Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. We find no basis upon which to disturb the determination of the hearing court which credited the arresting officer's version of the events, as against the defendant's claim that the traffic infraction was a pretext to investigate and to search his car (see, People v Artis, 201 A.D.2d 488; People v Culpepper, 188 A.D.2d 543; People v Pincus, 184 A.D.2d 666; People v Solano, 179 A.D.2d 791; People v Torres, 175 A.D.2d 191; see also, People v Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v Rosa, 179 A.D.2d 538; People v Fabian, 178 A.D.2d 544, 545; cf., People v Alexander, 189 A.D.2d 189). Rosenblatt, J.P., Lawrence, Joy and Krausman, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. Officer Edward Chorba testified that he stopped the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger because he recognized its distinctive vanity license plates and knew the operator had been issued a summons for driving with a suspended license approximately one week earlier. Under the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was operating the vehicle in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (cf., People v Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413). There is no basis for concluding, as the defendant argues, that the officers stopped the vehicle for the suspected traffic violation as a mere pretext to investigate unrelated criminal activity (see, People v Pincus, 184 A.D.2d 666; People v Solano, 179 A.D.2d 791; People v Williams, 137 A.D.2d 569). The record also supports the suppression court's finding that one of the police officers observed what appeared to be the handle of a gun protruding from the rear pocket of the defendant's pants after he had exited the car. This justified the pat-down of the defendant and the recovery of the gun and drugs from his person (see, People v Rose, 159 A.D.2d 600). Accordingly, the motion to suppress the physical evidence was properly denied.
The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicates that there was a sufficient basis for stopping the vehicle which the defendant was driving because (1) the officers reasonably believed that the defendant might be intoxicated, as evidenced by his weaving over the double yellow line, and (2) the defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by failing to use his signal and rolling through a stop sign. Therefore, there is no basis for concluding, as the defendant argues, that the officers stopped the vehicle for traffic violations as a mere pretext to investigate unrelated criminal activity (see, People v. Solano, 179 A.D.2d 791; People v. Rose, 159 A.D.2d 600; People v Francois, 155 A.D.2d 685, 686; People v. Williams, 137 A.D.2d 569, 570; People v. Gooden, 111 A.D.2d 871, 872). While asking for the defendant's license and registration, one of the officers observed the defendant attempting to hide a brown bag by pushing it under the seat.
The specificity and congruity between the information provided by the anonymous tip and the circumstances actually encountered authorized the police to approach the parked vehicle to inquire (see, People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181; People v Russ, 61 N.Y.2d 693, 694-695; People v. Batash, 163 A.D.2d 399, 400; People v. Hawkins, 161 A.D.2d 802, 803). In any event, it was clearly within the police officers' authority to approach an illegally parked vehicle so as to enforce the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see, People v. Solano, 179 A.D.2d 791; Vehicle and Traffic Law ยง 401). Since the police officers peered into the vehicle from a lawful vantage point, they were justified in seizing contraband which came into their plain view (see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446; People v Manganaro, 176 A.D.2d 354; People v. Baldanza, 138 A.D.2d 722, 723).