrived at the apartment or went to the kitchen to get a knife at some point during their argument. Either action represented a conscious decision to arm himself and constitutes planning. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 547.)
It is a reasonable inference from Ruby’s comments on the phone that she did not want to come over, that defendant had asked her to come over, rather than it having been her idea as defendant claimed.
Although the particular knife was not presented in evidence, defendant acknowledged the knife came from his kitchen.
Lastly, the manner of the killing also supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Ruby sustained multiple stab wounds. “[T]he brutality of a killing cannot in itself support a finding that the killer acted with premeditation and deliberation. ‘If the evidence showed no more than the infliction of multiple acts of violence on the victim, it would not be sufficient to show that the killing was the result of careful thought and weighing of considerations.’” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 24-25.) However, “[a] violent and bloody death sustained as a result of multiple stab wounds can be consistent with a finding of premeditation.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247; see also Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) Here, Ruby was stabbed seven times. The two fatal wounds were inflicted while she was lying on her back. The wounds were on both the right and left side of her face and neck. She had no defensive wounds. From this evidence, it was not unreasonable to infer defendant pinned Ruby down or otherwise rendered her helpless before he began stabbing her. (Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 247-248.) From the placement of the wounds, it was not unreasonable to infer that Ruby’s death “was calculated and was not the product of an unconsidered explosion of violence.” (Id. at p. 248.)
We recognize there are other reasonable inferences that could have been drawn from the evidence in this case. However, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, our task is not to determine whether the trier of fact reasonably could have reached a different conclusion with regard to defendant’s intent. Rather, we consider only whether sufficient evidence supports the finding made. Here, there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to reasonably find premeditation and deliberation in the killing of Ruby Pena.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.